Sunday, 1 January 2017

MH17: B777 mistaken for SU-25 but debunked

Imagine the SU-25 is at 2 km (just around the 2 km under boundary of Rostov radar) and MH17 is at 10 km.

 Prosto Tak // October 21, 2015 at 9:44 pm // Reply

> I am sure SU-25 played a role in this disaster.
Russian primary radar does not cover anything flying below 2000 meters near SnizhneWhy would Russia release this information?
However, what role could a Ukrainian ground attack plane flying below 2000 m (if it indeed was there, which is a sheer speculation) have in the disaster that took place at the same moment at more than 10000 m?

Don’t forget that a) Russia did not see any Ukrainian planes at all, at least higher than at 2000 meters, and b) an imaginary Ukrainian plane would have had absolutely no capability to strike a target at such a distance.

 Antidyatel // February 14, 2016 at 10:39 am //

The redirection of the semi-active missile actually the plausible explanation of the only eye witness report with name of the witness attached to it. I remember that he claimed to see su-24 going at low altitude and then suddenly going straight up. Hence, both SU24 and hit by Buk missile can be part of the story and make sense of why Russian MOD even talked about Su24

This is the situation without SU-25:

Coordinates of detonation: 48.12 N 38.52 E (North of Shakhtarsk')

Report MH17 crash:

In autonomous mode the accuracy of BUK-TELAR in which it confuses two planes is 180 m.

The TELAR in autonomous mode is more accurate than when connected by a Command Post/TAR. In autonomous mode the accuracy is 180 m. This means the TELAR radar can distinguish unique targets when they are 180 meters apart. When targets are closer there is a risk the wrong target is destroyed.

This is the situation without SU-25:

(All numbers are approximated)

And this is the situation with the SU-25. It was about 5 km from the BUK. After missing the SU-25 the missile had for 15 sec burn time left to reach MH17. This included a heavy climb and I fear the missile did not have enough power to reach MH17:

If the target is near, the missile approaches from below and in front and explodes just as it crosses above and in front of the target. If the target is more distant and well beyond the limit of thrust propulsion, the missile rises above the target and then glides on a quasi-ballistic trajectory from above down and in front of its target where it again intercepts it.

yep, little strange.
If they had been doing targeting practice and accidentally launched, the warhead detonates immediately when they turn of the guidance. So even if fired accidentally, hard to image accidentally not to shut down.

It is 24.3 km from Snizhne to last FDR point[BD: Flight Data Recorder].
With MH17 at 10 km altitude, that means a minimum flight path of 26.3 km.

9M38M1 has a reported range of 35 kmthis means MH17 was well within the range.
However, if the burn time of a 9M38M1 is only 20 sec as AD suggests, at then this missile will travel only 17 km on its own power, and would have to “glide” the remaining 10 km (in the case of MH17) and even 18 km of glide to reach its reported range of 35 km.
That does not add up.
So either the burn time of a 9M38M1 is longer than 20 sec (closer to the 35 sec suggested in that video) or MH17 was not shot down by a 9M38M1.

 Basic Dimension // April 30, 2016 at 11:04 am //


[If your point is MH17 wasn’t shot down by a SU-25, I agree, this is highly unlikely. However Hugh Eavan is making a different point: Was there a Ukrainian fighter that might have been the original target?
According to Westerbeke the most plausible scenario is that the passenger plane was accidentally shot down because it was mistaken for another, as yet unknown target.]

Russians knew there was a war in Donetsk, where SU-25’s flew below 5 km. They were able to see from 2 km to 5 km and Donetsk was nearby. Nobody beliefs they laid the threshold at 5 km for Donetsk. Nobody beliefs in this war situation Russia threw away their data. We simply must conclude Russians know perfectly all military movements in Donetsk between 2 and 5 km at July 17, 2014.

We have to conclude only fighter aircraft below 2 km were not discovered by the Russians. Then we take the earlier calculations of Rob to conclude the SU-25 falls from the Sky if ‘hiding’ before the slow and far away flying MH17. Then we calculate the chance the crazy dancing SU-25 – with radial speed – can be on the same point of the BUK radar for just one moment in time. This chance is nil. So they cannot have confused a SU-25 with the MH17.

