Sunday, 1 January 2017

Number Archive





http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/former-ukraine-chief-investigator-of-mh17-ukraine-buk-captured-in-crimea-could-have-downed-mh17/

Posted on May 21, 2017 by  in Uncategorized // 0 Comments

Former Ukraine chief investigator of MH17 “Ukraine BUK captured in Crimea could have downed MH17”


                                                          --------------------------------



Last published article: February 13, 2017
MH17: False flag planning


False flag planning:

If you were the Russian army planning assaults on military Ukrainian aircraft above Don Bass and in Donetsk, which warhead would you prefer? Notice, these BUK's would be out of control in Ukraine which might be dangerously in a diplomatic sense. Then Russians could be easily unmasked with warhead 9N314M


Good. Im happy with your answer. It is logical that if Russians passed TELAR to rebels, they would also provide TAR support from across the border. The only scenario when TAR will NOT be used is if there was an intent to shoot down an airliner. I’m sure you would get a lot of support in pushing the intent theory.

Would they send their 9N314M into Donetsk or the old 9N314 which is still in regular use by the Ukrainian army? What do you think? Yes, they anyway would be expected to send the old warhead 9N314.

And if Ukraine was the perpetrator, would they use the 9N314, which is in regular use by Ukraine, or would they fire the more modern 9N314M which is also in active use by the Russians? Well if intentionally, Ukraine would shoot down a passenger plane (what else?) with warhead 9N314M.

So our decision rule is as follows: the Russians would use warhead 9N314 and the Ukrainians warhead 9N314M.

Well, we know warhead 9N314 is falsified by my research on data from albert_lex. And in the same way the profile of 9N314M is confirmed. And last but not least the modern Russian warhead 9N318 is falsified. So, if it is a BUK it definitely is warhead 9N314M. 


9 March 2017

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-summary-of-the-hearings-on-the-ukraine-application-at-icj-against-russia/

Ukraine has several BUK systems in the area. According to Rogachev, Director of the Department of New Challenges and Threats at the Russian Foreign Ministry,

“it should be noted that during the summer of 2014 the Ukrainian Army’s anti-aircraft missile regiment No. 156, equipped with ‘BUK-M1’ missile systems, was stationed in the zone of conflict. The regiment’s headquarters and its first division were located in Avdiivka near Donestk, its second division in Mariupol and its third in Lugansk. In total the regiment was armed with 17 BUK-M1 SAMs, identical to the one identified by the JIT.”

Difficult to take a position. But Ukraine was in war, so why would not they install BUK's? Well, what planes had to be shot down? Maybe, if there was so much Russian equipment they also had to expect Russian SU's. So, it is complicated and all parties - especially the Dutch - lost their scientific credibility already from the start. 




http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-bellingcat-report-identifying-khmuryi-the-major-general-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/#comment-24303


 Andrew // March 11, 2017 at 4:56 pm // Reply
>The Buk was photographed/filmed/mentioned to be seen on the route Donetsk-Pervomayske many times.
Just to be clear, you should state that several hours after the shootdown, pictures and videos of a BUK on this route began to be released without any attribution of metadata and thus no ability to tie the pictures/videos to a specific time and date. This was followed up after several YEARS by the uncovering of a BUK on a commercial satellite image that coincidentally lines up with a newly released video.
Think about it. All those billions spent on CIA analysts and NRO imagery every year, and they couldn’t even be bothered to release the blurry image off the publicly available Digital Globe picture in the first few days/weeks/months.
It is also fascinating that contemporaneous mentions of BUK only show up on American controlled Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook but that a perusal of VK.com public message boards for Shakhtersk, Torez, and Snizhne have no mention at all of it passing through their towns until after the shootdown. The locals did not hesitate at all to constantly post about messages, images, and videos of battles, shelling, military convoys and aerial combat operations. They openly discussed the rebels firing anti-aircraft missile weaponry at military jets all day long on July 16.
There are literally several dozen (maybe even 100) YouTube videos of random people (and local news organizations) filming and posting Ukrainian BUK movements throughout 2014, most of them uploaded within hours of the sighting off dashcams and cell phone cameras. Thousands of  cars, all with dashcam recorders must have passed the supposed Russian BUK on the route it allegedly took, yet its taken years for a single video to be uploaded. Apparently not a single person in all Donbass was interested in showing they saw this fascinating war machine loaded with huge green missiles on the day it actually moved? Or did they all just get religion and suddenly adhere to military secrecy protocols just for this piece of equipment? Preposterous.

Comment BD: You know, if scientific research becomes fraudulent and corrupt, they better stop the investigation. MH17 research lost any credibility from the start, I think this was meant to be so.





Number Archive MH17 



MH17: CONFIRMATION OF 9N314M NOT POSSIBLE
MH17: Falsifying 9N314M by RF
MH17: Rosaviacia versus DSB report 
MH17: THE ILLUSION OF JUSTICE
MH17: The framework of justice around MH17
MH17: BUK-TAR scenario downing MH17
MH17: B777 mistaken for SU-25 but debunked
MH17: THE GAME CHANGER OF MH17
MH17: The albert_lex histogram
MH17: BUK AS BATTERING RAM

MH17: THE TRACK OF THE BUK THROUGH THE MH17
MH17: THE INDIRECT PROOF OF BUK
MH17: DRIFT ANGLE AND DOWNING OF THE MH17
MH17: Possibly torpedoed straight from the south of Snizhne
MH17: Witnesses
MH17: CALCULATING THE POINT OF DETONATION
MH17: Location of the missile from entry holes
MH17: HOW THE COCKPIT FELL APART
MH17: Reflected  shockwaves
MH17: JIT in despair?
MH17: The immoral role of Ukraine
MH17: Russia's official response to the Bellingcat probe
MH17: False flag planning


From http://sexualreligion.blogspot.com/ 


cc-by-nc-sa





This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attibution-Non Commercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International Licence.

Counter-espionage with MH17 (Part I)

Basic Dimension




                UPDATED OVERVIEW OF MH17



Start February 1, 2015.
Updated May 9, 2017.
Independent blog.



Counter-espionage with MH17 (Part I) (Dutch)

- At first sight Ukraine separatists had strong motives for shooting down MH17, for thereafter civil aviation over Donetsk would be banned and Donetsk was not held hostage by the Ukraine military any longer. Ukraine would lose air superiority and military aircraft would be shot down by separatists.

- Although this would cost the lives of many innocent airline passengers, this would fall away against thousands of innocent civilians who were expected to die by continuing Ukrainian air raids.

- But it is not as simple as Ukrainian military fighters and Antonov planes flew quite low resulting in little coverage by the higher civil flying. So, little benefit was to be achieved with the expulsion of the civil aviation.


- If separatists really were planning to get a civilian plane down, they could make the best use of a solitary BUK TELAR in autonomous mode, for it cannot distinguish correctly between military and civilian aircraft. Then they could pretend to have made a mistake by shooting down a civilian airliner with a bottle of vodka in hand.

- But despite so-called coverage by civil aviation, separatists or Russians increasingly succeeded in shooting down low-flying military aircraft such as the Antonov-26 on July 14. Hence, hostage of civil aviation hardly was effective for low-flying military aircraft.


- Therefore, we conclude separatists had no major interest in making civil aviation impossible, and certainly not at the price of shooting down a civil airplane.


http://www.buran.ru/htm/mh17_4.htm

  On 1 July 2014 the Ukrainian authorities closed the airspace over the zone of conflict for civil aviation to an altitude of 7900 meters (train FL260, ie 26,000 feet), and from July 8, represented by the Ministry of Transport Ukraine closed the airspace in the area of ​​combat operations for civil aircraft. (...) But the transit of "foreigners" remained above FL 260, and they continued to fly! Pravda, July 14, after the destruction of the An-26 at an altitude of 6000 ... 6500 m, the height of a comprehensive ban has been lifted to a height of9800 meters (32000 feet).

[MIVD (Dutch Military Secret Service): An-26 flew at up to 3900 m altitude, but unlike what MIVD claims is not shot by MANPADS, but probably by Pantsir.
http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/11/14/waar-was-de-antonov-toen-de-rus-hem-raakte-1556170]

- On July 15, it was announced by the military in a Public Statement since July 14 civil aviation was only allowed above 9,700 meters and military aviation was suspended. But actually military flights went on as usual.



If you have no primary radar available but you can split civil and military aviation in altitude below and above 9700 meter, then they cannot collide and you need no primary radar. May be that was the real reason for that absurd measure and that’s why it had nothing to do with SAM.



Legally, possibly for Ukraine there was no need to alert Eurocontrol when their primary radars one by one dropped out. Together with the different altitudes above and below 9700 meters, only there could be problems if civil airliners had to dive in case of decompression etc. This was a very low chance.
Also Ukraine did not need to deliver primary radar data to DSB, for they really had no data left from their ruined radar stations, and furthermore BUK-TAR radar cars possibly do not save data in full. So they theoretically registered the downing of MH17 correctly but had no primary radar data left, which does not mean they did not cover their airspace sufficiently with primary radar. So they needed not inform Eurocontrol.
They might have misled DSB successfully. So, legally Ukraine easily comes away with this brilliant move. They were obliged to keep these data, what technically might have been impossible, so only a reprimand will result under civil war conditions.
Now, meanwhile everybody knows except us, the public and the Dutch Parliament. So DSB, JIT and the government keep their mouth shut, since Ukraine has vetoed over what comes into the DSB report and it possibly suites JIT very good only having to deal with American satellite images to hang the separatists.


