Sunday, 1 January 2017

MH17: BUK-TAR scenario downing MH17

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/timeline-of-the-missing-primary-radar-recordings-of-ukraine/#comment-15084

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/






  • IFF or Identification Friend or Foe. Based on transponder information the radar knows if the target is a friendly aircraft , an civil airliner or a enemy aircraft.
  • non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR). This systems analyses the pattern of the radar returns. It can determine the type of aircraft by a typical footprint of the radar return Also jet engine modulation, or the analysis of beats and harmonics in the radar return that are caused by engine fan or compressor blades is used to determine type of target.  The return is kind of unique for each type of aircraft because of its size, number of engines, speed etc.








- On July 15, it was announced by the military in a Public Statement since July 14 civil aviation was only allowed above 9,700 meters and military aviation was suspended. But actually military flights went on as usual.


If you have no primary radar available but you can split civil and military aviation in altitude below and above 9700 meter, then they cannot collide and you need no primary radar. May be that was the real reason for that absurd measure and that’s why it had nothing to do with SAM. it had nothing to do with SAM.






Legally, possibly for Ukraine there was no need to alert Eurocontrol when their primary radars one by one dropped out. Together with the different altitudes above and below 9700 meters, only there could be problems if civil airliners had to dive in case of decompression etc. This was a very low chance.

Also Ukraine did not need to deliver primary radar data to DSB, for they really had no data left from their ruined radar stations, and furthermore BUK-TAR radar cars possibly do not save data in full. 


So they theoretically might have thought they registered the downing of MH17 correctly but had no primary radar data left, which does not mean they did not cover their airspace sufficiently with primary radar. So they thought they needed not inform Eurocontrol.

They might have misled DSB successfully. So, legally Ukraine easily comes away with this move. They were obliged to keep these data, what technically might have been impossible, so only a reprimand will result under civil war conditions.


—————–

BUK-installations:

BUK TELAR 1 : transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicle.
BUK TAR: target acquisition radar (TAR) vehicle.
BUK TEL: transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle.
BUK COMMAND VEHICLE.

BUK TELAR(K;P;A):
[1966] Precursor BUK 1958 :2K12 Kub (Russian code); SA-6 Gainful, (NATO code). 
Precursor BUK 1970: 2P25 (Russian code); SA-6 (NATO code).
[ 1980] OLD TELAR: 9K37(Russian code); BUK SA-11 Gadfly long chords (NATO code) ;missile 9M38.
OLD TELAR: 9A38 (Russian code); BUK SA-11 (NATO code). 
9A38 with (M4 =) four rockets long chords (not in use anymore in Russia).
9A310 (with range of missile up to 35 km).
[1984] 9K37M (BUK M1)(SA-11);(missiles: 9M38;9M38M1).
[1998] 9K37M1-2 (BUK M1-M2)(SA-17);(missiles: 9M38;9M38M1;9М38M2/9M317).
[1998] Newer Buk-M1-2 (NATO code Grizzlyand Buk-M2 systems (SA-17).
[1988;2007] 9K317E BUK-M2E (SA-17) (missile: 9M317).

Summary:
BUK M1 is (SA-11)(missiles: 9M38).
BUK M1-2 and BUK-M2 are (SA-17)(missiles 9M317).


Radars (S):
SA-6 :1S11 Distribution radar  + 1S31 Continuous wave illuminator  (Russian code).
TAR 1S91: Radar vehicle (Russian code).
9S35 (note – without M1 modification) = Radar of SA-11 (9A38).
9S35M1: Modernized Radar .
TAR 9S18 Kupol:
Target acquisition range (by TAR 9S18M1, 9S18M1-1) range – 140–150 km, altitude – 15 m – 25 km.

Batteries:
2K12M4 Kub-M4 (battery of TAR 1S91 +  (M4=) 4 TEL 2P25 (three rockets) + 1 TELAR 
TAR 1S91 + 4 TEL 2P25 + 1 TELAR 9A38.

Missiles (M):
SA-11 Gadfly Missiles:the missile has three variants, the 9M38, 9M38M and the 9M38ME1.9M38: old rocket with long chords (not in use anymore).
9M38M: Gadfly missiles
9M38M1: modernized rocket with long chords (Russia and Ukraine). XXX
9M317: Grizzly (only Russian short chords).

Warheads (N, H=Russian):
9N310: 70 kg
9N314: 70 kg
9N314M: (missile 9M38M1) XXX

Content Warheads (H=Russian):
(http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2015/05/kak_du_lai.html)
9H314: 2 types: paralellopipidum
9H314M: 3 types: I-profile (missiles 9M38M1XXX

[International experts endorse the conclusions of the forensic investigation. Defence experts of IHS Jane’s in London look into all weapon systems worldwide. They regard the damaged and deformed fragment below as a first piece of evidence. According to them the fragment directly belongs to the pay load of a 9M317 BUK missile, the modern version of the BUK 1-2 system.  Expert Nicolas De Larrinaga: "From the hour-glass form we can gather all the characteristics of an impact of a 9N314 warhead fragment. This fits perfectly."]