Then and last but not least, if the SU-25 is below 2 km it must have been in the neighbourhood of the BUK at the time of the launch. Otherwise there cannot be a straight line to the MH17. But targeting this SU-25 only takes 7 seconds for the experienced crew of the BUK, not 27 seconds. So they deliberately shot down a plane at 10km altitude.

Yes ‘the passenger plane was accidentally shot down because it was mistaken for another, as yet unknown target’. But this never can be a SU-25, but it might be an IL76 which the separatists could not verify with their own possibilities. Hence, they were misinformed by the Ukrainians, or the MH17 has been shot down by the Ukrainians, the most promising scenario until now, discarding albert_lex conclusions.

Including albert_lex conclusions partly, MH17 must be downed by the Russians by squares (8x8x6 mm), but it is to early for this crazy scenario.

Rob // August 29, 2015 at 7:03 am // Reply

Now that it is clear that MH17 was not shot down by any (Ukrainian) fighter jet, this scenario (where the BUK fires a missile at a jet that flies below the radar and in between the BUK and MH17) is the ONLY scenario left over where a (Ukrainian) fighter plane may have been involved.

That sole remaining scenario is where then the BUK fired a missile at a fighter at low altitude, which then missed, and then by being in the radar beam, found MH17 as a new target, I’d like to discuss that scenario.
First of all, we also determined that the Ust-Donetsk ATC radar can see targets flying as low as 1500-2000 meter over the target area in Eastern Ukraine.

Which means that in the scenario you present here, the Ukrainian jet must have been flying below that radar detection limit (1500 meters to be sure) to NOT show up on the Russian Defense Ministry’s radar images presented on July 21.

Next, for this scenario to work, the missile must lock onto MH17 after it lost its lock on the jet.
I’m not sure if that is even possible with a BUK radar lock system, but assuming it is, both planes would AT LEAST have to stay in the radar beam for the duration of the flight of the missile. Otherwise the radar would no longer illuminate MH17, which would make a downing impossible.

To stay in the radar beam for the duration of the missile flight, the jet would have to be moving along the same azimuth angle as MH17, and at a velocity that is proportional to the altitude difference between the two planes. That altitude difference is 1500/10000 = 0.15, so the velocity of the jet would have to be 250(velocity of MH17)*0.15 =37.5 m/sec. That is 135 km/hour.
Can a SU25 stay aloft at 135 km/hours ?

And not to mention that the missile would reach the jet (at 1500 meters altitude and 25*0.15=3.75 km distance) at about 0.15*30=4.5 sec.
Which means that the BUK crew has 25 sec to figure out that the jet was not downed, and thus they should switch off the radar or force the missile to self-destruct. Pretty slim line of events to make that scenario happen….

 Andrew // July 15, 2015 at 11:32 pm // Reply
“That does not add up.”
The Admin has previously posted articles discussing the operation of BUK-M1 which includes flight paths of its missiles fired at various targets at various elevations from various distances.
If the target is near, the missile approaches from below and in front and explodes just as it crosses above and in front of the target. If the target is more distant and well beyond the limit of thrust propulsion, the missile rises above the target and then glides on a quasi-ballistic trajectory from above down and in front of its target where it again intercepts it.
This was also part of the presentation of Almaz Antey in explaining the pitch of the missile and thus the pitch of its warhead annulus as it exploded changed based on the distance to target and could help determine the launch location if the location and elevation for the termination of flight were known.

      You also missed maybe the most likely scenario: The Buk was Ukranian, it was captured by the separatists in June 2014 and, contrary to what the Ukrainians said, not beyond repair. You have three possibilities. First the plane was deliberately brought down, but you are right, unless they are completely crazy, they have motive. Second, they thought it was military plane. Third, there was a military plane. The Buk was locked on to a military plane, but lost its lock after evasive maneuvers (loosing the lock is the whole point of these maneuvers. so I don’t agree with you) and locked on to a different target MH17. You mentioned the downing of Tu 154. After this incident, exercises with Buks where on a hold for seven years. You should also consider a Buk m1 is not a state of the art weapon, and it is not certain that all systems are functioning properly. A modern warplane is far from without a chance against a Buk m1.

