Sunday, 1 January 2017

MH17: Scenario MH17 hidden behind SU-25

Basic Dimension

MH17: B777 mistaken for SU-25 but debunked


[If your point is MH17 wasn’t shot down by a SU-25, I agree, this is highly unlikely. However Hugh Eavan is making a different point: Was there a Ukrainian fighter that might have been the original target?
According to Westerbeke the most plausible scenario is that the passenger plane was accidentally shot down because it was mistaken for another, as yet unknown target.]

Russians knew there was a war in Donetsk, where SU-25’s flew below 5 km. They were able to see from 2 km to 5 km and Donetsk was nearby. Nobody beliefs they laid the threshold at 5 km for Donetsk. Nobody beliefs in this war situation Russia threw away their data. We simply must conclude Russians know perfectly all military movements in Donetsk between 2 and 5 km at July 17, 2014.

We have to conclude only fighter aircraft below 2 km were not discovered by the Russians. Then we take the earlier calculations of Rob to conclude the SU-25 falls from the Sky if ‘hiding’ before the slow and far away flying MH17. Then we calculate the chance the crazy dancing SU-25 – with radial speed – can be on the same point of the BUK radar for just one moment in time. This chance is nil. So they cannot have confused a SU-25 with the MH17.

Then and last but not least, if the SU-25 is below 2 km it must have been in the neighbourhood of the BUK at the time of the launch. Otherwise there cannot be a straight line to the MH17. But targeting this SU-25 only takes 7 seconds for the experienced crew of the BUK, not 27 seconds. So they deliberately shot down a plane at 10km altitude.

Yes ‘the passenger plane was accidentally shot down because it was mistaken for another, as yet unknown target’. But this never can be a SU-25, but it might be an IL76 which the separatists could not verify with their own possibilities. Hence, they were misinformed by the Ukrainians, or the MH17 has been shot down by the Ukrainians, the most promising scenario until now, discarding albert_lex conclusions.

Including albert_lex conclusions partly, MH17 must be downed by the Russians by squares (8x8x6 mm), but it is to early for this crazy scenario.

 Basic Dimension // September 1, 2015 at 12:03 pm // Reply

(p = .9) Because the Russians clearly have lied and again came up with different scenarios they lost all credibility. And that means that Ukrainian SU-25 may well have flown between 1500 meters and 5000 meters. It would be absurd to debunk the confusion and distraction theory of SU-25 with MH17 under acceptance of the entirely unreliable reporting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s ATC radar images and poor understanding of real qualities and shortcomings of BUK-TELAR in technical and ergonomic sense.

Elena Kolenkina (June 21 2014):

- A month before the MH17 was shot Elena Kolenkina posted this video on YouTube:

- Elena says SU-25's under the cover of civilian aircraft dived down, dropped their bombs and rose again in hiding, so they could not be touched by the separatists:

[(1:32/2:14) This means it was a provocation; they wanted the self-defense force to shoot down an airliner so that the militias can be declared to be terrorists who shoot down airlines. Hundreds of passengers would have died; it would have been a huge catastrophy.]

- But suppose the separatists only had Manpads to 3.5 km at their disposal while airliners flew about 10 km altitude. Then they had no story and no reason to put this video on YouTube. Which means separatists already on June 18th IMPLICITLY ADMITTED the possession of Pantsirs, the little brother of the BUK with an altitude range of 15 km.

- Which also means the Dutch government could and should have been aware of the unsafety of civil aviation, and already on June 18th, 2014 SHOULD HAVE BANNED flying over Donetsk. The same goes for the greedy airlines. That whole diplomats consultation is a cover up of the total inertia and lethargy of the Ministry of Security. 

- This video shows the fear of the separatists for the terrible disaster they desperately tried to avoid. But it also shows Ukrainian government since 18 June SHOULD HAVE BANNED civil aviation. Any delay meant inciting of war crimes by conditional intent with probability consciousness.

- From the YouTube video of Elena Kolenkina is understood the separatists were apprehensive for TWO SPOTS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND TOGETHER on the radar of the BUK TELAR: A Ukrainian fighter in disguise to the tail of a civil airliner. There would certainly not be shot. 

But it is very likely separatists at that time only had access to Pantsirs:

Pantsir-S1 (RussianПанцирь-С1NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound) is a combined short to medium range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon system produced by KBP of TulaRussia

Pantsir-S1 carries up to twelve 57E6 or 57E6-E two-stage solid fuel radio-command-guided surface-to-air missiles in sealed ready-to-launch containers.  The first stage is a booster, providing rapid acceleration within the first 2 seconds of flight, after which it is separated from the sustainer-stage. The sustainer is the highly agile part of the missile and contains the high explosive multiple continuous rod and fragmentation warhead, contact and proximity fuses as also radio transponder and laser responder to be localised for guidance. The missile is not fitted with seeker to keep target engagement costs low. Instead high-precision target and missile tracking is provided via the system's multiband sensor system and guidance data is submitted via radio link for up to four missiles in flight.

The dive of SU-25

Though we think the separatists not yet possessed BUK TELAR we try to understand the situation in case it was a BUK.

Because separatists are no pilots, tailing civilian planes means for two planes people see only one object in the sky or about confounding blips at the autonomous radar of the BUK-TELAR: 

Confusing blips on radar

There are some options to confuse the blips of SU-25 and civilian aircraft on radar:

1: Same speed on radar.

2: Same behavior on radar.

Same speed of blips

Speed of planes on the radar is called 'radial velocity'. It does not concern ground speed but are movements of planes to the center of the radar:

Slant range

What exactly is the radar measuring? The radar measures slant range: 

Radial speed

Usually a plane does not fly exactly over the BUK. Therefore, the velocity of the plane is decomposed into some constituent vectors. It can be seen from the figure below the plane approaches to a minimum distance to the radar after which it moves away developing a convex arc on the radar. That characteristic must also be mimicked by the SU-25.

Normally aircraft measure their own altitude which they pass on to the radar.
If the radar has slant range C and altitude A, it calculates ground track B with Pythagoras theorem.