9K37M1-2 (BUK M1-2):SA-17 (only Russian). 
Warhead 9N314 in SA-11 (Russ/Ukr) and SA-17(Rus).

----------------------------------------


We start thinking again and the Ukrainians had no primary radar from the airports left. But in any case they had their [BUK TAR radar car with a full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR) modes (motor resonances)].

So they replaced primary radar with some BUK batteries throughout Luhansk and Donetsk. They made a network of primary radars in the field.


———————-

ESPIONAGE BY CRACKED BUK COMMUNICATION

Step 1: Separatists discovered the Ukrainian army had no control over fighter aircraft without primary radar.

Step 2: Separatists sabotaged primary radar of airbases.

Step 3: Ukraine more and more had to separate civil aviation (high alt) from military aviation (low alt) since they could not track their military aircraft any longer and wanted to prevent collisions with civil aircraft.

Step 4: Ukrainian army replaced primary radars from the airbases with some BUK Target Acquisition Radars (TAR) in the field.

Step 5: This TAR, or better the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE communicated with the airbase. This communication contained information about overflying military planes. The airbase informed about coming planes, on which TAR controlled the flight and the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE reported back to the airbase.

Step 6: I doubt the BUK system works with encrypted information between BUKs, because that would easily lead to mistakes. So separatists probably could intercept normal communication among BUKs on a distance of several kilometers.

Spotter
A lone TELAR is very vulnerable for attacks by aircraft because of its radar. Radar is easy to spot when switched on. A common practise is to make use of the human eye. A so called spotter is positioned 30-50 km away from the launch position of the TELAR. When an aircraft is seen by the spotter, they communicate that over radio to the people in the BUKThen they will switch on the turbo engine required for the Fire Dome radar. The powerup will take about 10 seconds. Then the radar can lock on the aircraft and a missile can be fired. By switching on the radar for short periods detection is reduced.

Step 7: Communication from and to the airbase might be encrypted though I bet Ukraine never had experience with this situation before and they possibly still use the radio for normal communication. Anyway the problem of spying has been reduced to decoding encrypted information at worst. This must be no problem for the Russians.

Step 8: We skip step 6, because step 7 gives direct information from the airbase. Also in step 7 separatists are not needed in the neighbourhood of any BUK system.

Step 9: This way separatists noticed when SU-25s approached from the airbase and shot down fighter jets with MANPADS, Pantsirs or BUKs.

Step 10: In this scenario separatists did not know their spying meanwhile was discovered by Ukraine. Now the airbase communicated a trick: an AN-26 was on its way to the stronghold below Snizhne bringing materials.

Step 11: Then separatists shot down MH17.

 Basic Dimension // February 8, 2016 at 9:20 am //

Note, what has changed fundamentally since February 4, 2016.

We now definitely know the Ukrainians had no primary radar left at the downing of MH17. To continue their flights above Donetsk and Luhansk they desperately needed other kinds of primary radar and they only had BUK TARs left.

Separatists understood this situation and with help of the Russians they simply succeeded in cracking the codes of BUK systems, if needed, but probably they only had to be in the neighbourhood of the TARs and on the right radio frequency.

This way they were warned when military planes were coming, since TAR warned the whole system. If TAR was solitary they somehow intercepted the message from the air base. Then they shot military aircraft with MANPADS or Pantsirs.

If they used BUKs this was much later and this would be easily detected by the Ukrainians.
This new information is of fundamental interest because we now know definitely what way eventual spying must have gone.

 Andrew // February 8, 2016 at 3:18 pm // Reply
Just an observation.
Ukraine has admitted having the BUK KUPOL unit of the 156th Regiment, 3rd Battalion in service in Kharkiv Oblast, presumably near ATO command at Izyum. It also had at least one ST-68UM field radar in use. Additionally, the military radar at 156th Air Defense Regiment, 2nd Battalion base A-1659 in Mariupol is not known to have been sabotaged, nor were local radar facilities at Mariupol airport. Finally, the local radar at Kramatorsk Military Air Field had to be functional to support ongoing flights to/from there.
These facilities were close enough and sufficient to see MH17’s flights and last minutes of distress.
Further, local partisans of Ukraine report military flights in the afternoon of July 17 on Twitter, which means military primary radar was active and being recorded for after action report purposes, especially given the shoot downs on the afternoon/evening of July 16.
The known damaged Ukrainian radars were at Donetsk, Lugansk, and Artemovisk and were taken down 4 to 7 weeks earlier. That civilian and military flights continued throughout up to July 17 means some method of air traffic control must have been present to coordinate and control operations, as hundreds of military bombing and airdrop supply sorties occurred in that time, and civilian overflight included thousands of trips with potentially conflicting routes.