      Now we proceed:

      If we take arc degrees it might be SU-25 and MH17 have about the same coordinates in the air. But this means the crew first aimed at SU-25, nearer to the BUK, and then jumped over for the last 8 km (in altitude) to MH17. But it might be more than (26.3 - 5 =) 21.3 km with 15 seconds burn time straight up. 
      [Or from the south of Snizhne 26.3 + 6 = 32.6 and (32.6 - 5 =) 27.6.]
      On the other hand MH17 came nearer.  
      What are the odds for this scenario?

      What is the total likelihood of this combined event? First the crew might have observed two points on the radar of the BUK. Remember they at least had a one-year course and were able to detect multiple aircraft. Now they definitely would not have shot on that SU-25 in this civil airspace.

      Only if MH17 and SU-25 flew at exactly the same spot on the radar to start with – and this only for a very short time – this could be the legitimate beginning of an ‘accidental disaster’.

      But think about this extremely rare event of flying together of a nearby fast and capricious SU-25 at 2 km and a steady tracking passenger plane at 10 km. Also think of the low number of flying objects in the sky at that moment. But theoretically it might be possible.

      Consequently, while aiming the radar on the SU-25 for a number of seconds, both airplanes would diverge in the air. If not, the SU-25 was shot down first, since it became a bigger and bigger object. If they diverged the crew would have to choose one of the planes to follow. But also possible is the SU-25 followed its course after escaping the BUK, this without change visible for the crew.

      They really would be so crazy as to aim at one of the 'split planes' if they realized one of them had to be a civilian aircraft? This is not about 180 meter precision but about continuing aiming as a form of Russian roulette. But maybe planes did not split visibly on the radar.

      But then!!!

      From SU-25 to MH17 is 8 km in altitude and 21.3 km (27.6 km) in distance. It would be remarkable if the crew did not notice the extreme time needed to catch the SU-25. They knew the SU-25 flew right over them. Not more than 5 seconds were needed aiming the radar of the BUK. Pointing for 25 seconds meant it had to be another aircraft. So MH17 was shot intentional.

      MH17: B777 mistaken for SU-25 but debunked
      MH17: BUK-TAR scenario downing MH17

      This total chance if not intended must be minimal:

      A Dutch military intelligence service report states they did not have any information on the presence of a Russian BUK in Eastern Ukraine at July 17. (source)

      MIVD: Military Information and Security Service.

      [Following information of the MIVD the Ukrainian Air Force had older BUK-systems in Eastern Ukraine.]
      [CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7] Twitter Pieter Omtzigt.]

      [Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]

      Now, only for the moment I take the witness statements as factual for the presence of SU-25s during the shooting down of MH17. I would like to present another unproven scenario. It is not my favorite, but it involves SU-25s and avoids all shortcomings of the previous scenario:

      Step 1: Ukraine wanted to shoot down a civil airliner as a false flag.

      Step 2: They first sent a number of SU-25s to Southeast Donetsk and then they let their BUK shoot down a passenger aircraft, as if the separatists aimed on the SU-25s.

      It is a heavy accusation but I only mean it fits the scenario better.


      Semi-active radar homing (SARH) is a common type of missile guidance system, perhaps the most common type for longer-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missile systems. The name refers to the fact that the missile itself is only a passive detector of a radar signal – provided by an external (“offboard”) source — as it reflects off the target[1][2](in contrast to active radar homing, which uses an active radar: transceiver). Semi-active missile systems use bistatic continuous-wave radar.


      Remote Control Guidance: The guidance computer is on the launcher. The target tracker is also placed on the launching platform.