We know civilian aircraft is flying around 10 km with 900 km/h and SU-25 can fly 5 km with 450 km/h. They must be given the same radial speed. Now it turns out within 2 km from the BUK they have about equal radial velocity:

MH17: alt=10km;dist=2km;speed=905km;radial speed of MH17=cos78°*905km=177km.
SU-25: alt= 5km;dist=2km;speed=450km;radial speed of SU-25=cos68°*450km=167km.

   Andrew // September 5, 2015 at 2:48 pm // Reply
Baisc Dimension:
Maximum speed of the SU25 is 950 km/h, not 450 km/h. Cruising speed is 750 km/h. 450 km/h might be the ground attack speed when it is trying to kill armored equipment.

   Andrew // September 5, 2015 at 2:48 pm // Reply
Baisc Dimension:
Maximum speed of the SU25 is 950 km/h, not 450 km/h. Cruising speed is 750 km/h. 450 km/h might be the ground attack speed when it is trying to kill armored equipment.

Rate of change of elevation target (MH17) combined with that of SU-25 over the horizon (angular velocity of movement):

Now the problem is the autonomous radar of BUK-TELAR cannot receive and process altitudes of incoming planes, which normally is done by BUK TAR: target acquisition radar (TAR) vehicle. 

[Later in this article I got new information. Radar measures not only slant range but BUK-TELAR also registers elevation angle with the optical target sensor , so the height of the plane and its ground track can be inferred. So don't believe the following red blocked pictures, though it is good for understanding :)] 


BUK TELAR 1 : transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicle.
BUK TAR: target acquisition radar (TAR) vehicle.
BUK TEL: transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle.

Hence, without altitudes a stand alone BUK-TELAR only has slant rates:

If SU-25 flew exactly below the civilian aircraft it had not the same slant range and the SU-25 with shorter range would lie closer to the center of the radar.

Of course the solution is the SU-25 flies half way (at 5 km altitude) on the circular slant range track of the civilian plane (at 10 km) to the ground:

Now both planes are projected on the same blips of the autonomous radar of BUK-TELAR. It is impossible to fire a BUK missile, because both planes have the same distance to the radar and the missile will take the plane with major mass, the civilian plane.

Now, a SU-25 pilot afraid of BUKs or Pantsirs and wanting to bomb a civilian area waits until the ATC (Air Traffic Control)  leads a civilian aircraft over the zenith of the village. Then within two km of the village he flies at 5 km in the slipstream of that passenger plane, which flies at 10 km. The pilot flies exactly on the arc of the circel of the slant range of the plane. When a missile is fired it will not choose the lowest plane but the plane with the largest mass ...

- On July 15, it was announced by the military in a Public Statement since July 14 civil aviation was only allowed above 9,700 meters and military aviation was suspended. But actually military flights went on as usual.

BTW this scenario did not happen with MH17 because there was no BUK in the neighborhood of Pol'ove, the place where MH17 was shot down.

Now we got new information. Radar measures not only slant range but BUK-TELAR also registers elevation angle, so the height of the plane and its ground track can be inferred. So forget the previous :)

Has anyone done the math for the radial speed of an AN26 vs the radial speed of a 777?
At a distance of 40 km the AN26 at 6000m would have an elevation of 8.5°, the 777 an elevation of 14°.
Radial speed of the AN26 would be:
cos 8.5° * 440 = 435 km/h
For the 777:
cos 14° * 905 = 878 km/h
Bottom line is, it’s hard to confuse an AN26 with a 777. Equally hard to believe is that a trained crew was not aware of the commercial airliners constantly flying overhead

admin, above you posted this scenario :
Now that it is clear that MH17 was not shot down by any (Ukrainian) fighter jet, this scenario (where the BUK fires a missile at a jet that flies below the radar and in between the BUK and MH17) is the ONLY scenario left over where a (Ukrainian) fighter plane may have been involved.

That sole remaining scenario is where then the BUK fired a missile at a fighter at low altitude, which then missed, and then by being in the radar beam, found MH17 as a new target, I’d like to discuss that scenario.

First of all, we also determined that the Ust-Donetsk ATC radar can see targets flying as low as 1500-2000 meter over the target area in Eastern Ukraine.
Which means that in the scenario you present here, the Ukrainian jet must have been flying below that radar detection limit (1500 meters to be sure) to NOT show up on the Russian Defense Ministry’s radar images presented on July 21.
Next, for this scenario to work, the missile must lock onto MH17 after it lost its lock on the jet.
I’m not sure if that is even possible with a BUK radar lock system, but assuming it is, both planes would AT LEAST have to stay in the radar beam for the duration of the flight of the missile.
Otherwise the radar would no longer illuminate MH17, which would make a downing impossible.
To stay in the radar beam for the duration of the missile flight, the jet would have to be moving along the same azimuth angle as MH17, and at a velocity that is proportional to the altitude difference between the two planes. That altitude difference is 1500/10000 = 0.15, so the velocity of the jet would have to be 250(velocity of MH17)*0.15 =37.5 m/sec. That is 135 km/hour.
Can a SU25 stay aloft at 135 km/hours ?
  • And not to mention that the missile would reach the jet (at 1500 meters altitude and 25*0.15=3.75 km distance) at about 0.15*30=4.5 sec.
    Which means that the BUK crew has 25 sec to figure out that the jet was not downed, and thus they should switch off the radar or force the missile to self-destruct.
    Pretty slim line of events to make that scenario happen….

    Missile cannot intercpet B777 after miss Su-25. Seeker dont have redirect option and missile energy will be exhausted on wrong trajectory.
    • AD:
      so your conclusion is the BUK crew could impossibly confuse a SU-25 with MH17. So they shot down MH17 deliberately?
    admin said “so your conclusion is the BUK crew could impossibly confuse a SU-25 with MH17. So they shot down MH17 deliberately?”
    admin, he did not say that.
    He only said that a BUK missile cannot “redirect” to a second target if it missed the first one.
    Which means that IF there were TWO targets in the BUK’s radar beam, as in your ‘shadow’ scenario here : [see above, BD]
    that the BUK could not have hit MH17 after it missed a low-flying fighter.