Just an observation.
Ukraine has admitted having the BUK KUPOL unit of the 156th Regiment, 3rd Battalion in service in Kharkiv Oblast, presumably near ATO command at Izyum. It also had at least one ST-68UM field radar in use. Additionally, the military radar at 156th Air Defense Regiment, 2nd Battalion base A-1659 in Mariupol is not known to have been sabotaged, nor were local radar facilities at Mariupol airport. Finally, the local radar at Kramatorsk Military Air Field had to be functional to support ongoing flights to/from there.
These facilities were close enough and sufficient to see MH17’s flights and last minutes of distress.
Further, local partisans of Ukraine report military flights in the afternoon of July 17 on Twitter, which means military primary radar was active and being recorded for after action report purposes, especially given the shoot downs on the afternoon/evening of July 16.
The known damaged Ukrainian radars were at Donetsk, Lugansk, and Artemovisk and were taken down 4 to 7 weeks earlier. That civilian and military flights continued throughout up to July 17 means some method of  air traffic control must have been present to coordinate and control operations, as hundreds of military bombing and airdrop supply sorties occurred in that time, and civilian overflight included thousands of trips with potentially conflicting routes:

http://tinyurl.com/ht3dxl2




http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf

Page 47 of 279

The data on the Flight Data Recorder showed that the aeroplane was flying at 33,000 feet, on  a  constant  displayed  heading  of  115°  and  at  a  constant  computed airspeed  of  293  knots.11  The  recording  had  stopped  abruptly  at  13.20:03 (15.20:03  CET).  The  FlightData Recorder  showed  that  the  aeroplane’s  position  at 13.20:02  (15.20:02  CET)  was  48.12715 N 38.52630538 E.(to Snizhne = 21 km)


Now, if a military plane (AN-26) just flew below MH17 on the same track UkSATSE could not warn MH17 since they could not track their own military planes. The horrible dilemma is UkSATSE had no primary radar (AN-26), and the separatists definitely did not use Flightradar (MH17). So this is Russian roulette.
The fault in this scenario is no military plane was visible on Rostov radar. But we trust nobody and certainly no video radar images. But to be fair if a military plane was on the same track the Russians surely would have shown.
But not reality is important but the possible misunderstandings from this tragic situation we are just going to grasp.So we must think better and further.

 Basic Dimension // February 6, 2016 at 11:47 pm // Reply

We start thinking again and the Ukrainians had no primary radar from the airports left. But in any case they had their [BUK TAR radar car with a full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR) modes (motor resonances)].
So they easily replaced primary radar with complete BUK batteries throughout Luhansk and Donetsk. They made a network of primary radars in the field.

Logic Reason (@gsobjc) // May 29, 2016 at 5:53 pm // Reply
> That really does require the seclusion of a BUK TAR radar car with “a
> full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE
> SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR)
I get from russian forums where former “PVOshiniki” are present that Buk has the display where a signal from the target is showed during the “measurement phase” of acquisition. That signal differs for different (in size, type) aircrafts.

> So, they must have been sure this was the plane to shoot down.
This is my impression too. A couple of people on the forums who had hands on experience with Buk quite convincingly said that it was impossible for the Buk commander not to know about the plane speed or height. This is due to the way the parameters are displayed, and due to the training which would teach them to make decisions about selecting corresponding launch modes based on the speed and height parameters. Some people posit that somehow the crew were made think that the plane was a military transport. But Il-76 would still not be able to fly with the 777 speed, and the crew would have guessed that they might be looking at a civilian aircraft, especially that they’d normally see those at the altitude.
The crew would also know that a military transport would likely start descending to do its job. They could have waited to make sure that they are not shooting at a civilian aircraft. But what we are told is that the rebels shoot the plane that was coming closer at almost the largest accessible distance for Buk and chose not to wait.


ESPIONAGE BY CRACKED BUK COMMUNICATION

Step 1: Separatists discovered the Ukrainian army had no control over fighter aircraft without primary radar.

Step 2: Separatists sabotaged primary radar of airbases.

Step 3: Ukraine more and more had to separate civil aviation (high alt) from military aviation (low alt) since they could not track their military aircraft any longer and wanted to prevent collisions with civil aircraft.

Step 4: Ukrainian army replaced primary radars from the airbases with some BUK Target Acquisition Radars (TAR) in the field.

Step 5: This TAR, or better the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE communicated with the airbase. This communication contained all information about overflying military planes. The airbase informed about coming planes, on which TAR controlled the flight and the BUK COMMAND VEHICLE reported back to the airbase.

Step 6: I doubt the BUK system works with encrypted information between BUKs, because that would easily lead to mistakes. So separatists probably could intercept normal communication among BUKs on a distance of several kilometers.

Step 7: Communication from and to the airbase might be encrypted though I bet Ukraine never had experience with this situation before and they possibly still use the telephone for normal communication. Anyway the problem of spying has been reduced to decoding encrypted information at worst. This must be no problem for the Russians.

Step 8: We skip step 6, because step 7 gives direct information from the airbase. Also in step 7 separatists are not needed in the neighbourhood of any BUK system.

Step 9: This way separatists noticed when SU-25s approached from the airbase and shot down fighter jets with MANPADS, Pantsirs or BUKs.

Step 10: In this scenario separatists did not know their spying meanwhile was discovered by Ukraine. Now the airbase communicated a trick: an AN-26 was on its way to the stronghold below Snizhne bringing materials.

Step 11: Then separatists shot down MH17.


[Pieter Omtzigt:

CTIVD (toezichthouder geheime diensten) bevestigt: volgens diensten had alleen Oekraine operationele BUK systemen in Oost Oekraine 17/7]

Double check:

[Those data confirm, among other things, that there was movement and increased activity by Ukrainian Buk surface-to-air missile systems observed within the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine one day ahead of the tragedy.]


James O’Neill,
Your main point is invalid:

[The essential point is that the Dutch Security Services concluded that the separatists did not have possession of BUK missiles, nor the means to fire them, nor the motive.]

They concluded they had no information:

(ctivd-toezichtsrapport-nr-43-nl-hr-011015-def.pdf)

– The AIVD had no information to indicate that the separatists had an operational powerful air defense system before the crash of MH17, for example a Buk-systeem, also called SA11.

Last years the Dutch cut back on intelligence gathering in Ukraine.



https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/331834-mh17-russia-storchevoy-letter/

- This so-called closing of the military airspace had to assure airlines separatists had no more reason to shoot planes out of the sky. Also, Ukraine would be exonerated legally from criminally keeping open the civil airspace above Donetsk.

- After suspension of military aviation civilian aircraft had nothing to fear. But airlines did not know military aviation was continued.

- The Public Statement of the army also did not mention Pantsirs (A2A) reaching up to 15 km altitude, probably downed the AN-26 on July 14. For, this was aired only on a diplomatic meeting generally not known to the airlines. Therefore many airlines wrongly assumed only simple MANPADS were in the game certainly not reaching above 9700 meters.

- Most obvious scenario meant Ukraine would hand out a huge diplomatic blow to the separatists and Russians before it had to close its airspace for civil aircraft. Ukraine would (make) shoot down a civilian aircraft on behalf of separatists and Russians.

- After July 14 for separatists it became even easier. For now everything below 9700 meter could be shot down as military aircraft. Except of course for low flying planes with a working ADS-B-transponder, which were identified by Flightradar as civil planes.

- What would be the conclusion of separatists and how critical would be a 300 meter difference? MH17 flew on 10 km altitude in the visual error margin of 9700 meters for spotters. And what about 
Flightradar? Was MH17 literally flying at the border of death? But of course, no sensible person would shoot her down there.

- On July 17, the separatists had no reason to start directly with the upper atmosphere, where without Flightradar it would come to Russian roulette immediately. That would be political suicide, understood by separatists as well as Kiev. And with Flightradar, MH17 definitely would have been identified as civilian plane.

- The 9700 measure was certainly not intended to protect the international jet set. Nothing changed except now the separatists were invited to shoot anything below 9700 meter. Of course, they would rely on the combination of visual information and Flightradar for ADS-B-transponder identity and altitude. For at Flightradar military planes are always invisible by not showing an ADS-B-transponder.

- And for mobile SAMs as BUK TELARs and Pantsirs nothing changed at all by the Public Statement of the army. This measure had no strategic impact. For sensible separatists in any case would combine visual information with Flightradar for ADS-B-transponder identity and altitude measurement as a control. And then nothing changed under and above the 9700 meter division.

- Therefore Flightradar plays a decisive role in the solution of the crash of MH17. Did separatists use Flightradar or not? Below 7 km they could figure out the AN-26 with binoculars and identify without Flightradar. But above 9700 meters there is no distinction possible without Flightradar.

- Possibly they were controlled by the Russian Rostov radar but there MH17 was well known and the Russians had no reason to let a civilian plane shoot down.


Report MH17 crash:

http://tinyurl.com/zm6zooj




  1. time: 00:00 the missile is launched . 
  2. time: 00:35 when the missile warhead exploded near MH17. 
  3. time: 00:35 when the cockpit of MH17 separated from the main fuselage.
  4. time: +/- 01:20 cockpit section impact with ground.
  5. time: 02:05 when the main fuselage of MH17 hit the ground.


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/dutch-member-of-parliament-asks-32-questions-on-missing-radar-recordings/#comment-12323

 Basic Dimension // November 21, 2015 at 11:18 am // Reply

– Primary surveillance radar images are worthless because they simply can be manipulated. Only with normal accidents radar images can be trusted.

– Hence we agree all parties have same primary surveillance radar images and satellite information: NATO, Ukraine and RF. They unanimously have seen the launch of a BUK and they all exactly know from where. But the ambiguity is all parties can be perpetrator: Ukraine, separatists/Russians.

– Nobody knows exactly where separatists and Ukraine were in power in Donetsk, hence radar images cannot be faked adequately.

– Of course NATO and RF know places where definitely Ukraine or separatists were in power.
– But manipulation of data by one party would be punished immediately by the other. And the first showing falsified data would be designated as the culprit by the other which then, in turn, would change its radar data adequately.

– Hence, falsifying radar was a dead end.

– No one can show faked radar images, for parties hold each other at gunpoint. RF might just find the original primary surveillance radar images in an old shoe box.

– Falsifying radar was a dead end, but not for the US. We know DSB has seen satellite images of the Americans which – as they say – are in agreement with their ventilated opinion in the DSB-report. And because these images are highly classified DSB lost freedom of speech in its own report. That’s why we cannot trust the DSB-report any longer. We can trust nothing, only the facts gathered by ourselves.

– As a compromise all parties agreed it was a BUK launched from a very large area, so all parties could be the culprit. With such a carefully considered stalemate primary radar images were no longer necessary. And so it was decided in the dark club of DSB.

 Basic Dimension // November 21, 2015 at 11:54 pm // Reply

We should talk. It is off topic but important. It is not about radar images but about independent research into the cause of abnormal passenger aircraft accidents. Rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should be reconsidered. This way we cannot proceed for the next hundred years.

New investigations should be delegated to an international respected scientific institute which randomly designates a team of outstanding experts of varying composition and nationality.

Concerned countries will harm their international position in aviation seriously if they do not recognize this committee and do not cooperate. Sanctions are not imposed prematurely by political machinations any longer, but after thorough neutral research. These sanctions will be easier accepted as righteous.

Of course fraud and corruption are still possible. But ties between countries and researchers involved are cut and independent experts are asked only once.