      Homing Guidance: The guidance computers are in the missile and in the target tracker.

      a) Radar homing

      - ACTIVE HOMING uses a radar system on the missile to provide a guidance signal. Typically electronics in the missile keep the radar pointed directly at the target, and the missile then looks at this "angle" of its own centerline to guide itself. [The 9М38M1 missile uses active homing when approaching the goal.]
      - SEMI-ACTIVE HOMING  systems combine a passive radar receiver on the missile with a separate targeting radar that "illuminates" the target. Since the missile is typically being launched after the target was detected using a powerful radar system, it makes sense to use that same radar system to track the target.
      -PASSIVE HOMING is infrared homing that homes in on the heat generated by the target. Typically used in the anti-aircraft role to track the heat of jet engines.

      b) Proportional navigation 

      Proportional homing is used in some form or another by most homing air target missiles. It is based on the fact that two vehicles are on a collision course when their direct Line-of-Sight does not change direction as the range closes. No radar is used but other means.


      In general, the system identifies potential targets (radar), selects a particular target (command), fires a missile (launcher) at the target, and resupplies the system (logistics). The missiles require a radar lock to initially steer the missile to the target until the missile's on-board radar system takes over to provide final course corrections. A proximity fuse aboard the missile determines when it will detonate, creating an expanding fragmentation pattern of missile components and warhead to intercept and destroy the target. A proximity fuse improves the "probability of kill" given the missile and target closure rates, which can be more than 3,000 km/h (1,900 mph) (or more than 900 m/s (3,000 ft/s)).


       Basic Dimension // February 12, 2016 at 4:03 pm // Reply

       [In the forward compartment of the BUK-missile, a semi-active homing radar head (9E50, Russian9Э50, 9Э50М1), autopilot equipment, power source and warhead are located. The homing method chosen was proportional navigation.]
      BUK-missiles use semi-active homing in which there is a passive radar receiver in the missile and active radar in the BUK-TELAR, steering the missile to the target. 
      But elsewhere also the 9М38M1 missile uses active homing when approaching the goal. This is active homing not by radar but by other means. It is proportional navigation phase based on the fact that two vehicles are on a collision course when their direct Line-of-Sight does not change direction as the range closes. Proportional navigation is the anticipation of the course of the target by timely adjustment of the direction of the missile.  
      The missile first has an inactive phase of vertical acceleration, then an active phase of radar guidance by BUK-TELAR or BUK-TAR (Snowdrift) and in the neighbourhood of the target is would use proportional navigation. Since the proximity fuse is still fed by the radar it must be both systems are working together till the end.  
      Remember in our former scenario the BUK missile with semi-active radar homing lost the SU-25 at 2 km and continued its way to MH17 at 10 km. Our assumption was an experienced crew would have been shocked by perceiving another plane hiding behind the alleged SU-25. Knowing it must be a civilian plane on much higher altitude they definitely would have stopped aiming the radar at MH17.

      Also remember missiles accidentally program to the next plane in hiding only with active radar homing, which old BUK missiles do not have. These modern missiles lock in on the next target, which they do not perceive as different. But this only happens after a miraculous escape maneuver of SU-25, which until now was the biggest object. Then the advanced missile locks in on MH17.

      But with semi-active radar homing purely it is a matter of good luck in a shot gun approach to impact on MH17 within several meters, after first blindly bridging 8 km through the air. Remember MH17 meanwhile was in a very different place in the air. This probability must be about zero.

      What means MH17 definitely must have been aimed at intentionally by the crew of the BUK all the time. IMO I have proven MH17 has been shot down intentionally (Q.E.D.)

      Now, what is the product rule of independent chances for a crew of a separatist BUK, which intentionally would shoot down a passenger airliner, times the chance Ukrainian SU-25 are in the air? This chance is zero because they definitely would not aim at MH17 after losing the SU-25. 

      Secondly, what is the product rule of independent chances for a crew of a separatist BUK, which INTENTIONALLY wanted to shoot down a passenger airliner, times the chance Ukrainian SU-25 were in the air? Then separatists would try to blame the Ukrainians of shooting down MH17 with machine gun fire. This would be a much bigger chance because of a covariate, but the problem is, we already concluded separatists did not have a motive to shoot down an airliner. So this scenario definitely must be zero.