    Rob // August 29, 2015 at 7:03 am // Reply
    It’s not my profession but I’m hopelessly intrigued by this issue. I think radial speed is also dependent on the varying ground tracks of the planes. The farther the airplanes are moving away from the radar, the more their slant ranges will equalize. But in the zenith of the BUK they converge to the real altitudes of the airplanes. Hence, varying ground tracks have repercussions for the cosine of alpha and radial speed will differ to the zenith of the BUK. Don’t blame me for this immature article:
    Scenario: MH17 hidden behind SU-25

    It is very good to further investigate the possibility the BUK crew believed they targeted a SU-25 but instead it was MH17. We do need several people and opinions to discuss this.

    Thanks Basic Dimension.
    I know that the math may be confusing, but it all comes down to basic trigonometry.
    If the plane comes from head-on, the relation is easy (as you can see in Marcel’s animation here) :
    The low flying plane has to fly at a speed that is the same fraction as the altitude difference between the planes. If MH17 moves at 250 m/sec at 10000 meters, a plane at 5000 meters in the same BUK radar beam would have to move at 125 m/sec.
    It may be surprising, but the same speed/altitude fraction (as the head-on approach above) holds regardless of the direction of the high flying plane. Even if there is an offset (not head-on approach) ! You can verify that yourself with basic trigonometry.
    So NO MATTER which approach, the speed of the low flying plane HAS TO BE the altitude fraction of the speed of the high flying plane.
    Since the Russian Defense Ministry’s ATC radar images did not see any plane flying over Donbass the altitude of the low flying fighter must have been less that 1500-2000 meters, the fraction thus 1500/10000=0.15, and thus the speed of the low flying fighter must have been 250*0.15=37.5 m/sec and thus a sustained 135 km/hour.
    Since (AFAIK) it is physically impossible for a jet (like SU25) to stay aloft at 135 km/hour, it is therefore physically IMPOSSIBLE for the BUK to have had TWO targets in its radar beam for the duration of the missile flight.
    Thus, the “shadow” scenario is debunked and the BUK at Snizhne saw only ONE target.

    Rob, thanks for the information and indeed at 1500 meters it will not work for SU-25. That’s why I have taken 5000 meters and then of course a SU-25 stays aloft at 250(velocity of MH17)*0.50 =125 m/sec = 450 km/hours = radial speed 170 km/h.
    That’s not meant for this specific case with side condition of 1500 meters Russian radar elevation lower limit, but in general I think it works if SU-25 wants to attack villages not knowing if there is a BUK.

    But now next problem: Members of BUK tried to shoot a SU-25 at 1500 meters but may be this range is too short because the rocket still is in its first mode?

    ‘The 9M38M1 surface-to-air missile utilizes a two-mode solid fuel rocket engine with total burn time of about 15 seconds, the combustion chamber is reinforced by metal.’
    ‘The Mach 3 semi-active homing 9M28M1 missile has a maximum slant range of 28 km and a minimum range of 3 km.
    I think this must be 9M38M1, but does this mean a low flying SU-25 at 1500 meters cannot be attacked by BUK within 3 km from the BUK? Because 9M38M1 is still in its first stage? Then it possibly could have taken MH17 in the second instance. Then SU-25 could have intentionally threatened BUK below 3000 meters and challenged to shoot a missile knowing they flew under MH17.
    And nowhere can I find proof of BUK-TELAR’s ability to estimate target height. What kind of apparatus is needed and do they have that?
    ‘The SNOW DRIFT warning and acquisition radar provides target height, bearing and range data.’

     Rob // August 31, 2015 at 5:24 am // Reply
    Basic Dimension said : “But now next problem: Members of BUK tried to shoot a SU-25 at 1500 meters but may be this range is too short because the rocket still is in its first mode?”
    That’s still the same problem.
    Let me summarize again :
    1) If ANY SU25 (or other fighter) was flying, it must have been flying below 1500-2000 meter, or else it would have shown up on the Russian Defense Ministry’s radar images.
    2) For that SU25 to have ANYTHING to do with MH17, both planes must have been in the same radar beam for the duration of the missile flight (some 30 sec). Otherwise even a missile that misses the SU25 cannot have been illuminated by the BUK radar.
    This means (because of basic trigonometry, that the SU25 must have been flying at 135 km/hr or slower.
    Since that is physically impossible, the conclusion is clear :
    There was NO SU25 or other jet involved when MH17 was shot down.
    MH17 was the ONLY target on the BUK radar.

     Basic Dimension // August 31, 2015 at 8:46 am // Reply
    Rob, I agree if 1500 meters really is the elevation lower bound of Russian primary surveillance radar it seems very hard Ukraine would try to mix the angular velocities of movement, the rate of change of elevation of MH17 mixed with that of SU-25 .
    Then possibly confusion might be left over as tactic whereby inexperienced members of the BUK panicked and fired a missile. In which case we have to relax the qualities of BUK-TELAR and their crew. We must relax the requirements of keeping the radar beam and the illumination by BUK-TELAR, since we have no objective record of these qualities of a stand alone.

     Rob // August 31, 2015 at 9:27 am // Reply
    Basic Dimensions said “Then possibly confusion might be left over as tactic whereby inexperienced members of the BUK panicked and fired a missile.”
    Still does not work, Basic Dimensions.
    Even if the BUK crew panicked for some reason, their radar beam would have to mysteriously illuminate MH17 instead of the target SU25, and the missile would have to have missed the SU25 target, and for some  mysterious reason (which some experts state is impossible) would have to have re-locked onto MH17.
    Which is really hard to do if you are panicking.

     boggled // August 30, 2015 at 5:49 pm // Reply
    Basic, these sites might offer some clues to technical names of BUK parts.
    Remember there is a difference between acquisition and tracking radars.
    And the abilities of passive tracking of the optical sensors and laser ranger finders.
    I have seen a site with many algorithms but cannot remember which characteristics they did or did not show.
    It may have been the wiki knock off acloserlookatsyria who got it from somewhere else, I am not sure.
    Anyways, these sites might guide you a little about the capabilities of a standalone or offline BUK.
    Fare thee well

     Basic Dimension // August 30, 2015 at 10:20 pm // Reply

    Boggled, thanks for the information and I found this:

    The 9S35 radar of the original Buk TELAR uses mechanical scan of Cassegrain antenna reflector. Buk-M2 TELAR design used a PESA for tracking and missile guidance.
    (9S35 (note – without M1 modification)= Radar of SA-11 (9A38).; BD). 9S35M1: Modernized Radar .
    Belarus systems integrator GNPO Agat displayed the 9K37MB Buk MB system at the Milex 2005 exhibition. The Buk MB is a digital systems retrofit performed on the 9K37-1/9K37M1 / SA-11 Gadfly, replacing the 1980s technology systems in the 9S470 command post, the 9A39 TEL/TL and 9A310 TELAR, and relifing other system components.

    ossie rx
    It certainly would need a highly trained crew to manage it with just a TELAR.
    “The 9S35 Fire Dome [BUK-TELAR; BD] provides a limited search and acquisition capability, a tracking capability and CW illumination for terminal guidance of the semi-active homing SAM seekers. It incorporates  an IFF interrogator, optical tracker, datalink, and is powered by the TELAR’s gas turbine generator. A shared antenna is employed for two X-band transmit/receive channels. These respectively provide a pulsed mode for search and track functions, with linear chirp for compression, and a CW mode for illumination.