[Pieter Omtzigt:
CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7]
[Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semi-active_radar_homing

Semi-active radar homing (SARH) is a common type of missile guidance system, perhaps the most common type for longer-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missile systems. The name refers to the fact that the missile itself is only a passive detector of a radar signal – provided by an external (“offboard”) source — as it reflects off the target[1][2](in contrast to active radar homing, which uses an active radar: transceiver). Semi-active missile systems use bistatic continuous-wave radar.

=======================

Remote Control Guidance: The guidance computer is on the launcher. The target tracker is also placed on the launching platform.

=======================

Homing Guidance: The guidance computers are in the missile and in the target tracker.

a) Radar homing

- ACTIVE HOMING uses a radar system on the missile to provide a guidance signal. Typically electronics in the missile keep the radar pointed directly at the target, and the missile then looks at this "angle" of its own centerline to guide itself. [The 9М38M1 missile uses active homing when approaching the goal.]
- SEMI-ACTIVE HOMING  systems combine a passive radar receiver on the missile with a separate targeting radar that "illuminates" the target. Since the missile is typically being launched after the target was detected using a powerful radar system, it makes sense to use that same radar system to track the target.
-PASSIVE HOMING is infrared homing that homes in on the heat generated by the target. Typically used in the anti-aircraft role to track the heat of jet engines.

b) Proportional navigation 

Proportional homing is used in some form or another by most homing air target missiles. It is based on the fact that two vehicles are on a collision course when their direct Line-of-Sight does not change direction as the range closes. No radar is used but other means.

=======================

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buk_missile_system

In general, the system identifies potential targets (radar), selects a particular target (command), fires a missile (launcher) at the target, and resupplies the system (logistics). The missiles require a radar lock to initially steer the missile to the target until the missile's on-board radar system takes over to provide final course corrections. A proximity fuse aboard the missile determines when it will detonate, creating an expanding fragmentation pattern of missile components and warhead to intercept and destroy the target. A proximity fuse improves the "probability of kill" given the missile and target closure rates, which can be more than 3,000 km/h (1,900 mph) (or more than 900 m/s (3,000 ft/s)).


=======================

Antidyatel thinks the proximity fuse can interpret the radar reflection of another BUK:

  Antidyatel // April 12, 2016 at 12:51 am // Reply
Hey “expert”, did you finally read Ieltsin book that you were so recomending.
It has interesting things for you. Particularly about shooting with foreign illumination (чужой подсвет, page 8), meaning when one TELAR is shooting the missile, while another TELAR or Kupol are guiding it to target. There was also a clear explanation of how proximity fuse works with its own ILLUMINATING antenna (fig 9), independent of signal from TELAR. you might find it interesting information about the time delay allowed for frequency hopping in presence of radio electronic suppression and time delay between loss of target and self destruction. It is important to actually read your source instead of using someone else selected quotes from it.



http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/#comment-10596

Any suggestions as to why the detonation was so close to the plane?
Also, do you know if the missile homes on the target’s radar equipment?
Interesting article. :)

 sotilaspassi // April 5, 2016 at 9:39 am // Reply
-BUK tries to get as close to target as possible, because of this it has also fuse that detonates from impact.
-Warhead detonation is most efficient in close range.
-BUk is designed to hit also ballistic missiles that are far smaller in diameter than a fighter jet.
-Boeing-777 is far bigger than fighter jet
-Because of the proportional navigation in the final approach, IMO, missile almost surely start to bank away from target’s strongest radar echo, so it is almost impossible for it to collide with target.
-Because MH17 did not change it’s course, BUK made the ideal hit. IMO, detonation center was ~1m from cockpit surface.

 sotilaspassi // April 5, 2016 at 9:42 am // Reply
“Also, do you know if the missile homes on the target’s radar equipment?”
BUK missile homes to TELAR sent radar radiation/dispersion from the target. It is designed to resist radar interference of other radar signal sources, so there is specific radar signal finger print that the missile search for and homes to.



=======================

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/


The TELAR in autonomous mode is more accurate than when connected by a Command Post/TAR. In autonomous mode the accuracy is 180 m. This means the TELAR radar can distinguish unique targets when they are 180 meters apart. When targets are closer there is a risk the wrong target is destroyed.

A complete overview of missile types used by SA-11 and SA-17
9M38: the first missile developped -> 9K37 BUK and  9K12M4 KUB
9M38M1: better version of  9M38 -> 9K37M1 BUK M1,  9K37M1-2 BUK M1-2
9M317: better version of  9M38M1 -> 9K37M1-2 BUK M1-2 and 9K317 BUK M2
The 9M38 missile has a fuel burn time of 15 seconds. After 15 seconds the engine will not provide trust.
The 9M38M1 missile has a fuel burn time of 20 seconds.


1 – semi-active radar homing
2 – proximity fuse (9E241M1)
3- warhead


Very qualified personnel (which work with the BUK each day year by year) can separate a Boeing 777 (2 engine plane on 10 km altitude) from possible Antonov-26 (which flies on a  much lower altitude) or Il-76 (4 engine cargo aircraft). But separatists can be under pressure by danger of destruction by an Ukraine fighterjet  (or detection) by plane coming right on them.
In case an Ukraine BUK was used by separatists  the operator would target military aircraft of Ukraine. However a missile would not lock on a friendly aircraft because of IFF. The missile could only lock on non friendly targets like MH17. This for sure must have been noticed by the operator. The operator can only launch on a friendly aircraft by overruling IFF notice.