If we do not have the guts to adjust the rules of the game to adapt to international criminality, confidence in this type of research will quickly disappear.








http://tinyurl.com/z8gvtqt






The Drift Angle


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/dsb-final-report-doubts-no-drift-angle/#comment-16886

Karel Knip:

http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/04/16/boekraket-had-mogelijk-ander-doel-dan-mh17-1609314

Ultimately calculated in subsequent exercises azimuth value rise from 17 to 35 degrees, with 27 as the most likely value.

http://tinyurl.com/jcprrd2




On this basis, the launch site can be calculated as the position and direction of the Boeing are known. The last position of the Boeing is shown by the Flight Data Recorder

http://tinyurl.com/hupfsy9





The drift was caused by approaching from the right side winds which forced the plane to a somewhat oblique position in its orbit.

http://tinyurl.com/jymjxxx









Has a BUK torpedoed the MH17. Maybe, the scenario had to be developed yet. And with a little disturbance in the trajectory followed by proportional navigation it certainly could be true. But we also have pictures of the partial forward fuselage roof without impact of a missile. So, it is difficult and we have no proof yet. 

But on the other hand we have the total disintegration of the plane within 3 seconds which is also difficult to explain. Furthermore we are interested in the possible chain of remains of the missile in the wreckage. If not-secondary fragments like the nozzle of the engine were found in the wreckage this is very unlikely, especially if found in Petropavlivka and Rozsypne. We must wait for withheld evidence of JIT.





http://tinyurl.com/jdjfc3c









The last position of the Boeing showed the Flight Data Recorder and the aircraft position can be calculated. Magnetic heading ( ‘heading’) was, according to a table: 115 degrees and ‘drift angle’ 4 degrees.

The drift was caused by approaching from the right side winds which forced the unit to a somewhat oblique position in its orbit. In the area (Donetsk) has a compass deviation of 8 degrees in an easterly direction. The true heading (relative to the meridians) of the Boeing 119 was therefore (115 + 8-4) degrees. This is reflected exactly as drawn in the OVV illustrations and are thus suitable for further analysis. Recall that a rocket-azimuth of 27 degrees relative to the Boeing manifests itself due to the drift as an angle of 31 degrees with the route flown.




DUTCH HEADING, GROUND TRACK AND TRUE TRACK

Literally an aircraft’s heading is the direction that the aircraft’s nose is pointing. It is the true track. But true track is not always the right course. Just as ground track for sailing boats not always leads to sinking on a sandbank. Anyway, in a narrower sense the heading of an aircraft is into the direction of the X-axis:

http://tinyurl.com/jcprrd2





Heading (in a general sense)
EN: heading NL: koershoek (course angle)
EN: magnetic heading NL: magnetische koers (magnetic course)
EN: change heading NL: koers/richting veranderen (change of course/direction)
EN: compass heading NL: kompaskoers (compass course)

http://tinyurl.com/zj4lk92






Relationship between course and heading

The heading will differ from the course depending on (1) the forward speed (speed [not] parallel to the heading) of the vehicle in its medium (air for an aircraft, water for a vessel), (2) drift speed (speed orthogonal to the heading) in its medium (only for vessels, especially for sail boats at close points of sail), and (3) wind speed and wind direction (only for aircraft) or current speed and current direction (only for vessels). In the event of a headwind or tailwind, heading and course in an aircraft are the same. For a ship at sea, if a current is running parallel to the heading, then the course is the same as the heading.

Koers (richting)
De koers van een vaartuig of luchtvaartuig is de hoek tussen een noordrichting en de koersrichting. De koersrichting is die van het vlak van kiel en stevens richting het voorschip. Er zijn meerdere noordrichtingen en daarmee meerdere koersen. De koers kan worden afgelezen van een kompas.

Track (direction)
The track of a vessel or aircraft is the angle between the north direction and course direction. The course direction is given by the plane of keel and hull towards the bow (true track). There are several directions north and with multiple rates. The course can be read from a compass.

Ground track and true track

Grondkoers (GrK) = track, ground track, track angle. It is the direction in which the ship is moving. If the ship is off course, for example by drifting, than it can run on the ground or on sand banks. That’s why they speak of ground track.

Ware koers (WK) = true track = course direction, the position intended by the board compass and given by the X-axis of the airplane. If there are no disturbances for vessels true track is the way through water. Else true track must be changed to avoid ground track and sink on sandbanks.

Ware koers en grondkoers

De ware koers (WK) wordt gegeven door de koersrichting, de stand van het vaartuig. De grondkoers (GrK) is de richting waarheen het schip zich beweegt. De afwijking tussen deze twee wordt drift genoemd. Drift wordt veroorzaakt door stroom en wind. Vooral bij zeilschepen kan de afwijking aanzienlijk zijn. Ook vliegtuigen hebben te maken met koersafwijking ten gevolge van de wind.

The true track (WK) is given by the course direction, the position of the vessel. The ground track (Grk) is the direction in which the ship is moving. The deviation between these two is called drift. Drift is caused by wind and current. Especially when sailing the error may be significant. Also, aircraft have to do with deviations as a result of the wind.

[The vessel aims at the desired course direction by its board compass. That is the intended true track visible from the keel line of the vessel towards the bow. But in case of drift the resulting course direction deviates and we say ground track is taking quite a different path.

http://tinyurl.com/zd7vv6j





Hence, with drift the true track given by the direction of the X-axis of the plane is still correct but leads to the wrong course. By landing in heavy winds, the course (the true track) must be over corrected and further than the desired course track (the runway), so the X-axis of the plane lands askew with strong side winds. Only if there is no drift then true track (direction of the X-axis of the plane) given by the board compass is in line with the desired course direction. Then true track and ground track are the same.]


http://tinyurl.com/jp2qol8











Report MH17 crash:








https://www.metabunk.org/debunked-mh17-10-previous-flightpaths-different-from-17-7.t4378/


When we check the flight history database of flightradar24.com, his claim doesn't stand up to scrutiny. I made the following animation of the flightpaths of MH17 from 8 July - 17 July and as you can see the flightpath (with one exception) always crossed the area between Donetsk and Luhansk. This area is on the right side of the image close to the border of Ukraine.


[​IMG]



- The question arises if factually separatists used a form of Flightradar. That looks obvious, but there are two remarks. Firstly, military aircraft was limited to about a height of 7 kilometers and used no ADS-B-transponder. Then Flightradar was not very necessary. And military aircraft were also visible on Rostov's primary surveillance radar.

- Secondly, military jets have an impressive ground speed at low altitude and so there was less time to inspect Flightradar. That must be running permanently. And in this stressful and hectic situation it is difficult to inspect Flightradar.

- That really does require the seclusion of a BUK TAR radar car with "a full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR) modes (motor resonances)". And so on what they did not haveAt least, the BUK TELAR has but very limited IFF / NCTR capability, in which it perceives the MH17 as enemy aircraft!

- Well there was possible help from Rostov's primary surveillance radar.



Logic Reason (@gsobjc) // May 29, 2016 at 5:53 pm // Reply
> That really does require the seclusion of a BUK TAR radar car with “a
> full-function identification FRIEND-OR FOE (IFF) and NON-COOPERATIVE
> SYSTEM TARGET RECOGNITION (NCTR)
I get from russian forums where former “PVOshiniki” are present that Buk has the display where a signal from the target is showed during the “measurement phase” of acquisition. That signal differs for different (in size, type) aircrafts.

> So, they must have been sure this was the plane to shoot down.
This is my impression too. A couple of people on the forums who had hands on experience with Buk quite convincingly said that it was impossible for the Buk commander not to know about the plane speed or height. This is due to the way the parameters are displayed, and due to the training which would teach them to make decisions about selecting corresponding launch modes based on the speed and height parameters. Some people posit that somehow the crew were made think that the plane was a military transport. But Il-76 would still not be able to fly with the 777 speed, and the crew would have guessed that they might be looking at a civilian aircraft, especially that they’d normally see those at the altitude.
The crew would also know that a military transport would likely start descending to do its job. They could have waited to make sure that they are not shooting at a civilian aircraft. But what we are told is that the rebels shoot the plane that was coming closer at almost the largest accessible distance for Buk and chose not to wait.


=========================================================


The Double spy of Ukraine

- So there's room for a scenario in which the separatists did not use Flightradar at all, as follows:

- The army leadership knew the separatists did not use Flightradar for they were not interested in the upper atmosphere with civil aircraft above 9.7 km. And after the 9.7 km measure of 14 July, separatists still made no use of Flightradar. Some high flying transport IL-76, SU-27 and MIG-29 were no immediate danger and had their ADS-B-transponder off.

- If the separatists would ever be interested in the upper sky, aircraft would earlier be seen and would seem to have a lower ground speed, what would give more time for Flightradar inspection. So beware if they were interested in the upper sky they would use Flightradar.

- In case of just perceiving a plane high in the sky but not on Flightradar, they could decide to bring that military aircraft down. What would be very unwise, for a device at high altitude was no immediate danger. So they would not do that. Complete madness certainly within several days after the 9700 caesura.


- On July 17, it was a cloudy day and spotters probably did not perceive MH17 in the upper sky. They would only see the MH17 coming from far on Flightradar. And only Flightradar would identify the MH17 as a civilian aircraft. Also, a height indication would have been given. Therefore, it is nearly impossible the spotter of the BUK - with Flightradar on - would have perceived MH17, erroneously as a military plane. Hence, we do not think the spotter used Flightradar. But as stated earlier the operator on the BUK with IFF will later have considered the MH17 as an enemy plane.

- So separatists in this scenario without Flightradar very likely had no information about the MH17 at the time of the disaster. Through the clouds the spotter hardly saw MH17, and used no Flightradar, for he was not interested in the upper skies.

- An identification error would be ruled out only with Flightradar and the cloudy sky made MH17 fairly invisible. So the separatists did not have any information about MH17. That gives room for another source of information.

- Hence, in this scenario, we consider the absence of Flightradar as evidence the separatists have not shot down an identified plane. For with Flightradar they would have timely identified MH17 as a civilian plane.

- But in this scenario Ukraine knew the spotter of the BUK would not check with Flightradar their indication of an incoming military Antonov aircraft below 9700 meters. And also the MH17 would be considered as enemy plane on the IFF of BUK TELAR. And so this scenario results in a double agent.

- We think about a double agent of Ukraine working as a spy for the separatists on Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk radar, or at an Air Force base. The spotter was tipped by this spy about an incoming military aircraft, an Antonov (the MH17) below 9700 meters.