    Monopulse angle tracking is employed for jam resistance. For target tracking the antenna and feed system provide a mainlobe with 2.5° width in azimuth and 1.3° in elevation. For CW illumination the antenna and feed system provide a mainlobe with 1.4° width in azimuth and 2.65° in elevation.

    Operating autonomously, the 9S35 will take 4 seconds to sweep a 120° sector, with an elevation of 6° to 7°. When cued to acquire and track, with will take 2 seconds to sweep a 10° x 7° az/elev solid angle. Average power output in pulsed tracking modes varies between 0.5 and 1 kiloWatt, with CW illumination at 2 kiloWatts. The search and monopulse angle tracking receivers are both rated at a Noise Figure of NF=10 dB. The range error is cited at 175 metres, the angular error at less than 1°. The radar can switch from standby mode to combat operation in twenty seconds.”

    IFF is a closely guarded military secret, particular to the country/alliance using it. US/NATO mode 5 is still being deployed – an ’80ies SU SAM system wouldn’t have it.
    Doubtful that even the acquisition radar would have the equipment to send and interpret civilian transponder squawks. That would be reserved for higher echelons, which would also give the order to fire.

    The BUK TELAR gives a numeric scale read-out of target altitude and speed once it is acquired on radar. See picture displays at end of this article.
    Mixing up a fast and a slow plane or a high and low plane seems far fetched. The mistake would need to occur from being pre-fed the flight plan of MH17 as where to look for the target.
    I don’t find it credible that someone would confuse 5 km and 10 km.
    • Andrew // August 29, 2015 at 2:21 pm // Reply
      Andrew thanks, this is an amazing lot of information. I learned about separatist spies at Ukrainian Airbases, but more important as RB2 already indicated: Old stand alone BUK-TELAR is able to read altitudes of aircraft. But that settles the matter. Now I will have to make up my mind again.

    (crew JMA = crew of BUK)

    [ У экипажа СОУ нет визуального контакта с целью - оператор видит не самолет в небе, а метку цели на экране монитора (хотя в сост (...)]

    Among the angular coordinates - azimuth flight goal (which direction is flying), and rate of change of elevation (elevation) target over the horizon [see dynamic figure below, BD], ie, It is not the true speed of the target, and its angular velocity [radial speed, BD] which depends not only on the actual target speed (linear speed relative to the ground in the direction of flight), but also on its height. Simply put, the angular velocity of the movement (ie, the apparent velocity) targets across the sky and the real speed of flight - are two different things. Slow, but low aim may seem faster [because cos alpha approx. 1 and radial speed aprox. groundspeed; BD] than the speed, but the altitude. In our case, the problem was in a fateful coincidence: Malaysian Boeing 777 coming at a cruising speed of 900 km / h at an altitude of 10 km, according to its flight parameters exactly two times the expected AN-26 speed (450 km / h) and the height flight (5 km)Fearing attacks by MANPADS, AN-26 could climb higher - up to 6 km, but its speed at the same time increased accordingly so that the proportional relationship between the speed and height of the AN-26 and Boeing 777 remained virtually the same. This means that the angular velocity of the expected AN-26 flying a Boeing 777 were equal, and as the Boeing 777 flew from the same direction as the expected AN-26, the screen SDA nobody looking at moving "as the AN -26 "label, could not suspect another plane ...

    Presented below animation shows that in the case of dual overspeed and altitude of the aircraft relative to the other of the angular velocity (rate of change of elevation) for the observer on the ground are identical:

    [Представленная ниже анимация показывает, что в случае двойного превышения скорости и высоты полета одного самолета относительно другого их угловые скорости (скорости изменения угла возвышения) для наблюдателя на земле идентичны:]

    If one knows the speed of a type of plane (MH17 = 900 km/h) and within a particular time interval one measures the change in slant range (distance of plane to radar), then this difference in slant range AND the rate of change of angle of elevation (angular velocity of movement) then one can deduce the height of the aircraft and its groundtrack.

    Rate of change of elevation target (MH17) combined with that of SU-25 over the horizon (angular velocity of movement) [angular velocity = radial speed; BD] :

    [Кроме угловых координат цели и скорости их изменения, экипаж СОУ видит дальность до цели, но эта дальность (и скорость ее изменения) используются бортовой аппаратурой в первую очередь для определения рубежа пуска в режиме сопровождения и подсветки цели.] (...)

    In addition to the angular coordinates of targets [changing elevation angles; BD] and the speed of change [angular velocity of movement; BD], the crew sees the JMA [BUK; BD] range to the target [slant range seen by BUK crew; BD], but the distance (and its rate of change) onboard equipment used primarily to determine the turn of the start-up mode, tracking and target illumination. Of course, the crew of the JMA had time to identify goals - this would have on the angular velocity through the range (or vice versa) to calculate the height and linear (travel) speed flight (*), get "10 kilometers" and "900 km / h" and think (if provided that the crew of the JMA knows the difference between An-26 and Boeing 777)but why do it in conditions of severe time pressure, if the target identification before you have done the other ("We are leaving!"), but you still aim only to detect and shoot down without letting her go? The crew waited SDA AN-26, "it" he saw on the monitor - what doubt? Purpose captured radar enters maintenance mode, the transmitter is turned target illumination, and enable signals operator presses the start button rockets ...