      Thirdly, what is the chance the crew of a Ukrainian BUK would shoot down a passenger aircraft times the chance Ukrainian SU-25s were in the air? Now we have the intention (the motive) of Ukraine as covariate which makes intentional aiming possible. This would be a dependent chance with high probability.

       Liane Theuer // February 16, 2016 at 9:31 pm // Reply
      1) U.S. intelligence
      There was never an offical Intelligence Assessment on MH17 – the mechanism used in the past to present significant findings.
      The “Government Assessment” supported the contention that the likely perpetrators were separatists. Like Kerry’s presentations on the Sunday talk shows of July 20, 2014 : “We picked up the imagery of this launch.  We know the trajectory. We know where it came from. We know the timing. And it was exactly at the time that this aircraft disappeared from the radar.”
      On July 20/2014 Robert Parry has reported on the statement of an anonymous source :
      „U.S. intelligence agencies do have detailed satellite images of the likely missile battery that launched the fateful missile, but the battery appears to have been under the control of Ukrainian government troops dressed in what look like Ukrainian uniforms.The source said CIA analysts were still not ruling out the possibility that the troops were actually eastern Ukrainian rebels in similar uniforms but the initial assessment was that the troops were Ukrainian soldiers. There also was the suggestion that the soldiers involved were undisciplined and possibly drunk, since the imagery showed what looked like beer bottles scattered around the site.“
      On June 2015 Parry said :
      “… after I reported on the growing doubts within the U.S. intelligence community about whether the Russians and the rebels were indeed responsible – the Obama administration went silent.
      This strange behavior reinforces the suspicion that the U.S. government possesses information that contradicts its initial rush to judgment, but senior officials don’t want to correct the record because to do so would embarrass them and weaken the value of the tragedy as a propaganda club to pound the Russians.”
      On October 13/2015 Parry said :
      “Last year, another source briefed by U.S. intelligence analysts told me they had concluded that a rogue element of the Ukrainian government – tied to one of the oligarchs – was responsible for the shoot-down, while absolving senior Ukrainian leaders including President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. But I wasn’t able to determine if this U.S. analysis was a consensus or a dissident opinion.
      CIA analysts had met with Dutch investigators to describe what the classified U.S. evidence showed but apparently with the caveat that it must remain secret.”

      This is the easiest way to be able to maintain a certain narrative.

      So, what do we know through U.S. intelligence sources :
      The culprits were „troops dressed in what look like Ukrainian uniforms“ or „eastern Ukrainian rebels in similar uniforms“ or „a rogue element of the Ukrainian government – tied to one of the oligarchs“. No evidence the BUK came from Russia.

      Basic Dimension | 18-04-16 | 02:29
      Je huidige link werkt niet. Die afbeelding zag ik al, maar er zit een klein probleempje in die theorie. Volgens mij bedoel je deze:

      Een toestel wat zes keer zo dichtbij is, levert vanuit de kwadraten wet al zes keer zoveel reflectie. Erger nog, omdat voor een reflectie deze afstand heen en terug werkt, is de SU25 uit dat plaatje 12 keer zo dichtbij, en dus 144 keer zo zichtbaar. De SU25 is nu niet echt een toestel met grandioze anti radar eigenschappen. Ondanks dat de MH17 een veel groter toestel is, verwacht ik dat de SU25 dichterbij genoeg is om er zinloze ruis van te maken.

      Dan heb je nog een ander puntje, dat de radar in de BUK zelf filtert, en alleen kijkt naar nabije toestellen. De puls van het toestel op 25 kilometer extra afstand komt te laat terug en wordt hopelijk genegeerd. In de vorige alinea gaf ik al aan waarom ik verwacht dat die ook nog eens te zwak is.