 Hector Reban // August 27, 2015 at 6:33 am // Reply
There is no proof whatsoever rebels believed they targeted or launched at something. Its a false assumption emanating from the manipulation of the deleted Strelkov_info posting.
And the spotter claim is so ludicrous, its kind of weird people even started to think about its possible trustworthyness. A double agent, right. There are more credible conspiracy theories than this one.
But I guess for pro-Kiev people the feeling the incompetent spotter must have been there because the SBU claimed he was, is strong enough.
  • Hector: just by saying a theory is nonsense is not an argument. It is very well likely a BUK uses human eyes to spot targets. The simple reason it that as soon as the radar of a BUK is switched on, it can be detected by the enemy. And thus can be destroyed.
    Now tell me why a spotter telephone call is nonsense.
  •  Hector Reban // August 27, 2015 at 6:55 am //

    Second argument (sic!): its not credible because it entails the assumption the spotter must be incompetent or that he get false information by a (fictitious) double agent. I already wrote that too by the way.

(...)
A more realistic sequence is as follows (not that I necessarily believe this happened, but we will take it as a hypothetical and enthralling story to illustrate).
The spy/double agent at Dnipropetrovsk has been fed some of the flight plan and parameters of MH17 adjusted to make it look like an AN-26 to pass on the the rebels, pretending it is an AN-26 about to perform a HALO drop to the southern pocket from as close to 8 km as he can get. He is ignorant of the real plane to be hit.(...)



(..) The BUK crew most likely was for the first time in the field without an commander and radar systems. An error is by far the most likely cause.
It is likely Ukraine increased the chances for this error (not closing airspace, double spy providing false info)


 Basic Dimension // August 24, 2015 at 1:15 pm // Reply

Hence, Ukraine ‘knew’ (by Birdie) the danger for all passenger planes but they did not warn, because there was no trail to warn for. That’s because there probably was no military plane in the sky. But then how the separatists got this information in the first place?

Therefore, we are inclined to conclude there was no self-informing separatist spotter involved at all and the Birdie message never existed. And there were also no military planes in the sky because that could compromise Ukraine. Ukraine is in a big mess with this scenario because now only the double agent remains.

 Hector Reban // August 27, 2015 at 8:38 am //
Again, I established this with reason by pointing out to you the spotter and doubleagent scenarios are speculative, unfounded and only supported by dubious claims made by a party we cannot trust (the SBU timestanmped spotter taps).      
        




 Andrew // August 27, 2015 at 8:25 pm //

Admin:

“The simple reason it that as soon as the radar of a BUK is switched on, it can be detected by the enemy. And thus can be destroyed. Now tell me why a spotter telephone call is nonsense.”

If the spotter call is at 16:18:XX and the BUK radar is not even turned on, but the missile is fired by 16:19:28-30, with at least a 24 second launch sequence, then a go-to-launch command is spoken around 16:19:01-05.
We are getting down to mere seconds to fire up the radar and find the target. How realistic is that?
The only way this works is if the rebel crew has also been pre-fed a flight plan which would make them immediately find MH17 because they already knew where to look. Otherwise, in searching for an AN-26 flying slowly at 7 km they wouldn’t find MH17 at 10 km and flying much faster.
This implies a Ukrainian double-cross via the supposed spy at Dnipropetrovsk and the deliberate shootdown of the civilian plane through the agency of manipulation of the targetting by the rebels to make them think MH17 was a military transport.

 igor // August 28, 2015 at 12:09 am // Reply
What exactly is the source for the Dnipropetrovsk´s spy story?


It appears to have originated from somebody called “Andrew”, in this post :
http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/13-months-later-what-happened-to-flight-mh17/#comment-6922
where out of thin air he states, it as if it is know to be a fact : “The spy/double agent at Dnipropetrovsk has been …”…
  • There was a report in Ukraine press that someone who worked at the airport in Dnipropetrovsk informed the separatists about military aircraft movements. I will try to find that report which was in a newspaper. I believe the person worked for an airline.
    • A spy accuses the separatists and double-spy points to Ukraine in the first place. A spy easily leads to the accusation of committing an intentional and witting assault on civilians by the separatists. A double spy places the motive to shoot down a civilian airliner wittingly and intentionally by Ukraine or some Ukrainian renegade faction.



 Соответственно, СБУ начала кропотливую работу по выявлению и обезвреживанию "кротов", регулярно "сливавших" информацию сепаратистам о вылетах украинской авиации.(....)

Accordingly, the SBU start painstaking work on the identification and disposal of "moles" regular "merge" the information about the separatists departures Ukrainian aviation. The hunt for spies conducted by different methods and in almost all airfields from which the combat missions in the area of ​​the ATO. And occasionally in Ukrainian media leaked information on the detention of another "Russian spies" for example, according to the head of the SBU Valentin Nalyvaychenko, as of 15 January 2015 were arrested a total of 232 (!) Spy transmit information to the separatists and "GRU Russian Armed Forces ". This "surge spy mania" in Ukraine began in the second half of July 2014 when the failed offensive along the Russian border. If we talk about the "spy aircraft" detained close to the date of July 17th, 2014 - the day of the tragedy of flight MN17, it is possible to bring the case of detention 07/24/2014 An airline cabin attendantthe detention of 23 July spy, "listen to the talks of military pilots and transmit information to terrorists," or detention of July 24 An airline cabin attendant, a spy in favor of the separatists at the airport Dnepropetrovsk (adding that reports of the capture of "aircraft spies" appear fairly regularly, and much later, for example 26.08.2014, 11.03.2015 and 03.21.2015). What is more important - if the official press releases of the SBU willingly and often reported the arrests of various separatists and terrorists among civilians and militants, the reports of arrests among the soldiers of the Ukrainian army will never be published. 

(...)
Важно другое - если официальные пресс-релизы СБУ охотно и часто сообщают об арестах разнообразных сепаратистов и террористов среди гражданских лиц и боевиков, то сообщения об арестах среди военнослужащих украинской армии никогда не публикуются.

... For one of the most "prolific" informants separatiststo inform them about the Ukrainian aviation sorties from one of the military airfieldsSBU hunted several monthsGradually managed to get on the trail of a spynarrow down the suspects - was a little bit moreanother outlet spy on contact, yet another attempt of communication, any errorthat it accurately locateAgent separatists had to express themselves in any way - and then it can be taken for sure. It was just July 17, 2014 ...



=========================================================


Separatists had no spotters

- From the separatists intercepted telephone calls were real-time intelligence, thisthe Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) could make contact with the (spotters of) BUK.

- The SBU also knew the separatists had no spotters to report from Kiev or elsewhere departing Antonov-26 and we know July 17 it was too cloudy to spot them with binoculars:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2rmN7jeX8A

(5,17/5,29)

Hmuryi: You see, we've got a GRAD, but no spotter. However we're waiting for Russia to shelter them from the other side.





======================================


Marcel van den Berg:

'JIT was not able to find a motive for the shot down. Most likely because the motive is something which should not be made public. My guess Ukraine somehow provoked the launch of a missile.'


Policarp // April 16, 2017 at 1:19 am // Reply

“My guess Ukraine somehow provoked the launch of a missile.”
My guess as well. And they made it with help of USAThat is why all parties are throwing feces at each other instead of providing tangible and verifiable evidence. Practically leadership of all 3 countries (Dutch government behaviour might indicate that not just USA but NATO structures are involved as well) should be put on independent trial – impossible situation.


sotilaspassi // April 19, 2017 at 2:01 pm // Reply

>“My guess Ukraine somehow provoked the launch of a missile.”
I imagine it is possible that someone fed incorrect spotter info.


Good. Im happy with your answer. It is logical that if Russians passed TELAR to rebels, they would also provide TAR support from across the border. The only scenario when TAR will NOT be used is if there was an intent to shoot down an airliner. I’m sure you would get a lot of support in pushing the intent theory. 


                                                  ===================

Basic Dimension: I don't believe in drunk and stupid operators of BUK-TELAR in autonomous mode. I doubt support from a BUK-TAR radar car across the Russian border. I doubt information from Rostov's surveillance radar. Simply because in all those cases they would have recognized the MH17 directly. Russia had no motive. Ukraine had a motive. I know separatists had no spotters on July 17, 2014 for GRAD. Imagine, separatists had not the slightest information about military planes coming from Kiev besides information from the Ukrainian military. Then there is but one scenario left: Ukraine set a false flag as a double spy spotter who gave the operators of BUK-TELAR wrong information. They said a military transport plane, an IL-76 was coming at high altitude of 10 kilometers from Dnepropetrovsk Airbase or Kiev and gave the coordinates of the MH17. And if those operators were Russians, they easily could be misled by wrong separatist spotters. But the problem is a military plane at 10 km alt in Donbass flies to high, so likely an AN-26 was reported at 6 km.

=======================================        

 Basic Dimension // August 27, 2015 at 12:07 pm //
Comment on: Hector Reban // August 27, 2015 at 8:54 am //

Hector said:
‘Like I said: The spotter scenario is not credible because it entails the (non-supported) assumption the spotter must be totally incompetent (ie. can´t differentiate between planes) or that he get false information by a(fictitious) double agent. So who proves the spotter was competent any way and the double agent existed in reality?’

We only have logical reasoning:

A spotter can be postulated to inform the operator of the BUK about incoming military planes of Ukraine. He is the logical link in the chain. But of course, the operator can decide on other grounds to fire a BUK missile. Numerous options are available ranging from complete madness to a phone call from Moscow. But a spotter is most obvious.

Then, a set of requirements is established which the spotter must meet. These are personal characteristics but more important are the means at his disposal. From scratch and by logical reasoning we set boundaries for the spotter.

First of all separatists usually were not using Flightradar, otherwise they would have timely identified MH17. But this must be a fallacy in reasoning, because this would be incredible. We only proceed after finding a good reason why the spotter did not use Flightradar: Flightradar is senseless with military planes with their ASD-B responder off.

This means the spotter always needed inside information from the base of which military planes departed. He was a trustful spy of the separatists but has been unmasked by Ukraine because spotters make use of their telephone and are easily identified by the SBU. Now he was fighting for his life as a double agent.

Now, the operator of the BUK trusted his good old spotter blindly. And the double agent – with a gun against his head – said he needed not look at Flight Radar because that AN-26 or IL-76 had his ASD-B transponder turned off. And there were no civilians on that track, so don’t worry. Normally spotters would be double checked but the separatists had not enough spotters available at July 17.

·   admin // August 27, 2015 at 12:16 pm //
basic dimension: military aircraft like Antonov 26 and IL76 do not have ADS-B. Some IL76 used by civil companies transporting cargo into western countries have ADS-B




["The story passed about by the SBU is that “Birdie coming towards you” was radioed in from Gorlivka, 65 km from the Snizhne position."]

 Basic Dimension // August 24, 2015 at 1:15 pm // Reply

Re-estimating probabilities of scenario 1:

Conclusion: (p = .01): IL-76 en route of MH17, with self-informed separatist spotter.