    (*) [Radar measures slant range and BUK-TELAR also registers elevation angle, so the height of the plane and its ground track can be inferred; BD]

    I foresee objections - say, An-26 and Boeing 777 - it is the aircraft of different sizes, so their mark on the radar screen will be different, and they can not be confused. This is true, but only partly. Radar signature ("brightness") of an object describes an integrated indicator of ESR (effective area of ​​dispersion), measured in square meters conventional reference area and depending on the size (more precisely - is reflected in the direction of the source of the radio signal area) goal range before it and the degree of reflection / absorption of it surface. And now look - a Boeing 777 in fact almost three times larger than the An-26, but he is at least two more! Of course, the label does not in any case be the same, and the differences between them will - but these differences can be seen only when the operator sees the two tags directly and is able to compare them. In other words, if the AN-26 is still flew, the crew would have seen the JMA on the screen two slightly different brightness mark moving in close and bearing the same angular velocity. But they would still be two, and the crew of the JMA will inevitably have to choose one of them, "her." So, he would have had to look for differences between them, trying to identify them, to determine their true speed and / or height. Moreover, animation above two planes deliberately aligned in phase, so it was obvious equality of their angular velocities, but in reality such an ideal match up to complete fusion targets (on screen radar and the sky) is extremely unlikely and virtually never occurs - SDA life crew would see two marks at the same angular velocity, but the phase error (and / or little azimuth) in which the one aim ahead of and / or flying from the other side. For example, as this animation (speed and altitude are the same, but the time of arrival in the target field of view of the radar other SDAs):

    [Например, как на этой анимации (скорости и высоты полета те же, но время прихода цели в зону обзора РЛС СОУ другое):]

    [Как видно,] (...)

    As can be seenthe angular velocities coincide only at the coincidence of elevation anglesbut as soon as the mismatch occurs elevation angles, then immediately changed and the apparent angular velocityand the two marks on the radar screenmoving now with different angular velocityit is already impossible to confuseBut ...

               If the AN-26 is still flew, then the Boeing 777 would have chances to surviveAfter all, in order to see the difference between the two marksthe monitor should be two marksHowever, AN-26 and went out ...

    And the crew of the JMAlooking at the Boeing 777"saw" An-26:

    [И экипаж СОУ, глядя на Боинг-777, "видел" Ан-26:]

      [У экипажа СОУ было примерно 5-8 минут на "принятие решения", ](...)

    The crew SDA was about 5-8 minutes on the "decision", during which the Boeing 777 was in the affected area. And if there was any doubt, that this time was enough for the purpose of identifying it as a Boeing 777 instead of the An-26. But instead of doubt was an order. And acting logic of war - shoot first, otherwise the enemy will overtake you. And work experience in the exercise, in which the skills of the crew practiced to automaticity, providing the very "dead time SDA offline (from target detection to start SAM) 24-27 seconds," recorded in the field tests "Buka". What could the crew for these 25 seconds? Moreover, he had been taught at the gym and of range of fire - nothing. And as soon as was possible (as permitted by the target range) launch anti-aircraft missiles, the crew did not deliberate a second ... is not

    Malaysian Boeing 777, flying the MH-17 on the route Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur, was indeed "in the wrong place at the wrong time" ..

    [И как только стал возможен (по разрешенной дальности до цели) пуск зенитной ракеты, экипаж не раздумывал не секунды...]

    Information of an Ukranian army officer:

    [Анатомия ошибки, погубившей МН17] (...)

    Anatomy errors destroy MN17

    In the history of the death of Malaysian Boeing 777 flying from MN17 from Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur July 17, 2014, it is still one is not fully elucidated moment. Already there is little doubt that the airliner was shot down by a self-propelled fire installation (SDA) anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) "Buk-M1", and the version that the anti-aircraft gunners shot down a Boeing 777 instead of the expected Ukrainian transport aircraft An-26 crash which was canceled at the last moment - explains almost all of the facts.

    But the question remains - how the crew of the JMA could confuse a large civilian Boeing, flying at a speed of 900 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 10 kilometers, with a smaller military An-26 flying at an average speed of 450 kilometers per hour at half the height - about 5 kilometers It has already been shown through animation, how it could happen this error, but remained questions - what information had a crew of SDA at the time of detection of air targets, whether he could at least theoretically identify the target as a civilian Boeing 777, and that it confused the crew SDA looking on their devices?

    To begin with, what information about the traffic situation gets SDA SAM "Buk-M1". When the SAM is deployed as part of the battery, the whole comprehensive information supplied to the JMA by powerful radar station (radar) "Dome", which detects targets, identifies them, selects (highlighting the most important or threatening), and transmits the data to the SDA, whose task in this case is to take on maintenance of the specified target (capture) and then make a missile launch, providing its guidance (realizing his goal of highlighting radio waves).

    But if the SDA "Buk-M1" working without radar information support "dome" that is changing - SDA itself should detect the target, identify it, and make a start to capture. For this purpose, the JMA has its own radar, but with more modest resources than the "Dome" - both in the detection range of targets, and the width of the field of view (field of view of the sky). Accordingly, reduction of range target detection reduces the time that remains for the crew after the appearance of the target on the monitor Omnidirection to perform all these operations. To make it clear, about what time intervals in question - on the ground tests SAM "Buk" from the moment of target detection to missile launch is just 20-25 seconds. Remember these figures.

    Now let's see what he sees (ie know) crew SDA offline. By deploying its radar in a threatening direction (the field of view of 120 °, so you need more or less know exactly the direction from which flies the purpose), the crew looks at the big monitor air conditions. Once the field of view (in the distance) radar target appears on the screen immediately target mark appears, with linear dimensions greater than the target, the label is brighter (brightness target but can not be identified).

    In addition, the right of the large monitor devices are arranged, showing (in separate) target range in kilometers [slant range, BD] , and the height of the target speed [radial speed, BD]On the big screen the operator sees SDA angular velocity of the target over the horizon (elevation change, see the animation on this page), but it also did not identify the targetAnd on the right sensors to capture the operator (this is important!) Sees only the goal (attention!) Target range.
     [slant range, BD]. All to capture the target by tracking the operator receives no other informationAnd with only a wealth of information, the operator must make a decision about taking goal to score. The command is issued to a takeover target by pressing an illuminated push button "Capture".