      Exacte specs weten we natuurlijk niet, maar iedere SAM heeft echt geleiding nodig van de grondradar totdat het doel binnen enkele kilometer is. Puur omdat de radar in deze raket te klein is. Te weinig oppervlak om een puls weg te sturen die vooral gericht naar voren gaat, en te weinig oppervlak om genoeg van de terugkerende puls te ontvangen om een zinvolle meting te doen. Feynman | 18-04-16 | 02:45

      Antidyatel // May 4, 2016 at 11:42 am // Reply

      Here is one of the systems that confuses semi-active missiles

      “The modulated reemission simultaneously with the echo signal from the helicopter results in the
      wave front distortion, recognized by the antenna systems of the hostile RESs, which exerts an integrated effect on angle, range and velocity (Doppler)measuring instruments and tracking systems of the hostile RESs. This effect shows itself in the form of stable false targets (marks) spaced at a considerable distance in range, Doppler, azimuth and elevation from the true position data of the
      object under protection. ”
      The resident “expert” on buk systems Eugene, is not aware of developments in last decade, but it doesn’t mean that his literal frequencies are something magical. There are systems, and Israel one that I’ve seen at recent airshow, that can redirect SAM to a distant target – false or real. Hence, there is a full possibility of Ukrainian aircraft flying in the shadow of MH17 to climb up immediately after launch is detected, and then use such system for redirecting buk missile at mh17. This scenario can explain all the strange and contradicting claims from Russian, USA and Ukrainian sides. Meaning that there was ukr aircraft, rebels had a buk and launched the missile. Both are on satellite and radar data of USA and Russia.


      ‘Flying in the shadow of airliners’ full with arms to the war zone does not make a SU-25 fly fast and high. Hence, SU-25s must have flown far below the airliners. Maximal at 5 km alt and with lower speed. Then if the separatists of Elena Kolenkina shot a kind of Pantsir and that SU-25 dived, there might be an unknown possibility of targeting the passenger plane at 10 km altitude.
      But in your scenario I thought more about an IL-76 flying on the same track as the MH17 at 10 km alt. And it was this IL-76 which had the technical equipment you meant.

      I do not believe the crew of the BUK would be so stupid to launch a BUK to two blips, nearly together on their autonomous radar, knowing nothing about the identity of that second plane. That’s why Elena said they could not target that SU-25 and rightly so.

      But it could be possible Elena unwittingly brought the Ukrainians an idea. They would send some SU-25s as a false flag to accuse the separatists and meanwhile shot down the MH17. And the blips on the autonomous radar would be far apart.

      And here lies the compromise with what you might mean. It is not an IL-76 but a SU-25 flying at 5 km alt and far below the MH17, waiting for the launch of a BUK.

      And now the Ukrainians has the scenario in their hands. Separatists would not target two blips together. But there was no need for the SU-25 to hide below the MH17. The passenger plane only had to be accessible for the BUK within 22 to 35 km. So the blips could fall far apart. And now we’re getting somewhere.
      If the crew of BUK-TELAR somehow could be tempted to launch a BUK, then it might be technically possible the SU-25 diverted the missile from itself to the MH17.
      This would make a bow around the SU-25 to the MH17. At the same time the SU-25 would make a preprogrammed escape maneuver to the other side.
      This might be a very interesting scenario, for now the Ukrainians did not need to launch a BUK to the MH17 by themselves. And the separatists could not stop or let explode the BUK because they were sabotaged. This is a new and progressive view on the situation. Thank you Antidyatel :)

      Antidyatel // May 6, 2016 at 12:41 am //
      It seems that system for diverting missiles requires to be in front of the missile so that it can send signal into the seeker. So your drawing might be impossible. That is why I was suggesting that su25 or another Ukrainian jet were flying in the shadow of mh17 well below it, so that on buk-telar radar they will be clearly separated as 2 blips. The moment the launch is detected the jet goes vertically up and illuminates the seeker from vicinity (<1km) of mh17. For the radar recording of civilian radar shown by russian MOD with poor spatial resolution, there will still be only one blip. Another option is that there were 2 jets. One provoking the missile and another redirecting. There were witness accounts talking about 2 jets.
      In any case, technically it is possible. The question is how confident Ukrainians could be that such scenario will work without a hick up. Flying in the shadow of airliner drastically increases probability of success for such operation, and it directly points to intent. There is no other scenario when flying in the shadow makes any sense. That is why I hold to this idea.