(P = .8): ‘The BUK crew believed the airspace was closed for civil aircraft below 9,700 meters.’

======
Separatist spy or Ukraine double spy:
======
Separatist spy:

(P = .3): ‘A separatist spotter located some 50km from the BUK informed the crew that the target was coming towards the BUK.’

Remember Andrew’s analyses showing there were big logistical problems for a separatist spotter to identify any (military) aircraft in this time and place path.

—-
AN-26 or IL-76:
——
IL-76: (Remember in this scenario a real IL-76 was en route).

(P = .2): The BUK crew was informed an IL-76 was their target at 11 km, INTERFERING WITH civilian planes. But, because separatist did not use Flightradar this would come down to Russian roulette in the higher areas, which they feared.

Remember Andrew’s analyses showing there were big logistical problems for separatist spotters to identify the IL-76 in its time and place path, where they obviously used no Flightradar on a rather overcast day. The spotter really could not have the slightest clue to identify IL-76. He must have warned the operator of the BUK for uncertainty about this IL-76 observation and not to confound it with civilian aircraft.

Concluding separatists had no clue at all about the identity of that so called IL-76. They were completely unable to identify above 10 km, otherwise they would have identified MH17. (In case of Flightradar, IL-76 had its ABS-B responder off.)

(P = 0,01): Truth of: message intercepted by Ukraine. (‘Birdie coming towards you).

Our assumption is the SBU had real time information about phone calls of the separatists. Also remember Ukraine must have known Rostov’s primary surveillance radar would follow the track of IL-76.

So, if Ukraine trapped MH17 (with a real IL-76) it never would admit foreknowledge by ‘Birdie coming towards you’. They would only just in time change the course of IL-76 to sacrifice MH17.

Hence, a real IL-76 in the sky does not fit with the downing of a passenger plane by the separatists on behalf of Ukraine.

And a real IL-76 in the sky combined with the Birdie story certainly would compromise Ukraine (because no general alarm given).

Because if Ukraine was not setting a fall for the separatists – and a real IL-76 was en route – they would have aired ‘Birdie coming towards you’ AND they would have warned MH17 on the same course immediately, what they didn’t.

Hence, if someone obviously planned to target a real flying IL-76, – there probably was no other Birdie in the sky – Ukraine would have given a total alarm for all civilian planes above 9,700 meters in Donetsk.

The conclusion must be there was NO real IL-76 en route (also there was NO AN-26 in the sky).

Hence, Ukraine ‘knew’ (by Birdie) the danger for all passenger planes but they did not warn, because there was no trail to warn for. That’s because there probably was no military plane in the sky. But then how the separatists got this information in the first place?

Therefore, we are inclined to conclude there was no self-informing separatist spotter involved at all and the Birdie message never existed. And there were also no military planes in the sky because that could compromise Ukraine. Ukraine is in a big mess with this scenario because now only the double agent remains.

Conclusion:

The total probability of a Ukrainian military plane is near zero. We conclude there was no self-informed spotter of the separatists involved and there also was no ‘Birdie’ message. Because we concluded no IL-76 was in the sky, we need not judge about Russia cleaning its radar.


[Horlivka = Ukranian] [Gorlovka = Russian]








- Therefore, the separatists had no information at all on planes at 10 km altitude. Civil airliners to 75 a day. Why MH17? From whom did they actually get the information about Ukrainian military aircraft departing from Kiev or elsewhere? SBU could have placed a double agent in between, pointing the MH17 as low-flying Antonov-26 from Kiev.

- Also Russians or separatists in the BUK had no contact with Rostov radar, because then we had known from YouTube. Therefore, the separatists were totally dependent on the SBU for departing AN-26 aircraft from Kiev.

- The operator of the BUK TELAR had a limited version of IFF for determining the difference between own and enemy aircraft. The system is imperfect and it considered MH17 as enemy aircraft. But it did the same with the remaining 74 aircraft coming in every day. So the spotter of the BUK was probably misled and the MH17 was regarded as an Antonov-26 coming from Kiev.

Russia is above suspicion, but it does not apply to factions within the military who acted on their own and wanted to force a war with Ukraine.


 Basic Dimension // August 26, 2015 at 9:49 am //

Rob, intriguing scenario, all scenarios must be taken seriously.

You wrote: ‘A high-level call came in from Moskow to switch on the radar at 17:20 Moskow time and shoot down the target that was approaching from 115 deg.’

If this scenario should have a chance of success, an additional degree of freedom should be given splitting the command of the Russian army: then we have got two opposing faces of the Russian Army:

1: Russia’s Defense Ministry.
2: A renegade faction within the Russian Army.

Russia obviously has no motive and therefore is above suspicion, but it does not apply to factions within the military who acted on their own and wanted to force a war with Ukraine.

The BUK was not under separatist control and Russian government was not yet informed about this renegade action. And this renegade faction would welcome the BUK shooting down a Russian aircraft because they desperately wanted an invasion into Ukraine.
But for some reason they have chosen MH17. Deliberately because they possessed all kind of radar equipment. May be those officers did not want a Russian invasion of Ukraine, cause in fact they blamed Ukraine and the separatists. Hence, the flaw in this script is they should have known the enormous damage brought to the separatists and that’s why it is not my favorite. This only has a very, very low total chance.

Just by adding an extra degree of freedom all arguments are in line. But now motives of the renegade faction are incorrect and seem completely false. In this scenario Russian government really must have been shocked about what happened. Just as we do they developed all kind of scenarios (not to blame Russia). If the official Russian government deliberately would have shot down MH17, it would never react as  childish, silly and stupid as they did but would have offered a clever defense.


=========================================================


The scenario of the BUK in Donetsk


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/sbu-doubts-buk-received-at-july-15/





I am convinced there were BUKs in Eastern Ukraine before July 17. The narrative a BUK was delivered at July 17 and photographed/video taped at severall places is just incorrect.
There are some inconsequences in time (speed of truck) and weather.
The issue is, press does not have capacitity/time/energy/agenda to fully investigate and report on this. Instead they copy/paste Bellingcat.

Eugene // June 15, 2016 at 11:15 am //
> I am convinced there were BUKs in Eastern Ukraine before July 17
Surely they were. Rebels captured a couple. I think on 14 July Kurginyan told that he brought Russian specialists to fix the radar on one of the broken captured Ukrainian Buks. I am not following this subject closely, so may have minor errors, but the Russian forums have all the info and Andrew here not once quite convincingly showed this.

=========================

RTL nieuws:22 juli 2014 23:20:

Onderzoek vliegramp Oekraïne


[De Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten denken dat het neerschieten van het Malaysia Airlines-vliegtuig boven Oekraïne waarschijnlijk een vergissing is geweest van pro-Russische separatisten.
De Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten zien geen bewijs van directe Russische betrokkenheid bij het neerhalen van het vliegtuig van Malaysia Airlines.
De VS weten niet precies wie persoonlijk verantwoordelijk is geweest voor het afvuren van de luchtdoelraket. Ze hebben ook geen direct bewijs dat de raket uit Rusland kwam en aan de rebellen was geleverd.]

Een 'vergissing begaan door separatisten' is een belediging van het gezonde verstand. Eerst moet een model van motieven worden opgesteld waarin de permutatie van de meest logische volgorde de eerste plaats krijgt. En dan blijkt dat alleen Oekraïne een motief had om een passagierstoestel neer te halen. Pas wanneer dat scenario gefalsifieerd wordt kan men filosoferen over een eenvoudiger toedracht.

En daarom begint de permutatie van de MH17 met een false flag (a) van Oekraïne. Vervolgens kunnen de separatisten dan door misleiding het verkeerde vliegtuig hebben neergehaald (b). De permutatie (a,b) is daarmee de meest logische verklaring voor het neerhalen van de MH17. Een permutatie (b) zonder meer is op dit moment inhoudelijk onzin.

September 3, 2016.   


THE IMMORAL ROLE OF UKRAINE

Ukraine knew the first (Russian) BUK entered Donetsk before or on July 17, 2014. It might protect large equipment (vehicles) which massively passed the Russian border. Ukraine certainly must have realized this could be the beginning of an invasion. Then, closing the airspace for civil aviation was the wrong strategic measure, because then Ukraine would have eliminated any risk for the separatists of shooting down civil aircraft instead of military airplanes.

So it looks like Ukraine had no choice as to continue civil aviation because otherwise they would have lost Donetsk definitely, for they would have lost all military airpower above Donbass.

They must have noticed civil aviation did not prevent the infiltration of earlier BUKs, GRADs and MANPADs. Then, the longer this invasion would take the more vulnerable Ukraine would become in a moral sense by not closing its civil airspace on time. They had to undertake some action. So, what could they have decided?

They experienced a terrible dilemma: They could not stop civil aviation, but also they could not continue their immoral politics of keeping open their airspace. The only possible way to stop civil aviation AND the infiltration of BUKs at the same time was by the downing of a civil aircraft.

So, they might have been forced to do such a terrible thing. Then they would have found the perfect way to stop the invasion of Russian BUKs into Donetsk, since no BUK dares to enter Donetsk nowadays.

Of course I have no proof. But I do know the SBU had real-time intelligence of phone calls between separatists, so in principle they could have interfered. Also at July 17, 2014 the separatists were out of spotters for Grad. Also we know they had no information about the MH17; they even did not use Flightradar.

Then someone MUST HAVE GIVEN THE SEPARATISTS THE WRONG INFORMATION which led to the allegedly shooting down of the MH17. But only Ukraine or a faction within the army had real-time information about Ukrainian military aircraft which could be controlled and was to be trusted by the separatists. And we know a separatist spy would never have let this disaster happen. Only a caught separatist spy at a Ukrainian airbase could have been forced at gunpoint to be a double spy and could have given wrong information about an allegedly Ukrainian military plane to the separatists.

Now, taking a Russian crew they would have been experienced and not drunk. Then, we cannot say they were stupid any longer and did not understand what they were doing. But then there could have been a language barrier with the separatists and they could have been misinformed more easily by the SBU. So remember, with a Russian crew we run into quite another scenario.

Then we must skip the spy and the double spy, since the Russian crew likely did not know anybody. Maybe they had contacts with the separatist commander in chief. But more likely they acted on their own. Then it would have been very easy for the SBU to misinform the crew of the BUK, since their cellphone numbers were known to them.

In general, we are looking to signals of the scaling up of the civil war by Ukraine. For example, we know from the earlier bombing of Snizhne, probably by Ukraine. It was a severe aggravation of the civil war. Maybe they thought to have detected a BUK, maybe not. But there are lots of earlier war crimes from the Ukrainian side.