In case a Russian BUK would have been used, both for an Ukraine military aircraft and MH17 would appear to the operator as enemy aircraft.


https://www.metabunk.org/does-damage-to-mh17-indicate-or-exclude-a-particular-buk-launch-location.t6345/


Older scenario:



ESPIONAGE BY CRACKED BUK COMMUNICATION

Step 1: Separatists discovered Ukrainian army had no control over fighter aircraft without primary radar.

Step 2: Separatists sabotaged primary radars of airbases.

Step 3: Ukraine more and more had to separate civil aviation (high alt) from military aviation (low alt) since they could not track any longer their military aircraft and wanted to prevent collisions with civil aircraft.

Step 4: Of course Ukrainian army detected a series of BUK Target Acquisition Radars (TAR) could replace primary radars in Luhansk and Donetsk.

Step 5: Since the reach of TAR radar is about 140 km, they were placed with intervals of 140 km in a straight line from the military airport of Dnepropetrovsk into the direction of the stronghold in Donetsk, (South East of Snizhne). The first TAR was placed 70 km from Dnepropetrovsk to the east, the second 210 km further, etc.

– They were placed in a straight line so fighter jets came over the radial center of the radars and it looked like normal primary radar from the airbase.

Step 6: Separatists – in cooperation with the Russians – quickly discovered just a single (even mechanically faulty) BUK-TELAR suffices to break into a BUK-missile communication system. They managed to interfere in the internal communication of the Ukrainians without discovery .

Step 7: This way they noticed when SU-25s were approaching from the base and just in time they switched on their BUK-TELAR Radar and shot down fighter jets.

Step 8: As said in July 14 the Ukrainian army had a stronghold in the south east of Snizhne on which separatists brought a BUK-TELAR into that direction.

Step 9: But separatists did not know they meanwhile were discovered and Ukraine had set a trap. Over their BUK system they communicated this trick: an AN-26 was on its way to the stronghold below Snizhne to bring materials.

Step 10: Separatist waited and just in time they shot down MH17.


Variation:

Step 6: Separatists – in cooperation with the Russians – quickly discovered how to break into a BUK-missile communication system. They managed to interfere with the internal communication of the Ukrainians without discovery.
Step 7: This way they noticed when SU-25s were approaching from the base and they shot down fighter jets with MANPADS or Pantsirs.

 Basic Dimension // February 8, 2016 at 8:26 am //

Variation:

Step 9: But separatists did not know they meanwhile were discovered and Ukraine shot down MH17 shortly after the BUK of the separatists arrived in the south of Snizhne.

 Basic Dimension // February 11, 2016 at 1:18 am // Reply

Integrated radar PSR and SSR in Ukraine would not have prevented the assault on MH17.
Rules of Eurocontrol prescribe how PSR and SSR have to be integrated.

PSR = Primary Surveillance Radar (reflected radar beams)
SSR = Secondary Surveillance Radar (aircraft with ADS-B)

http://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/eurocontrol-standard-radar-surveillance-en-route-airspace-and-major-terminal-areas

This Standard contains the requirements for independent (primary) and cooperative independent (secondary) radar surveillance for application in the provision of Air Traffic Services.

[We split radars in: SSR in Dnepropetrovsk and PSR in BUK-TELARs to explore the consequences of these rules:

Above meant Standard only works for planes with ADS-B, for civil aircraft. Since, in case of military aircraft without ADS-B, Dnepropetrovsk detects no plane at all on SSR.
But now we have a problem if Dnepropetrovsk detects a plane with ADS-B (MH17) and BUK-TELAR (PSR) (Ukrainians) detects a military object (II-76 or AN-26).
If both systems had been integrated (requirement of Eurocontrol) then Dnepropetrovsk (SSR) would have corrected BUK-TELAR (PSR): ‘This might be a civil aircraft’, what of course was the task of BUK- TAR (RADAR).

This means a solitary BUK-TELAR in a civil aviation area is inciting war crimes by conditional intent with probability consciousness (dolus eventualis).

(Dolus eventualis refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility. The legal definition of dolus eventualis is: Awareness of the likely outcome of an action.)]

[A complication is a Russian BUK of the separatists which of course was not integrated within the Ukrainian system. Now Ukraine could object this is an invader and this is not their fault, not our responsibility. Then, legally, missing PSR in Donetsk has nothing to do with the assault on MH17].

6.2.5
PSR/SSR Data Combining
Performance for PSR/SSR data combining shall be defined by:
– Overall probability of association;
– Overall false association rate.