      Basic Dimension // May 6, 2016 at 11:16 am //
      1: the missile aims at the SU-25 which flies below the MH17.
      2: The SU-25 drags the track upward and rises straight up to the MH17. It drags the missile to the MH17.
      [The moment the launch is detected the jet goes vertically up and illuminates the seeker from vicinity (<1km) of mh17.]
      3: A second jet redirects the seeker to the coordinates of MH17.

      Antidyatel // May 29, 2016 at 5:48 pm // Reply
      It is ecen simpler. According to Raetheon promotional video some of such systems totally simulate the target plane and do not require the host plane. Everything is fixed on wing missile
      Meaning that BUK crew was perfectly believing in flying in Su25, while it wa phantom even before the launch. So no even nerd for retargeting as such. Abd this is against modern systems, not prehistoric lonely BUKM1.
      We know that AWACS were flying around Romania. Just good for support of such operation. Range of Raetheon missiles is ~1000 km, just enough to pull this of.

      Antidyatel // May 29, 2016 at 6:03 pm //
      In any case, it is more or less confirmed that rebels had a BUK. video recorded by them on arrival to the scene indicates that till then they were sure that they have shot at SU25.
      We also know now with certainty that Ukrs were aware about the BUK in rebel territory. Not sure how many days byt there was a time to plan the false flag. Rebels aee aware that they shot the plane, Russians as well. They also know that the target was SU25. That is why the whole radar claim appeared. They new that something had to be there but could not figure what, within such short time. I wonder if they figured it a bit later and that caused John Kerry to be less vocal.

      Eugene // May 14, 2016 at 8:24 pm //
      It was an R27 missile (fragmentation based) shot likely from a Su-27, that was hovering at a medium altitude (~3km, above clouds but below reach of Russian radars) somewhere between Torez and Zaroschenske.
      There were Ukrainian Su-25’s in the area near crash, but they had nothing to do with the crash, they likely did not even know what’s was going on. The theories that the plane was shot by a Su25 gun were abandoned weeks after the crash by sensible researchers. It’s only people like you or solispassi keep mentioning it nowadays.
      Question for you? Russia would know that there are Ukrainian military radars capable of detecting a Buk launch, and still decided to shoot the airliner. You think this is plausible? Or is it more likely that Ukraine claims they switched off the radars because they don’t want to show recordings proving their planes were still flying?
      The density of the bowtie shaped holes on the Mh17 wreckage should be the same as the density in the AA test. Of 300+ documented holes on 777 there should be dozens of bowtie holes. There is not a single one.

      Logic Reason (@gsobjc) // May 29, 2016 at 3:52 pm // Reply

      “Retargeting” (launched at one target but acquired another target in fly) is unknown for Buk.

      Antidyatel // April 12, 2016 at 3:05 am // Reply
      Our original discussion was here
      You missed my reply.
      Your incorrect claims were:
      1) buk missile launched from one TELAR cannot be redirected by another TELAR or Kupol. Function of missile control with “foreign illumination” is one of BUK’s integral features
      2) you claimed that proximity fuse relies on signal from TELAR for detonation, which is false. Which is not true.
      3) if you read about the time for feequency hopping and self destruction if signal from target or TELAR is lost at particular frequency, you could better understand the purpose of 8 literal frequencies pre installed on the rocket.