In retrospect it is clear Ukraine was losing moral self-control and this exceeding of moral limits must have been noticed by the Ukrainians themselves in the first place. They must have understand that this was a dead end. They had to think about other definite measures. And here they possibly got the idea of a false flag but remember, this is an unproven scenario.

Bombing Snizhne was just the scaling up of one of their previous crimes against humanity. Therefore, important for our investigation is to note that Ukraine has been proven to be willing to commit war crimes in advance of the downing of the MH17. What is not the same as they were the perpetrators, only that they were in the mood to undertake such terrible and desperate actions.

Anyway we conclude Ukraine lost our respect by not protecting civil aviation. Then it could have been just a little step to the worst war crime scenario ever in civil aviation. And that not for the first time…

Counter-espionage with MH17 (Part I)

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/mh17-what-i-believe-26-months-later/#comment-20813


 Hugh Eaven // September 2, 2016 at 11:54 pm // Reply
Speculating here a bit but the main reason the standalone BUK might have been supplied was likely to target transport planes on higher altitudes. From what I understood the main vulnerability for Kiev became the problem of resupplying the troops. In a few documented cases they got seriously, massively isolated and ran out of gas, ammunition, medical supplies, some basic electronics etc. Without these transports, the war could have been lost pretty quickly, so it was truly paramount to get something there to turn the tides. The pro-Russian militias did not suffer that problem with the Russian borders so nearby.
Considering the above, the BUK would be there specially to target eg the Antonov 26 at Monday July 14. As for shooting at any Su-25, that might have been more like defense since these jets seem to have been particularly targeting the roaming BUK and perhaps other heavy equipment. Just to hunt for Su-25’s using some spread out set of modern MANPADs could suffice. Plus, one needs to know where to place that one single BUK. Not likely unless it’s known where the Su-25 would try to do something. But the A-26 targeting without radar network (assuming some Russian radar was not helping) would be a bit easier if insurgents knew or estimated the narrow supply route in advance and could place the BUK where the Antonov was expected to fly over.
If that was indeed the case, one can see the MH-17 accident waiting to happen. They’d be waiting exactly for a big target like that, flying as high as possible on a specific route. Some intelligence then somehow erred and bang!
Now for the importance of the possible related Su-25 attacks: some might have been targeting the traced BUK all along but this would have to remain classified as these missions would unravel the whole case for Ukraine. They would be charged as equally responsible for this particular air war at higher altitudes. Or perhaps even messing with intelligence?


==========================

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/

Posted on September 30, 2015 by  in ReconstructionResearchRoute

– the narrative of the BUK arriving from Russia at Donetsk around 09:00 EEST on July 17th and returning in the night after was constructed by the SBU to distract public opinion from the negligent and irresponsible behaviour of the Ukrainian authorities, namely the fact that BUKs had been present in eastern Ukraine before July 17th – possibly already since June – and that the airspace above the ATO zone should have been closed because of this presence (and also because of the air combat between Russian and Ukrainian jet fighters at the time);



 Hector Reban // October 1, 2015 at 8:56 am // Reply

Second, stunningly Arnold draws the conclusion “That there was a BUK in Snizhne is beyond reasonable doubt”. No, it isn’t.





Viktor: with all respect but I am very sure a BUK was transported on July 17. So far the Russian Federation failed to come forward with some good proof something else happened. Fighter jet scenario is nonsense. There is no evidence for an A2A powerfull enough to down a B777 and create the fingerprint of damage we see.
Maybe just maybe a Ukraine BUK was used. However, so far Russia failed to provide any good proof for that.

Eugene // June 15, 2016 at 11:15 am //
> I am convinced there were BUKs in Eastern Ukraine before July 17
Surely they were. Rebels captured a couple. I think on 14 July Kurginyan told that he brought Russian specialists to fix the radar on one of the broken captured Ukrainian Buks. I am not following this subject closely, so may have minor errors, but the Russian forums have all the info and Andrew here not once quite convincingly showed this.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wuj1u_Z6Bgc

Militant: Regarding the plane shot down in the area of Snizhne-Torez. It's a civilian one. Fell down near Grabove. There are lots of corpses of women and children. The Cossacks are out there looking at all this.

They say on TV it's AN-26 transport plane, but they say it's written Malaysia Airlines on the plane. What was it doing on Ukraine's territory?

Nikolay Kozitsin: That means they were carrying spies. They shouldn't be f...cking flying. There is a war going on.


http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/4021328/separatisten-stelden-buk-raketsysteem-in-rampgebied-mh17.html

- [According to the Public Prosecutor's Office, the wiretapped conversations are from the Security Service of Ukraine, SBU.]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olQNpTxSnTo

- In real time the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) was already quite familiar with the route of the BUK what the JIT (Joint Investigation Team) now wants to know from the public. All this does not make it any better for Ukraine:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2rmN7jeX8A

(1.01/ 5,29)

SBU: In the morning of July 17, 2014, the day of the tragedy, counterintelligence obtained trustworthy information of the DPR terrorists obtaining at least one BUK-M unit with a crew transferred across the Russian border near the town of Sukhodolsk around 1.00 AM.

- On July 17th, the separatists or Russians were driving with a very striking BUK in the middle of the war zone of Donetsk where numerous spies of the SBU (Ukraine) are active. All secret agents have telephone with internet for charging pictures and footage. From the first moment SBU must have been informed about the arrival of the BUK and will have shadowed the BUK.

- What means the SBU possessed real-time intelligence about the position of the BUK and in Snizhne probably knew exactly what civilian aircraft would fly within reach of the BUK on July 17th in the afternoon. 

  AN-26 from Ukraine was already shot at July 14th. Hence, this country has been in war permanently and therefore must have monitored the BUK already throughout the entire period, including July 17th; information what  JIT (Joint Investigation Team) now wants to get from the public.

- Also the intercepted telephone traffic of the separatists was probably real-time intelligence, this means the SBU could make contact with the spotters of the BUK. What does not make it better for Ukraine. They could bring a double agent in contact with the spotter of the BUK and show him MH17 as a low-flying Antonov-26 from Kiev.

- Otherwise, Ukraine immediately would have forbidden all civil air traffic because of inside information of criminal intent. But that did not happen ...





 Basic Dimension // August 26, 2015 at 10:11 pm // Reply

 // August 26, 2015 at 7:38 pm // Reply

There is said: ‘And why would Russia present so many lies instead of telling the truth? And why did Russia used its veto? It you have nothing to fear and 100% evidence there is no problem to have a tribunal, right?

This could be a posteriori reasoning caused by lack of knowledge of the Russians. Remember if Ukraine was the culprit Russia had no foreknowledge of the attack and their a posteriori  reasoning would be understandable. They obviously would develop wild theories just as we do, for they would have no facts. And Russian veto is completely understandable because they do not trust the “100% evidence” of JIT and Safety Board. If you have 100% evidence you normally go to court, otherwise you better look for political condemnation by the UN.

In contrast with Russia, Ukraine shared a priori facts with the public by releasing statements from (probably) real time tapped phone calls. These calls demonstrate ruthless foreknowledge and raise the question why Ukraine did not intervene to warn the airlines. A priori facts, which should have encouraged Ukraine to prevent the attack. As an example Ukraine timely ‘knew’ of the transport of BUK in Donetsk the  17e of July. The pinnacle was probably the real time registered “Birdie comes to you ‘, without alerting immediately all civilian planes over Donetsk. This is inexcusable and Ukraine will be accused of inciting war crimes by conditional intent with probability consciousness (dolus eventualis) .

Dolus Eventualis refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility. The legal definition of Dolus Eventualis is Awareness of the likely outcome of an action.

The downing of MH17 definitely was no mistake. It has been  a premeditated and intentional mass murder. 

Prosto: 
The downing of MH17 definitely was no mistake. IMO it has been a premeditated and intentional war crime (mass murder on civilians).  
The downing of MH17 was no accident. In the first place Ukraine is extremely guilty of dolus eventualis what refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility: Awareness of the likely outcome of an action. 
Ukraine is extremely guilty of immoral behavior not to have closed its airspace for civil aviation. This is pure inciting war crime since Ukraine must have foreseen mass murder on air passengers.   
But there is more. I do not believe the separatists had the intention to shoot down a passenger airplane. So in this case war crime cannot be proven. 
Also I do not believe someone pressed the wrong button. Also I believe separatists and Russians had no motive. 
But maybe separatists effectively were the perpetrators. If separatists downed MH17 and also had the intention to shoot down a plane they very likely are premeditated and intentional mass murderers of Ukrainian military's. And it does not matter that it later turned out to be air passengers. So, if they had no intention to shoot a passenger plane than it will not be war crime but mass murder. 
But separatists and Russians are definitely guilty of the incitement of war crimes if they brought Pantsirs and/or BUKs into Ukraine, just because of Dolus Eventualis. They must have expect to kill air passengers (Elena Kolenkina).
Ukraine is the only country with a motive but it is off topic to explain here further.
[“it’s difficult to find a black cat in a dark room, especially when it’s not there.” ]
Well, I see a big elephant in the room, which you apparently have missed.




From a collection of testimonials around Snizhne:

Conclusion

Though each piece of social media evidence described in this article is not conclusive on its own, a clear pattern emerged and matches the widely accepted narrative of July 17. A Buk anti-aircraft system was located in Donetsk in the late morning, headed east through Shakhtarsk, moved through Torez at around 12:10, and headed south out of Snizhne later that afternoonA rocket was fired—both seen and heard by locals supporters of separatist forces—from south of Snizhne immediately before the downing of MH17.

17 July BUK Sightings: Planting Evidence In Advance?



Now more information is coming through, although at low pace, a likely alternative reconstruction of the events can be made. It seems Ukraine has been preparing a ¨terrorist¨ BUK convoy at the 17th that never was there.


The BUK didn´t go with Vostok.
It is getting even worse for SBU, Bellingcat, Ukraine-at-war and the like. From videos and geolocation can be established Vostok departed much earlier than the truck with BUK allegedly did, as Michael Kobs shows in his latest report. This salient fact raises more doubts about the Khmuryi tapes, telephone taps about which Dutch head prosecuter Westerbeke said they were “authentic recordings” that “were analyzed through and through”.

# In fact pro-separatist people would probably be welcoming the arrival of a BUK containing convoy. But there are no street vids, dashcams or written sightings from pro-separatist people welcoming an anti-aircraft missile, something that could be expected after the bombing of Snizhne on the 15th. The sightings arrive for the most part from a small group of pro-Kiev infowarriors, collecting messages from unknown pro-Kiev sources;

# The Khmuryi tapes, about which Dutch head prosecutor Westerbeke said they were authentic, seem to have difficulties to be timed on the 17th. The three Gvozdikas (self-propelled howitzers) Khmuryi says are coming his way, were on the road to Donetsk two days before as part of a 7 machine or ¨tank¨ convoy carrying Russian flags.