NOTES
1. PSR/SSR data combining is the capability of the radar system to associate at each antenna scan the target reports of the same aircraft detected by the two sensors and to combine these reports into a single target report.(MH17 and II-76)
2.The probability of association is determined by the ratio of the number of combined target reports in relation to the number of total expected combined reports, as defined by the measurement method.
3.The association is defined as false, if the target reports from two unrelated targets detected by the two sensors have been associated.
4.The false association rate is the number of combined target reports resulting from a false association in relation to the total number of combined target reports
5. If this function is performed at the centre level, the same performance requirements apply.
5.3.3.
2. Reduced performance means that the performance of some element of the radar chain is below full performance. Depending on the circumstances, the provision of a radar service may or may not be affected.
5.3.6. Warnings of significant failures within the radar chain, which may have an impact on flight safety and provision of air traffic services, shall be provided at the relevant control positions.
5.3.8 Recommendation
Scheduled maintenance should not exceed 24 hours over a period of 3 months.



We know three major PSR (Prim.Surv.Radar) were damaged long before the downing of MH17:

Andrew:

[The known damaged Ukrainian radars were at Donetsk, Lugansk, and Artemovisk and were taken down 4 to 7 weeks earlier. That civilian and military flights continued throughout up to July 17 means some method of  air traffic control must have been present to coordinate and control operations, as hundreds of military bombing and airdrop supply sorties occurred in that time, and civilian overflight included thousands of trips with potentially conflicting routes.]

http://tinyurl.com/ht3dxl2





There were no financial and technical means to rebuild those PSR immediately. And they would be demolished again. So what could Ukraine decide? Of course, they had some PSR stations left which could be used, but we know they also placed BUK-systems in Eastern Ukraine which covered PSR. One or two BUK-systems were already sufficient:

A Dutch military intelligence service report states they did not have any information on the presence of a Russian BUK in Eastern Ukraine at July 17. (source)


[Following information of the MIVD the Ukrainian Air Force had older BUK-systems in Eastern Ukraine.]

MIVD: Military Information and Security Service.

https://twitter.com/PieterOmtzigt/status/690486999669678081
[CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7] Twitter Pieter Omtzigt.]

https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/331834-mh17-russia-storchevoy-letter/
[Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]

As Eugene already said it is technically quite impossible to connect SSR (Sec.Surv.Radar) with PSR of BUK. In former comments we argued this also was not needed since Ukraine had split Civil Aviation above and Military Aviation below 9700 meters. So planes could not collide and of course Ukrainian BUKS would not shoot their own planes. So in this way they followed the rules of Eurocontrol somewhat and did not foresee any danger.

But they were very wrong:

Ukrainian BUKS in Eastern Ukraine were vulnerable because communication among BUKS is not encrypted and by radio. Furthermore, BUK COMMAND VEHICLES maintained contacts with the Dnepropetrovsk airbase, information which must have been intercepted easily by separatists with the help of the Russians.

So Ukrainian BUKS controlled hundreds of military flights into Luhansk and Donetsk in a very risky manner. Spotters only had to listen to radio traffic between Dnepropetrovsk and BUK COMMAND VEHICLES to know what sort of military planes were coming to shoot them down with Pantsirs:




Ukraine finally unmasked this spying but was unable to stop it. As a remedy they invented some secret language for their messages. But now real confusion threatened since all civil air traffic (SSR) passed along the PSI of the BUKS.

Separatists with their alleged BUK in Snizhne tangled with this secret language and military aircraft was not properly distinguished from civil aircraft any longer. And that’s why in this scenario separatists shot down MH17 erroneously thinking it was an AN-26.



The theory of Ukraine using BUK for guidance of military traffic is complete nonsense.
A BUK radar is not designed for ATC just as a Lada is not designed to transport cargo like a truck is. Both share a common thing: wheels.
Military have their own radar infrastructure based on PSR. These radars are fixed at military bases as well as mobile.
Make sure you write facts or I will need to put your comments on moderation.

https://www.rt.com/news/360056-mh17-crash-bellingcat-bloggers/
Published time: 20 Sep, 2016 18:51

In the report Russian bloggers have countered Bellingcat’s claims that there have been no Ukrainian BUK missile systems in the conflict-zone in the country’s East. They provided various screen shots of Ukrainian media reports, picturing BUK missile systems of the Ukrainian army in the conflict area.


One of the screenshots contains part of the program called “Hour CH” by the Ukrainian First National TV channel. The respective program is dated July 16, just a day before the MH17 crash.


“The photo shows a self-propelled fire installation "Buk" [missile system] and radar 19ZH6 (35D6). This radar station in the Ukrainian army is used as an additional means of controlling the air space and targeting systems for air defense fire units, armed with ‘Buk’ [missile system]”, the bloggers’ investigation finds.

 Basic Dimension // February 11, 2016 at 12:39 pm //

Well, you may be right and that’s why I warned it is just a scenario. But now I would like to ask you to prove separatists definitely were not able to intercept any radio communication between BUK COMMAND VEHICLES and Dnepropetrovsk airbase concerning flights of military aircraft on Eastern Ukraine. I mean ATC was not my point which I easily can give up.