    Only after SDA equipment seized purpose, the operator begins to see, in addition to the range 
    [slant range, BD], target speed and altitude of its flightBut there are multiple "ambush" (see above photograph on the instrument): 

    - Firstly, the target speed is not measured by conventional kilometers per hour, in meters per second, and its value is given to the digital two-digit (!) Indicator value x10; In other words, the speed of the Boeing 777, 900 km / h as the operator sees the "25", and the speed of AN-26 is 450 km / h - as "13"; It is interesting, right? It is convenient for the purposes of the primary selection by type, for example - is less than "33" means the subsonic airplane, helicopter or a cruise missile, a value greater than "33" - a supersonic (ie uniquely military) aircraft, and in some cases more than "70" - it is flying missile, with the possible anti-radiation, i.e. released by someone at the SDA. In a sense, it is not so much the identification of the target as a signal operator - how fast he has to act, make decisions on missile launching; as you know, and Boeing, and the An-26 "sit" in a range of subsonic;- Secondly, the dial gauge in the bottom left corner of the photo shows the height of the target, but again on a scale of x10, ie height for the An-26 will be on this device as "0.5", while Boeing-777 - "1".

    See an example of the photo - SOU "Buk-M1" captured target (burning button in the top right corner of the frame), flying at a distance of 24 kilometers (two last digits on the left) at a rate slightly greater than the speed of sound - 1760 km / h (two last red digits "49" to the right) at an altitude of 2 km (the arrow at the bottom left to "0.2").

    I note a fundamental point - JMA SAM "Buk-M1" is equipped with the Automatic definition of the purpose of the principle of "friend or foe", which are equipped with warplanes, with the lack of response target for the automatic request is understood by the system as "foreign". The transponders installed on commercial aircraft, SOU "Beech" does not see. In other words, the apparatus of the JMA "Buk-M1" can not distinguish between a foreign military aircraft from foreign civil - a response to a request comes in both cases.

    Returning to the original question - so how could confuse the An-26 (height of 5 km, the speed of 450 km / h) with a Boeing 777 (the height of 10 km, the speed of 900 km / h)? Please try to answer themselves, given that the operator sees only the combination of two different indications (!) Devices - "25" and "1" (instead of "13" and "0.5"), the goal has been identified as "foreign" and even have captured, and its mark moves on the screen exactly as it should, and all in all just released some 20-30 seconds ...

    Could the crew differentiate SDA AN-26 from Boeing 777? Theoretically, he could. But to do that he had to know exactly what is above his head continually fly Boeing and Airbus, and with the brutal time trouble the operator should also have before my eyes a crib, a memo to the corresponding figures to know what target to miss, even identifiable as "foreign." Or - what a single goal (13 and 0.5) need to knock on the background of many others, and also all the "others" ... Did the crew of "Buka" that over him an international air corridor with heavy traffic? Judging by the statements of the leaders of the separatists puzzled July 17-18 - a highly unlikely.

    Crews SDAs teach "on the machine" for a few seconds to shoot down "foreign" aircraft. But here there was combat missions, there was an order, and in the sky - an alien subsonic goal that waiting - well, what doubt?

    I should add that even glued to the dashboard, under the nose of the operator crib could not guarantee to save Boeing - and suddenly, instead of another AN-26 flying a stranger to us the IL-76? Yes, the more ukrov blockages, the better!

         [ Добавлю, что даже приклеенная к приборной панели, под носом оператора шпаргалка не могла гарантированно спасти Боинг – а вдруг вместо чужого Ан-26 к нам летит чужой Ил-76? Да чем больше укров завалим, тем лучше!]

     Basic Dimension // September 1, 2015 at 12:03 pm // Reply

    Russian Rostov radar has given quite remarkable interpretations of the alleged attack of SU-25 on MH17, which has been easily debunked as falling debris. In addition, Russia changed its theories regarding the cause of the attack continuously. Also Russia made an ‘understandable’ error where it changed 5000 feet into 5000 meters lower limit elevation angle. And indeed Rostov radar did not report SU-25s below 5 km.

    [But we can be wrong because sometimes Russian radars are working in standby mode which means detection possibilities at the given distance are over 5000 m altitude. Then the plane simply is too far from radar to see below 5 km.]

    Observations of Rostov radar should be interpreted with caution and may not be used as facts that Ukrainian SU-25 have not flown between 2000 and 5000 meters. Hence, the theory in which SU-25s confused and distracted the members of BUK, so they accidentally fired a BUK missile on MH17, cannot be debunked solely on the base of the Russian Defense Ministry’s ATC radar images.

    Another reason this theory cannot be easily debunked is the unreliability of reports concerning the exact operation of BUK-TELAR. As an example we have no reliable information that a BUK missile cannot “redirect” to a second target if it missed the first one. So far debunking is based on speculation and not on controllable facts.

    Especially ergonomics of BUK-TELAR to handle different aircraft at different speed and varying elevation angle is questionable:

    Precisely I mean the rate of change of elevation target (MH17) combined with that of SU-25 over the horizon (angular velocity of movement) [angular velocity = radial speed]:

    On the basis of our knowledge of the working of BUK we are not in the position to exclude errors in human decision making. Hence, if angular velocities [radial speed] do not coincide because elevation angles differ, logically it might be impossible to confuse different aircraft but ergonomically confusion might be quite understandable. For, at the psychological level confusion is dictated by the complexity of the situation in the first place, as the BUK-environment is not designed to make such critical assessments with that silly radar screen.
    Radar measures slant range and BUK-TELAR also registers elevation angle, so the height of the plane and its ground track can be inferred. But all these measures are recoded and given digitally to the crew in the cabin. Ergonomically this looks irresponsible and in panic it might be much too difficult for the human mind to keep the overview.