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-video-found-showing-buk-travelling-eastwards-on-volvo-lowloader/#comment-17300


Liane Theuer // May 13, 2016 at 9:32 am // Reply
My thoughts on the new video :
1. The CropiPic software was used to delete all traces of the date the video was made.
2. The vehicles seen in this video match the vehicles seen in a military transport by the separatists on July 15 2014 travelling from Luhansk to Donetsk. That’s why the Buk transport did not happen on July 15.
3. As the newly discovered video does not show the tank tracks of the July 15 convoy, the video was made before July 15.
4. The fuel prices shown in the video indicate the video was shot after July 11.
Conclusion : The newly discovered video was made between July 11 and July 14.
This suggests that the whole Buk-transport Donetsk-Zuhres-Torez-Snizhne
happend between July 11 and July 14.
Now my speculation :
SBU and interior ministry collected evidence of the Buk-transport.
They forged the plan to use this evidence for a false flag operation.
Ouestion : Why did Kiev insist the Buk-transport happened on July 17 ?
Possible answers :
1. The Buk was not in Snizhne on July 17 anymore.
2. They did not want to disclose that they knew about the Buk-transport. It was better to leak the evidence by social media on the day MH17 was shot down. That made it easier to cover up a false flag.
3. Had become known that Kiev has evidence the separatists were holding a Buk, they would have had to close the airspace.
But there are a lot more questions to be answered…

admin // May 13, 2016 at 9:47 am // Reply
This is a likely scenario! The BUK convoy must be visible on a satellite photo. Many satellite passed the area on July 17. The fact that there has not been a photo of this concoy is remarkable.


https://hectorreban.wordpress.com/2015/07/10/an-alternative-track-trail-another-buk-on-another-day/

An Alternative Track Trail: Another BUK On Another Day



The game is on.
Half an hour after the disaster a dispatch appeared on a pro-rebel page on Vkontakte (Russian Facebook), in name devoted to the Russian commando leader Strelkov. An AN-26 had been shot down near the mine Progress, the message said based on the perception of citizens in the area of the disaster.
The editors, like the people in the neighbourhood of the crashsite according to their social media postings, assumed too early and too eager an AN-26 was downed. Probably they were merely jumping to conclusions because the same event had happened three days before (14 july an AN-26 had been shot down by the rebels). They claimed a ¨success¨ without knowledgde of all the facts and official briefing from men in the field. When it became known MH17 had been victimized, the  message was deleted.
People of the other site also got the wrong idea. This deleted message with Strelkov´s name attached to it could be disseminated as evidence the rebels had taken out a civilian plane by mistake. Not only the citizens from Torez and Snizhne initially thought an AN-26 was downed, which were the original sources the ¨Strelkov¨ Vkontakte adiminstrators had used. The rebels and their chief themselves, obviously still clinging to their previously fired weapon, assumed that too when they were targeting the plane.
The suggestion that Strelkov was in any way connected to this VK.com site, was of course fallacious. But it was very expedient. With the speed of light the internet was fed by Ukrainian war dispatch services, pro Kiev activists and the western media pundits with the suggestion it was the commander in chief himself who thought he had shot down an Antonov.
The SBU rose to the occasion. Within a few hours a nicely edited, translated and finished up video clip with intercepted phone calls was spread on Youtube in which rebels ¨confessed¨ their mistake. From a computer of the secret service were popping up the photos and videos that were taken when the rebels moved the broken BUK with the Volvo truck and low-loader.

Maybe the SBU had anticipated by creating fake evidence, maybe they made it useful when expedient. In each case the trail theory could be set on track.(...)

Citizen researcher Max van der Werff, who has an extensive blog about the MH17 disaster, made a trip to the region in which the plane crashed, looking for evidence. According to a tweet he spoke to a witness who had a very interesting explanation. This witness, living across the Furshet Market in Torez where the BUK had been photographed at the crossroads, said (s)he saw the BUK all right, not at the 17th though, but at a previous date.


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/

Posted on September 30, 2015 by  in ReconstructionResearchRoute


Main findings
– there is no convincing evidence that the BUK was transported from Donetsk to Torez in the morning of July 17th, 2014. The BUK may have been brought into the area of Torez/Snizhne before July 17th. The Paris Match photos are most likely faked. The Zuhres video seems to originate from another day;

– the BUK convoy never was accompanied by the Vostok battalion tanks. That narrative was evoked by InfoResist’s Dmitry Tymchuk’s reporting as well as by the SBU intercepts;

– there is evidence that there was a BUK at Torez and Snizhne on July 17th. The most important being the testimony by the AP journalists, who saw the BUK at Snizhne;

– the narrative of the BUK arriving from Russia at Donetsk around 09:00 EEST on July 17th and returning in the night after was constructed by the SBU to distract public opinion from the negligent and irresponsible behaviour of the Ukrainian authorities, namely the fact that BUKs had been present in eastern Ukraine before July 17th – possibly already since June – and that the airspace above the ATO zone should have been closed because of this presence (and also because of the air combat between Russian and Ukrainian jet fighters at the time);

– section one of the Bellingcat November report (dealing with the route of the BUK) heedlessly adopts the SBU/Tymchuk narrative, hardly contains any research apart from some geolocation and does not assess or examine any of the materials collected, but takes everything for granted.


Conclusion

Basically, one year after the downing of MH17 we know little more than that there was a BUK passing through Torez to Snizhne, and that it disappeared some time after 13:15 EEST. As for the rest there is no conclusive evidence. And, in case there were two BUKs present in the area of Torez and Snizhne that day, as Anton Gerashchenko suggests, we may start laying the puzzle anew…

As Humanrightsinvestigations.org already wrote on July 25th 2014 :

To sum up, the Ukrainians have managed to put together a credible narrative but the
scenario they present currently lacks concrete evidence, particularly of the BUK
originating from or returning to Russia. The intercepts they have produced indicate that if the rebels did shoot the plane down, it was a mistake. If the Paris Match images are not of July 17th, then either they are fabricated or they originate from another day. And since that imagery most likely shows the same trailer that is also visible on the Zuhres video, the Torez photo and the Luhansk video, it becomes doubtful whether these materials originate from the 17th.


=========================================================

Rethinking the spy scenario

January 2016

We must not alone autistic stick to the facts. We have the bounden duty to fully identify the domain of this terrible attack. So, once again use your full imagination to see if you have missed a possible scenario.

Facts are important but a mere concatenation of facts in logical order is dangerous since it could be a false flag. That's why the permutation of a series of events leading to a disaster always must be accompanied by research on motives. Then you work from two sides to the midst.

A year ago and not hindered by factual knowledge I developed a human thought scenario called 'Counter espionage with MH17'. It is important because it addresses motives in the first place. Meanwhile I know more and I made a new version with a better fit. Though, I still have no facts.

What has been changed? First, a minimum IQ-level for the captain of the BUK has been posed, and second the crew of the BUK got back their trusted spotter, a spy at Dnepropetrovsk Airbase - or another base - from whom they first thought he was arrested by the SBU. But that appeared not true since he phoned he had not been arrested but had a faulty cellphone. They were delighted because they had just acquired a BUK meant for chasing military planes and so they fully trusted their spotter who in reality was kept at gunpoint by the SBU at the Dnepropetrovsk Airbase, fighting for his life. Remember, this is a scenario and these are no facts.

- The adapted scenario again accepts the BUK as weapon which took MH17 down.

- We set the lower bound of intelligence for the captain of the BUK-TELAR on IQ 115. This is important since this immediately eradicates a lot of possible stupid actions of the crew as has been insinuated by counterparties.


- Rejected is the possibility the crew of the BUK was all separatists. That would have been a too stupid action of the Russians. So probably it were Russians. But at least one of them spoke Ukrainian and kept contact with the spotter at Dnepropetrovsk Airbase, possibly by an intermediary spotter near the BUK.

- On the other hand, if this BUK would have made a long journey through Donetsk - as accepted by reading Bellingcat and Greidanus -  then some separatist crew members could be included. Maybe they were former soldiers from the Ukrainian army who got experience with BUK-TELAR, but with a Russian captain.

- This script accepts definitely MH17 has been intentionally shot down for a number of reasons, though the crew was not aware of shooting down a passenger plane:

- Why MH17 must have been shot down intentionally:

- Also in automatic mode a BUK-TELAR needs a lot of handling to shoot down a plane.
And in case of distraction with fighter aircraft it is unlikely a BUK-TELAR easily changes focus from a SU-25 to a passenger aircraft for a number of technical reasons around radial speed. 
- Only in theory there might be a number of scenarios in which the crew of BUK-TELAR confuses an apparently fast and low flying fighter jet with a slow aircraft at 10 km altitude. 
- Also only in theory, the radar of BUK-TELAR jumps to the bigger passenger plane. 
- And as said, an experienced and intelligent captain on the BUK does not make these beginner's errors.
- Furthermore and most important: the product rule of independent chances of the vicinity of a 'fast flying' SU-25 and a 'low flying' passenger plane on the radar of the BUK at any moment in time - for more than some seconds - is extremely low. And this very low chance must be multiplied by the very unlikely mistake of the experienced captain on BUK-TELAR.

Proceeding with the scenario: 

- Remember, no intelligent captain of a BUK will shoot a passenger plane with hundreds of passengers and let it crash on his own ground, on Donetsk. Since, he knows in advance to get the whole world about them. So, the separatists had no motive.

- Only anti-separatists might have a motive to let a passenger plane crash in Donetsk. That's why in this scenario we only give Ukraine or Ukrainian factions within the army, or other military groups the motive. 

Now we split into two scenarios in which MH17 has been shot down by: 1) the misled crew of BUK-TELAR or 2) MH17 was shot down from Zaroshchenske.


- Concluding: If MH17 has been intentionally shot down from Snizhne but the crew was not aware of a passenger plane, then they must have been misled by third parties. And we do not accept tragic technical failure or human mistakes around the BUK.


- Proceeding in this scenario we think about a double agent of Ukraine working as a spy for the separatists on Ukraine's Dnepropetrovsk Air Force base or another base. The spotter near the BUK was tipped by his spy at the airbase about an incoming military aircraft, an IL-76 (the MH17) over 10,000 meters.