Thinking about the downing of MH17 has cost me an awful lot of time and I am very grateful for your patience and for all freedom I have got on this site. I am pretty sure it is this site which will eventually discover what really happened. I wish you all the best…

=================================
I doubt if the radar was able to detect a missile. I believe the radar recordings are gone because it would show military aircraft near MH17.
I believe those military aircraft played a major role in downing MH17. Likely not because they shot a missile at MH17.
More likely those SU-25s or other type were a target for the BUK missile. The BUK might mistarget and hit MH17.
Not sure if this is possible but could be.

 Antidyatel // February 12, 2016 at 11:41 am // Reply

I doubt it is possible. But what is possible is to use command vehicle with snowdrift radar and to redirect the missile during active phase of guidance. Missiles are not linked to particular BUK unit and command center has a priority in controlling the missile. TELAR radar is less powerful than snowdrift and missile will go for the stronger signal at active phase.


 Antidyatel // February 12, 2016 at 11:43 am // Reply

It is not considered in Buk design a scenario when enemy also has Buks. I doubt it was envisioned, particularly for older models


Then Ukrainian BUK systems possibly can hear each others communication as a form of spying. We must come to know if each BUK-system has a secured communication system against other BUK-systems. If not, the receiver of a BUK possibly can be built into a car and so Ukrainian BUKs could have been followed by ‘spotters’.

 Antidyatel // February 14, 2016 at 7:38 am //
Listening each other is not a problem. The issue is if command vehicle hooked to snow drift radar can redirect semi-active missile. First seconds missile goes without guidance. Then it will follow the strongest reflected signal, which is achievable by very powerful snow drift radar. Also command center is actually designed to control TELAR remotely. So if rebels got a BUK from Ukr army from a group if pretend to be defectors, the actual control of the unit stayed with Ukr army.

 Andrew // February 14, 2016 at 8:03 am //
“It is not considered in Buk design a scenario when enemy also has Buks. I doubt it was envisioned, particularly for older models”
The BUK’s possessed by Ukraine are legacy Soviet units that were previously fully integrated operationally with units in Russia proper. If they can no longer talk to each other electronically, it could only be from Ukraine changing the method of data link (anyone think UKRBORONPROM did that?) or encrypting it with a code somehow not possessed by Russia (seems farfetched given Russian penetration of Ukraine’s military and secrete services). Its unlikely that Almaz Antey removed backwards compatibility from Russia’s BUK-M1-2’s and BUK-M2’s. After all, one of the key selling points of BUK-M was its ability to control and guide firing stations of the prior air defense system called KUB.

 Antidyatel // February 14, 2016 at 10:29 am //
Yes, apart from still encountered difficulty with identifying the exact missile used, the interlinking of BUK systems and relative ease of redirecting semi-active missile makes the permutations about actual organisers of the false flag quite diverse.

 Antidyatel // February 14, 2016 at 10:39 am //
The redirection of the semi-active missile actually the plausible explanation of the only eye witness report with name of the witness attached to it. I remember that he claimed to see su-24 going at low altitude and then suddenly going straight up. Hence, both SU24 and hit by Buk missile can be part of the story and make sense of why Russian MOD even talked about Su24


 Basic Dimension // February 12, 2016 at 4:03 pm // Reply
 [In the forward compartment of the BUK-missile, a semi-active homing radar head (9E50, Russian9Э50, 9Э50М1), autopilot equipment, power source and warhead are located. The homing method chosen was proportional navigation.] So, the homing method is how the semi-active radar information effectively is used to change the course of the BUK. 
BUK-missiles use semi-active homing in which there is a passive radar receiver in the missile and active radar in the BUK-TELAR, steering the missile to the target. In the first phase this steering is straight to the target.
But also the 9М38M1 missile itself uses active homing when approaching the goal. This is active homing not alone by radar reflection but also by other means. It is the proportional navigation phase based on the fact that two vehicles are on a collision course when their direct Line-of-Sight does not change direction as the range closes. Proportional navigation is the anticipation of the course of the target by timely adjustment of the direction of the missile by cutting corners.  
Hence, the missile first has an inactive phase of vertical acceleration of the launch, then an active phase of radar guidance by BUK-TELAR or BUK-TAR (Snowdrift) and in the neighbourhood of the target is uses proportional navigation for cutting corners to the targer. Remember the proximity fuse only determines the best moment of detonation. It does not steer the missile. It is not proportional navigation.

Remember in our former scenario the BUK missile with semi-active radar homing lost the SU-25 at 2 km and continued its way to MH17 at 10 km. Our assumption was an experienced crew would have been shocked by perceiving another plane hiding behind the alleged SU-25. This inferred from the longer lock-on time. Knowing it must be a civilian plane on much higher altitude they definitely would have stopped aiming the radar at MH17.

Also remember missiles accidentally program to the next plane in hiding only with active radar homing, which old BUK missiles do not have. These modern missiles lock in on the next target, which they do not perceive as different. But this only happens after a miraculous escape maneuver of SU-25, which until now was the biggest object. Then the advanced missile locks in on MH17.