    Google translate of at

    [- Firstly, the target speed is not measured by conventional kilometers per hour, in meters per second, and its value is given to the digital two-digit (!) Indicator value x10; In other words, the speed of the Boeing 777, 900 km / h as the operator sees the “25”, and the speed of AN-26 is 450 km / h – as “13”; It is interesting, right? It is convenient for the purposes of the primary selection by type, for example – is less than “33” means the subsonic airplane, helicopter or a cruise missile, a value greater than “33” – a supersonic (ie uniquely military) aircraft, and in some cases more than “70” – it is flying missile, with the possible anti-radiation, i.e. released by someone at the SDA. In a sense, it is not so much the identification of the target as a signal operator – how fast he has to act, make decisions on missile launching; as you know, and Boeing, and the An-26 “sit” in a range of subsonic;- Secondly, the dial gauge in the bottom left corner of the photo shows the height of the target, but again on a scale of x10, ie height for the An-26 will be on this device as “0.5”, while Boeing-777 – “1”.]

    Further it is madness to think that setting strict standards regarding the use of BUK can avoid predictable human errors. And, a standalone BUK leads in advance to disasters. Therefore it is quite unlikely that Russia would have authorized to send a standalone BUK to Donetsk. This must have been decided by a renegade faction within the Russian army.

    BUK is a technologically very advanced lethal killer, but it can be a very unreliable murder weapon too. We have no scientific information, no international standards and no reports of how it really works. Far too little experience has been recorded in objective reports. That it can kill, we know, but we know nothing about checks and balances. And before we get this information we conservatively assume that from BUK everything can be expected. Hence we exclude no fatal interactions of human failure with BUK-failure.

    Scenario 3:

    The BUK crew shot at a low flying SU-25. The missile missed the target. The missile found a new target being MH17.

    Scenario 5:

    SU-25s were flying very close to passenger aircraft to use as a human shield. On the 18th of June, one month before this disaster, Elena Kolenkina, a Russian separatist in Sloviansk and the wife of rebel commander Arsen Pavlov reported that the Ukrainian Air Force were tailing civilian planes over Eastern Ukraine. The claims, if proven true, indicate that the Ukraine were using civilian aircraft as human shields.

    Merging scenario 3 and 5.

    (p = 1.0): Civilians in the neighborhood of the disaster said to have seen one or two SU-25.
    (p = .5): There was one or two SU-25 of Ukraine at the disaster with MH17.
    (p = .8): Russian government was not well informed about the cause of the disaster.
    (p = .01): Rostov radar noticed a SU-25 near MH17 at 10 km altitude.
    (p = .9): Because the crew of the BUK also did not quite understand what happened the Russian government decided window dressing of the detrimental effects of SU-25 for the separatists.
    (p = .9): In this scenario Russia knows from Rostov radar – and the public – that SU-25’s were there, so this could not be denied. But their altitude would make an enormous moral difference. High altitude would accuse Ukraine of wittingly committing war crime; low altitude accuses Ukraine of instigation of war crimes by separatists, which would therefore be morally condemned as Russia.
    (p = .9) Because the Russians clearly have lied and again came up with different scenarios they lost all credibility. And that means that Ukrainian SU-25 may well have flown between 1500 meters and 5000 meters. It would be absurd to debunk the confusion and distraction theory of SU-25 with MH17 under acceptance of the entirely unreliable reporting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s ATC radar images and poor understanding of real qualities and shortcomings of BUK-TELAR in technical and ergonomic sense.

     Basic Dimension // September 2, 2015 at 9:40 pm // Reply

    First, it would be an absurd form of tunnel vision to debunk the confusion and distraction theory of SU-25 with MH17 under acceptance of the entirely unreliable reporting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s ATC radar images. Hence we really do not know if SU-25 flew around MH17 or at a lower altitude of 5 km.
    (p= 1): Residents say to have seen SU-25 in the neighborhood of MH17.

    (p= 0.5): At the time of the disaster residents probably saw more than one object in the sky. They were very familiar with the daily stunts of SU-25, so they probably did not confuse SU-25 with BUK, even though they possibly had never seen BUK smoke trail or heard BUK thunder before.

    (p= 1): The witness is sure he has seen two objects in close proximity before the explosion. (That’s the only important information of the interview).

    If we suppose this grown man knows the difference between SU-25 and BUK, then he must have had a reason not make a choice or not to tell his conclusion. If he concludes a BUK he would make himself vulnerable to the separatists. And if he had chosen for SU-25 he would be chased by the SBU. Hence he possibly decided not to lie but also not to give full information. He decided to give just enough information for us to draw our own conclusion. Otherwise his cooperation to the interview would be worthless.

    From his experience he knows SU-25 cannot climb so fast and high. Also they are not that maneuverable at high altitude. He wants us to draw the conclusion it was no SU-25.

    And he describes quite exactly the path behavior of a BUK without saying anything about the sound of the launch or the smoke trail, since the BUK possibly was launched from a very distant position and it was cloudy. But I am no expert.

    He knows we will infer BUK. Unless Erik Toonen is right after all with his advanced SU-25 from Georgia: ‘The modification of the [upgraded SU-25; BD] device is performed by the Israeli Elbit Systems and the Python missiles are also provided by the Israeli Rafael to Georgia. Location of these devices is the airport of Tbilisi since 2000.

    I draw no conclusions but only protect a scenario against tunnel vision.

    Well, it’s all very distracting and confusing. May be I was wrong and the witness sincerely meant he saw two planes. I accept the Russian translation he really saw two planes. Now what does this mean? In this scenario I suppose the witness saw a SU-25 and there was a SU-25.
    Now as AN already made clear a SU-25 (450 km/h) cannot overtake MH17 (900 km/h) and even make a hook around B-777. But because the clouds were at 3 km, the SU-25 could have made antics at 5 km, which were projected higher on the MH17 surroundings. Now it would be possible to see SU-25 next to MH17 but factually SU-25 was flying much lower.
    The stunts of the SU-25 could be meant to distract the members of BUK who intended to shoot down a military plane (IL-76). Also is possible the SU-25 had nothing to do with that military plane (MH17). And in case of IL-76 the SU-25 would bomb BUK in the first place. We see scenarios of SU-25 and MH71 at same altitude are not working. So, we conclude different altitudes.
    Next problem is SU-25 at 5 km was no immediate threat to BUK, so there was no reason to fire a missile. This except if the crew of BUK made a fatal error of judgment with radial speed and/or overlooked MH17.
    Then the solution would be as follows: Ukraine had no bad intentions with MH17. Also there was no spotter involved. ‘Birdie’ is a nonsense story afterwards. The BUK crew panicked because there was no complete BUK configuration set up. And the real cause would be a solitary OLD BUK-TELAR has enormous ergonomic shortcomings to keep apart civilian aircraft and military planes at different altitudes.
     Andrew // September 5, 2015 at 2:48 pm // Reply
    Basic Dimension:
    Maximum speed of the SU25 is 950 km/h, not 450 km/h. Cruising speed is 750 km/h. 450 km/h might be the ground attack speed when it is trying to kill armored equipment.