      > 1) buk missile launched from one TELAR cannot be redirected by another TELAR or Kupol. Function of missile control with “foreign illumination” is one of BUK’s integral features
      The illumination has to be on the frequency the missile listens at. Therefore for a foreign illumination to work:
      -A “foreign illumination” mode needs to be turned on a TELLAR.
      -A corresponding liter for the frequency entered on a TELAR, which needs to be first synchronized with the illuminating station. Do you expect Ukraine to send the liter to the rebels for their Kupol to illuminate a target on the frequency that the rebel’s missile will listen at?
      -The quartzes in the exchangeable blocks need to be set on the same physical frequencies. The physical frequencies corresponding to different liters is a guarded secret and differ from country to country.
      -Right blocks (one out of four) have to be plugged/selected in.
      You seem to have problems with grasping the simple idea for why the system works this way.
      > 2) you claimed that proximity fuse relies on signal from TELAR for detonation, which is false. Which is not true.
      Please, show me where I said that.
      > 3) if you read about the time for feequency hopping and self destruction if signal from target or TELAR is lost at particular frequency, you could better understand the purpose of 8 literal frequencies pre installed on the rocket.
      Where did you get this frequency hopping from?

      Logic Reason (@gsobjc) // May 30, 2016 at 3:24 pm // Reply

      > We do not have any evidence Geogian SU operating in Ukraine.

      Many things go unreported in this world.

      > Georgian SU25 is not stealth

      Neither any other aircraft. You mix reality with computer game experience. ‘Stealth’ is a marketing term. All can be visible in certain circumstances. And the visible one can not in other conditions.

      > we should see it on radar

      The radar range is the distance where the PROBABILITY of detection has a defined value, usually 0.5. It is important to understand that DETECTION IS NOT GUARANTEED. The chances depend on conditions (weather, jamming, landscape, signal processing algorithm, radar emission power, even sun activity).
      That radar did not have primary contact with even bigger B-777. The MH17’s mark was interpolated for some period of time before ‘something’ was switched on/off ~45secs after the hit. This ‘something’ can be jamming or a radar power change (supposedly on the ATC controller’s request), may be the both.
      We shouldn’t see Su-25 (or another jet) if even the B-777 was not visible for the primary part of the ATC center.

      > Tiny python missile is not able to destroy jumbo-jet cockpit.

      Air stream is able with its drag force applied to the hole made by a tiny missile (or even by a round).

      > SU25 modifications can not efficienty attack airliner at 10km.

      Mantra without facts. Su-25 can reach 12km, can fly controllably at 11km. It is real pilots’s experience. RB-47s were shot down at around that altitude by cannon fire from Mig-17s and MiG-19s (not far superior to Su-25 aircrafts and the much bigger, not evading B-777 does not require special capabilities for an attacking plane). The MH17 debris bears marks of cannon fire. It was missed in the DSB report. Sometimes silence tells more than saying.

      Logic Reason (@gsobjc) // May 29, 2016 at 3:52 pm // Reply

      Military jets have a very distinctive from airplanes radar signature. They also change behavior when illuminated by a radar (because of an alarm is triggered) : evading, jamming are things very recognisable by radar sensors. Air defense crews are routinely trained on tracking of airplanes with the launch part is switched off for safety. They would see the very habitual picture of a civilian airplane on their displays, distinctive from a military jet. The crew also must not be connected by any means with their commanding center because the latter knows that it IS a civilian airplane. “Retargeting” (launched at one target but acquired another target in fly) is unknown for Buk.
      Some tactical basics prevent a Buk crew IN THE AREA from attacking a cargo (or even a military jet) on the altitude 10km. Such a target (if posing a threat) is to be a prey of others, more distantly placed air-defense units (e.g. on the Russian territory if your prefer to consider Russia’s guilt). The reason to send a Buk there is to defend objects/units from low-flying threats. It shortens the time required for acquisition (more strong return signal) and the missile fly time, increasing chances to hit. By attacking the high-flying target they would discover their position selected for low-flying threats and break the order to wait for the latter. This type of behavior is very discouraged and prohibited by all armies.
      The imaginable Ukrainian cargo wouldn’t fly at that altitude because it is bound to resupply Ukrainian units along the border. It MUST already begin descending for that task. The Buk crew would not fire at non-descending target. Here one of Ukrainian explanation for “mistaken for a cargo” arises. That is that the crew believed that the target is closer than it actually was. But a Buk crew has indeed one detached operator to measure the distance. Very unlikely.
      Many illogical if’s surround any Buk version.


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