But with semi-active radar homing purely it is a matter of good luck in a shot gun approach to impact on MH17 within several meters, after first blindly bridging 8 km through the air. Remember MH17 meanwhile was in a very different place in the air. This probability must be about zero.

What means MH17 definitely must have been aimed at intentionally by the crew of the BUK all the time. IMO I have proven MH17 has been shot down intentionally (Q.E.D.)

Now, what is the product rule of independent chances for a crew of a separatist BUK, which intentionally would shoot down a passenger airliner, times the chance Ukrainian SU-25 are in the air? This chance is zero because they definitely would not aim at MH17 after losing the SU-25. 

Secondly, what is the product rule of independent chances for a crew of a separatist BUK, which INTENTIONALLY wanted to shoot down a passenger airliner, times the chance Ukrainian SU-25 were in the air? Then separatists would try to blame the Ukrainians of shooting down MH17 with machine gun fire. This would be a much bigger chance because of a covariate, but the problem is, we already concluded separatists did not have a motive to shoot down an airliner. So this scenario definitely must be zero.

Thirdly, what is the chance the crew of a Ukrainian BUK would shoot down a passenger aircraft times the chance Ukrainian SU-25s were in the air? Now we have the intention (the motive) of Ukraine as covariate which makes intentional aiming possible. This would be a dependent chance with high probability.


=======================
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buk_missile_system

In general, the system identifies potential targets (radar), selects a particular target (command), fires a missile (launcher) at the target, and resupplies the system (logistics). The missiles require a radar lock to initially steer the missile to the target until the missile's on-board radar system takes over to provide final course corrections. A proximity fuse aboard the missile determines when it will detonate, creating an expanding fragmentation pattern of missile components and warhead to intercept and destroy the target. A proximity fuse improves the "probability of kill" given the missile and target closure rates, which can be more than 3,000 km/h (1,900 mph) (or more than 900 m/s (3,000 ft/s)).

=======================



 Shalcker // May 19, 2016 at 6:05 pm // Reply
Regarding metabunk discussion, important point is mentioned at the end of linked thread (from Appendix V of AA report):
Argumentation:
It appears that during the simulation no consideration was given to the specifics of the proximity fuse. The main feature of the proximity fuse of 9M38 and 9M38M1 rockets is that on receiving the required number of  response impulses by the reception antenna, a functional delay is activated.
The time of the functional delay is optimized on such condition that when firing at head-on courses the detonation point would be at least 3 to 5 meters from the front part of the aircraft in the direction of the tail unit.
The delay may change only in case the response signal of the proximity fuse disappears. (when a target is flying on crossing courses). In this case an immediate detonation of the warhead occurs. The distribution of fragment spray is optimized with a functional delay. Given the summarized speeds of the rocket and the target in the range of 1000 – 1200 m/s, the spay of fragments will be directed perpendicularly to the rocket movement
vector.
Thus, in the case of the encounter conditions between the aircraft and the rocket, described in section 3.7.4, the detonation point of the rocket warhead should have been 3-5 meters further from the front part of the aircraft towards the tail unit.
This behaviour can be easily seen in many anti-air missiles, Russian or US, thus making the only possible point for detonation as observed to happen on crossing course (thus refuting forward point of Shnitze, and pointing to Zaroschenskoe).

IMO, the 3…5m extra delay would cause the missile to start missing some of it’s intended targets.
And if launched from Zaroschenskoe the proximity fuse detects Boeing777 about 17 meters before fuselage. So it’s absolutely sure the shrapnel would hit from right to left if launched from there.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2waS1FT2tjWEh0bk0




Sotilaspassi,
No, absolutely not. Following the state of the art, that’s Eugene and me, the launch site was between Zaroshchenske and Snizhne. Then shrapnel hits the left side. I offer you these pictures :)

http://tinyurl.com/joakl6v



http://tinyurl.com/z67fsk5




You think BUK proximity fuse look sideways 90%?
Where have you got that idea?

Even with 50 degrees it works:
[The delay may change only in case the response signal of the proximity fuse disappears. (when a target is flying on crossing courses). In this case an immediate detonation of the warhead occurs.]
If the proximity fuse disappears it detonates too early just in front of the cockpit:

http://tinyurl.com/haon6lu




 sotilaspassi // May 23, 2016 at 6:57 pm //
My brain does not compute it the same way.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2wWExYZnJtdTdGR0U






Fourth attempt to post this, now to the end of thread.
Related to discussion of BUK approach in 50deg angle and
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2wWExYZnJtdTdGR0U

TELAR “lights” the whole target with it’s radar, I’ve read at max range that is 180m area around the Boeing777. Missile sees the sum of reflected radar signal, in practice it means missile target the center of Boeing777 echo.

When missile comes closer to target, it starts to focus on the strongest signal reflected from target. That can be the engine area or the nose of Boeing777, nose becoming more likely when coming closer to target in an angle. The guidance of missile proceeds like that until proximity fuse detonates the warhead.