     AD // September 5, 2015 at 8:43 pm // Reply
    Su-25 cannot have maximum speed 950 km/h on alt=10km. Any plane dont have MAXIMUM speed but maximum speed for current ALT.
    Im already shown why Su-25 cannot catch B777 with examples from Su-25 instrument panel.
    1. Su-25 on ALT = 8700 m have only IAS (Indicated Air Speed) = 480 km/h or TAS (True Air Speed) = 750 km/h
    2. Su-25 on ALT = 10500 m have only IAS = 440 km/h or TAS = 740 km/h
    3. MH17 B777 on ALT = 10000 m have IAS = 300kn or TAS = 890 km/h
    So for Su-25 maximum speed for alt = 10000 m is 440 km/h (IAS) which close to 450 km/h. And this plane cannot catch B777.

     boggled // September 5, 2015 at 9:06 pm // Reply
    Likely 450km/h would be about top climbing speed and/or top forward momentum speed at the most while fully loaded struggling to make climb to 7 km – 8 km.
    Fully loaded, empty, modified, unmodified, so many things to think of aren’t there Andrew?
    Attacking a ground target I would imagine it is like a hawk and dives in fast for the kill.
    But it could use a different attack profile of flying as below radar as it can.
    Probably different specs for flying over water versus dry land.
    Regardless, Basic is BASICALLY correct.
    As a fighter jet makes a climb it will be going up at an angle which will slow down its overall forward momentum.
    It could be travelling at 975 km/h (actual top speed of a unmodified empty SU25) to get to FL280, but its actual forward momentum or velocity would only be 700km/h if it is lucky.
    Kind depends how quickly you want to get to that altitude to what your forward speed is.
    N’est ce pas?
    So after a SU25 is making the long slow climb to 8 km – at most unmodified, consistent straight flying B777 is flying away from it steadily and leaving it in the dust a long ways behind.
    SU25 forward movement?? 700 km/h or less B777’s forward movement? 900 km/h or more.
    About 3 km a second faster with just those numbers.
    So in 10 seconds the B777 is 30 km down range.

    Basic, you need to stop disqualifying the effectiveness of the Optical Sensor scope and laser range finder, they would have been effective that day.
    Some light filters they put over the camera lens almost makes clouds disappear.
    It is almost like having X-Ray glasses.

    And I am still not so sure a Command center and radar emplacement is impossible to be in range of the BUK launcher’s wireless signal.

    Russia says there were four BUKM1 batteries with active radars, plus a S200 network, which they may know just how to break into.
    Admin’s recent article I found at least one full battery within distance, and evidence of others.
    This article discusses various radars Ukraine had active about S200’s. Also interesting is an ITAR link that goes to describe daily active radars, some 9 some 8 some 7 –
    Fare thee well

     Basic Dimension // September 5, 2015 at 10:11 pm // Reply

    Well Boggled thanks for the information about SU-25.

    I have not spoken about the optical target sensor or the slant range finder. May be, these instruments register optimally. I only stipulated we have no official reports, no official standards of how BUK-TELARtranslates and recodes this raw information optimally for human processing. Hence ergonomic optimizing differs from optimal registration.
    Further in this scenario I supposed a standalone BUK. And if there were a BUK Command vehicle and a BUK TAR involved, it would be worse because then their cooperation totally failed, unless you suppose the Russians deliberately shot down a civilian aircraft. Of course a complete BUK system across the border also should be explored.

    Basic Dimension | 18-04-16 | 02:29
    Je huidige link werkt niet. Die afbeelding zag ik al, maar er zit een klein probleempje in die theorie. Volgens mij bedoel je deze:

    Een toestel wat zes keer zo dichtbij is, levert vanuit de kwadraten wet al zes keer zoveel reflectie. Erger nog, omdat voor een reflectie deze afstand heen en terug werkt, is de SU25 uit dat plaatje 12 keer zo dichtbij, en dus 144 keer zo zichtbaar. De SU25 is nu niet echt een toestel met grandioze anti radar eigenschappen. Ondanks dat de MH17 een veel groter toestel is, verwacht ik dat de SU25 dichterbij genoeg is om er zinloze ruis van te maken.

    Dan heb je nog een ander puntje, dat de radar in de BUK zelf filtert, en alleen kijkt naar nabije toestellen. De puls van het toestel op 25 kilometer extra afstand komt te laat terug en wordt hopelijk genegeerd. In de vorige alinea gaf ik al aan waarom ik verwacht dat die ook nog eens te zwak is.

    Exacte specs weten we natuurlijk niet, maar iedere SAM heeft echt geleiding nodig van de grondradar totdat het doel binnen enkele kilometer is. Puur omdat de radar in deze raket te klein is. Te weinig oppervlak om een puls weg te sturen die vooral gericht naar voren gaat, en te weinig oppervlak om genoeg van de terugkerende puls te ontvangen om een zinvolle meting te doen. Feynman | 18-04-16 | 02:45

    It was an R27 missile (fragmentation based) shot likely from a Su-27, that was hovering at a medium altitude (~3km, above clouds but below reach of Russian radars) somewhere between Torez and Zaroschenske.
    There were Ukrainian Su-25’s in the area near crash, but they had nothing to do with the crash, they likely did not even know what’s was going on. The theories that the plane was shot by a Su25 gun were abandoned weeks after the crash by sensible researchers. It’s only people like you or solispassi keep mentioning it nowadays.
    Question for you? Russia would know that there are Ukrainian military radars capable of detecting a Buk launch, and still decided to shoot the airliner. You think this is plausible? Or is it more likely that Ukraine claims they switched off the radars because they don’t want to show recordings proving their planes were still flying?
    The density of the bowtie shaped holes on the Mh17 wreckage should be the same as the density in the AA test. Of 300+ documented holes on 777 there should be dozens of bowtie holes. There is not a single one.

    Counter-espionage with MH17



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