Proximity fuse use it’s own radar transmitter built in the missile. So, when any metal comes to it’s view and reflections are received, detonation process is started according to built in delay.
Proximity fuse detection beam must be at least “long” enough to cover 17m kill range to the sides, this would mean minimum of some 20m+ signal forward in 30deg-60deg angle (depending on missile design), in practice the beam is not “limited” to 20m, it most likely detects targets up to 40m (to the side, 50m~in forward angle) or so, because warhead has capability to cause damage to that range.

For missile to work reliable the logic needs to be very simple, more so with decades old missiles.
BUK missile is designed to kill cruise missiles (<<10 meter long & 300m/s speed & 1000m/s collision speed) and maneuvering fighter jets (15 meters long & 1300m/s collision speed).
If fuse delay is (up to) 7ms like DSB somewhere stated, it means missile travels 7 meters vs approaching target before it detonates. Against cruise missile 7ms delay cause BUK to be able to hit only the tail of the approaching missile. + Almaz-Antey delay, it would miss the target.
Also against supersonic fighter jet 7ms delay + Almaz-Antey delay would cause the missile to miss the target or damage only the tail of the fighter jet.


Detonating warhead after proximity fuse received signal is lost would seem to be too late. (emergency action by missile, hoping that some of the shrapnel from warhead tail would still hit the target while 95%+ of fragments miss the target)

That's roughly what I've learned.
I might be wrong, just waiting someone to dig facts to prove it if I'm wrong.
(preferably in english)



Most interesting discussion. But in my view the BUK-missile is semi-active homing and reacting on the radar impulse from BUK-TELAR. I suppose this is reflected by the nose of the target. So, the proximity fuse will not react on the right side of the cockpit. I do not think active homing cutting corners is involved.
http://tinyurl.com/haon6lu



Sotilaspassi,
The missile already identified from TELAR ‘the sum of reflected radar signal, in practice it means missile target the center of Boeing777 echo’. It would be illogical if this information about ‘the center of target’ was neglected with the onset of the proximity fuse.
[When missile comes closer to target, it starts to focus on the strongest signal reflected from target.
That can be the engine area or the nose of Boeing777, nose becoming more likely when coming closer to target in an angle.]
To avoid confusion the target of the proximity fuse will be brought in agreement with the earlier received radar center from TELAR. Only when TELAR stops emitting radar pulses then the proximity fuse has to choose its own center.
Which all means the fuse might see the right wing, but it knows it must detonate on the nose. And now the horizontal course angle with the launch site becomes important, since below 50 degrees azimuth BUK-TELAR will aim at the nose of the plane.
The delay story is indeed somewhat weird. I would say detonation starts when received pulses converge to their maximum rate at the target, that’s the nose.

Basic, to me that seems absolute nonsense.
From my learnings, BUK proximity fuse use it’s own radar transmitter and is fully independent from TELAR sent signal.
It reacts when it’s own signal is reflected from any surface on it’s view.
Proximity fuse does not choose any center. It’s function is to detonate warhead when detects “metal”. (more so with decades old missiles)
If TELAR radio guidance is lost, warhead detonates immediately.
If TELAR sent radar signal receiving is temporarily blocked warhead should not detonate.
If proximity fuse does not trigger the warhead, missile most likely continue flying on set track until it is out of TELAR guidance radio signal or hits ground and then detonates.
But if documented better know-how appears, it’s welcome.




Basic, to me that seems absolute nonsense.
From my learnings, BUK proximity fuse use it’s own radar transmitter and is fully independent from TELAR sent signal.
It reacts when it’s own signal is reflected from any surface on it’s view.
Proximity fuse does not choose any center. It’s function is to detonate warhead when detects “metal”. (more so with decades old missiles)
If TELAR radio guidance is lost, warhead detonates immediately.
If TELAR sent radar signal receiving is temporarily blocked warhead should not detonate.
If proximity fuse does not trigger the warhead, missile most likely continue flying on set track until it is out of TELAR guidance radio signal or hits ground and then detonates.
But if documented better know-how appears, it’s welcome.

Sotilaspassi,
Thanks, I think you’re right with the fuse detonator. Does this mean in your opinion the missile might have approached from the left side?

http://tinyurl.com/haqwbgj





 Eugene // May 26, 2016 at 12:25 pm //
Basic Dimension,
This sotilispassis discussion about fuse workings seems to be a bit amature. For example, he writes a lot but he doesn’t know that the impulse trigger slit antenna also measures distance, which is also taken into account while determining the detonation time. Secondly, the trigger beam may bounce off the body when touching at a shallow angle and need a relatively normal hit point, we don’t know. So overall, sotilaspassi’s arguments cannot be considered serious, but just another load of noise.

 sotilaspassi // May 26, 2016 at 3:36 pm //
No. Only possibility is from ahead. About 0… 30deg to the right of flight path.
Navigation methode of BUK takes it to the other side of the plane’s nose before detonation, when target does not maneuver.
Unless I find any hard proof stating otherwise.



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