- So, the crew thought it was a high flying IL-76 (not an Antonov 26). Both military planes have no ADS-B. And we earlier argued at length separatists did not use Flightradar, otherwise they would have identified MH17. So from their premise it must be an IL-76 there was no way back to identify MH17. Hence, the crew of the BUK has been fallen in a trap.

- Also the crew had not the slightest information about the incoming plane from themselves. You know it was a rather overcast day. But more important the timeline was inadequate as perfectly indicated by Andrew.

Remember Andrew’s excellent analysis showing there were big logistical problems for separatist spotters to identify the IL-76 (or AN-26) in its time and place path, where they obviously used no Flightradar on a rather overcast day:

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/13-months-later-what-happened-to-flight-mh17/#comment-6922

- We conclude: the spotter near the BUK as intermediary of the spotter at Dnepropetrovsk Airbase really could not have the slightest clue to identify the IL-76. 

- But if we change our scenario of the crew from separatists to all Russians then some misunderstanding can be created in the communication with the spotter near the BUK and the spotter at Dnepropetrovsk Airbase. Remember there will be no Russian spotters in Donetsk.


- Hence, language problems may have occurred as well as badly known spotters.

- In this scenario separatists had spotters near Dnepropetrovsk Airbase. But around July 17 there were no spotters for GRAD:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2rmN7jeX8A

(5,17/5,29)

Hmuryi: You see, we've got a GRAD, but no spotter. However we're waiting for Russia to shelter them from the other side.

- Remember the SBU confessed the tactical error to have intercepted the separatists telephone calls which must have been real-time intelligence, what means the Security Service of Ukraine could make contact with the (spotters of the) BUK.

- And about those silly cell phones, how long do you think the SBU needed to track separatist spotters in the neighbourhood of their air bases and capture them?


- The SBU learned from the internet that the separatists had no spotters to report from Kiev or elsewhere departing AN-26 or IL-76 and we know at July 17 it was too cloudy to spot them with binoculars. So what would the SBU have devised?


- In this scenario they keep a prisoner spotter at gunpoint to give misleading information by his cell phone about an incoming IL-76 at high altitude of 10 kilometers (MH17). He is fighting for his life.

- Well, lack of facts gives interesting scenarios. But if this cell phone conversation among separatists really happened and they used no encrypted information it's all too bad for the SBU. Then instead of alerting civil aviation they let shoot down MH17. Hence, SBU made a fundamental error in publishing their real time knowledge of separatist's communication. 


=========================================================
Elena Kolenkina




- A month before the MH17 was shot Elena Kolenkina posted this video on YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gENJhZwfEfc&list=LLZ3GTMiT5A5cyMntaf6Nh6w&index=4

http://thebigsmoke.com.au/2014/07/28/smoke-signal-separating-issues-ukraine/

- Elena says SU-25's under the cover of civilian aircraft dived down, dropped their bombs and rose again in hiding, so they could not be touched by the separatists:

[(1:32/2:14) This means it was a provocation; they wanted the self-defense force to shoot down an airliner so that the militias can be declared to be terrorists who shoot down airlines. Hundreds of passengers would have died; it would have been a huge catastrophy.]

- But suppose the separatists only had Manpads to 3.5 km at their disposal while airliners flew about 10 km altitude. Then they had no story and no reason to put this video on YouTube. This means separatists already on June 18th IMPLICITLY ADMITTED the possession of Pantsirs, the little brother of the BUK with an altitude range of 15 km.



Pantsir-S1



Pantsir-S1 (RussianПанцирь-С1NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound) is a combined short to medium range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon system produced by KBP of TulaRussia


Pantsir-S1 carries up to twelve 57E6 or 57E6-E two-stage solid fuel radio-command-guided surface-to-air missiles in sealed ready-to-launch containers.  The first stage is a booster, providing rapid acceleration within the first 2 seconds of flight, after which it is separated from the sustainer-stage. The sustainer is the highly agile part of the missile and contains the high explosive multiple continuous rod and fragmentation warhead, contact and proximity fuses as also radio transponder and laser responder to be localised for guidance. The missile is not fitted with seeker to keep target engagement costs low. Instead high-precision target and missile tracking is provided via the system's multiband sensor system and guidance data is submitted via radio link for up to four missiles in flight.

http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2015/07/onderste_steen_seperatisten_sc.html | 17-07-15 | 11:10Yes, but Elena married a few weeks later with the rebel leader. Therefore, some uncertainty is in place if this was not a false flag. Basic Dimension | 17-07-15 | 11:16 
- Which also means the Dutch government could and should have been aware of the unsafety of civil aviation, and already on June 18th, 2014 SHOULD HAVE BANNED flying over Donetsk. The same goes for the greedy airlines. That whole diplomats consultation is a cover up of the total inertia and lethargy of the Ministry of Security. 

- This video shows the fear of the separatists for the terrible disaster they desperately tried to avoid. But it also shows Ukrainian government since 18 June SHOULD HAVE BANNED civil aviation. Any delay meant inciting of war crimes by conditional intent with probability consciousness (Dolus Eventualis).

Dolus Eventualis refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility. The legal definition of Dolus Eventualis is Awareness of the likely outcome of an action.


The downing of MH17 is no accident, Ukraine is guilty of Dolus Eventualis what refers to where a perpetrator foresees indirect consequences as a possibility (Awareness of the likely outcome of an action).

- From the YouTube video of Elena Kolenkina is understood the separatists were apprehensive for TWO SPOTS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND TOGETHER on the radar of the BUK TELAR: A Ukrainian fighter in disguise to the tail of a civil airliner. There would certainly not be shot.

- The operator on the BUK developed an ambiguous decision rule: with two spots on the radar, both must be above the 9700 meter mark. But with one spot, nothing is known about altitudes. Except of course if he is already under stress and understands an Antonov will pass at low altitude. Then he is somewhat more inclined to converse the rule and to take one spot as an indication of a low flyer.

- In case of only one spot on the radar and far below the 9700 meter mark, it must be a Ukrainian military aircraft following the new rules the Public Statement of July 15th, an aircraft what could be shot down. 

http://sexualreligion.blogspot.nl/2015/08/scenario-mh17-hidden-behind-su-25.html



=========================================================


More early warnings:

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/was-ukraine-air-traffic-control-aware-of-separatists-having-buks/

Posted on July 12, 2015 by  in NewsResearch 

What could well be a Ukraine air traffic controller already in June 2014 warned that the Ukraine air space should be closed instead of closing to Fightlevel 260. 
[Pressure altitude: 26,000 feet is about 8 km, BD
This could mean Ukraine state was already aware of Russian BUKs in East Ukraine as early as June 2014. He warned in a post at Pprune.org which is a forum used by airline pilots, air traffic controllers and others working in the airline industry.

At June 14 2014  this message: was posted by a user with nickname  TC_Ukraine in a thread called Ukrainian Il-76 shot down killing 49

Ukrainian officials should close whole airspace over eastern part. now is closed up to fl260. Russian terrorists can easily hit passenger a/c.


=========================================================



The Attack

- Hence, the spotter of the BUK could be misled on an overcast day, a day when he could not visually determine the altitude of the MH17 and also did not consult Flight radar. Ukraine would therefore strike on an overcast day. 


http://app.nos.nl/datavisualisatie/vluchten-over-oost-oekraine/








- And that pretty heavily overcast sky was already there on July 17th. Now the spotter of the BUK hardly could perceive the MH17, because separatists used no Flight radar below 9.7 km.

http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/DSB%20Accident%20777-200%20Flight%20MH17%20Hrabove%20Ukraine%2017%20July%202014.pdf http://www.avherald.com/h?article=47770f9d/010&opt=0




- Hence, with this cloudy weather the spotter of the BUK could not verify his information. That day there was no visibility check possible that an Antonov actually arrived. And a transport aircraft as the IL-76 at 10 km altitude would be totally unidentifiable. But there was a solution because the operator on the BUK indeed saw appear a single aircraft on his autonomous radar, but without height measurement but with IFF identification as 'enemy', as did the MH17. 

- The Boeing 777 with a ground speed of 905 km/h at 10 km altitude, slowly came nearer on the BUK-radar. Its altitude was unknown, so it really looked like an Antonov (440 km/h) on just 6 km altitude, slowly approaching with radial velocity (towards the BUK).

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/13-months-later-what-happened-to-flight-mh17/#comment-6981



Has anyone done the math for the radial speed of an AN26 vs the radial speed of a 777?
At a distance of 40 km the AN26 at 6000m would have an elevation of 8.5°, the 777 an elevation of 14°.
Radial speed of the AN26 would be:
cos 8.5° * 440 = 435 km/h
For the 777:
cos 14° * 905 = 878 km/h
Bottom line is, it’s hard to confuse an AN26 with a 777. Equally hard to believe is that a trained crew was not aware of the commercial airliners constantly flying overhead




Thanks, but that means Ukraine may have used SU-25′s to confuse the operator of the BUK as long as possible, also in this scenario.

Agree. Very hard to believe the crew misidentified an Antonov for a Boeing 777.
It could be their target was believed to be a IL76
It could be the missile was aimed at sU-25 and then retargeted at MH17

 admin // August 19, 2015 at 5:36 pm //
What was the first source mentioning an Antonov 26 was downed? I do not know. Could be the Strelkov fanpage.
It could just be an educated guess that an Antonov 26 was downed. And many media copied it without checking facts first.
I know at least one media mentioned a IL76 was flying near MH17.
https://burkonews.info/russia-shoots-down-malaysian-mh17/
The source in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that the route of a military transport aircraft IL-76 had lain close to the route of Boeing. IL-76 headed to deliver goods to the blocked Ukrainian troops. It was also noted that there were anti-aircraft defense units in the area of deployment of Ukrainian forces.

 Basic Dimension // August 19, 2015 at 7:09 pm // Reply
Comment: admin // August 19, 2015 at 2:56 pm // Reply
Admin said: ‘Agree. Very hard to believe the crew misidentified an Antonov for a Boeing 777.
It could be their target was believed to be a IL76
We already wondered why Rostov’s primary surveillance radar missed AN-26 on about 6 km. But it would be peculiar to miss the IL76 at 11 km. Hence, there was probably only one plane on track: MH17.
admin // August 19, 2015 at 7:14 pm //
It is an assumption Rostov radar recording provided by Russia shows all traffic it could detect.
What if Russia modified the recording?
We do not know.

Conclusion: Russia definitely would have reported any trail parallel to MH17 of Ukraine’s military planes but Russia did not and we therefore assume no trails existed. Hence we conclude THERE ALSO WAS NO SEPARATIST SPY SPOTTER.

Conclusion: Russia certainly would have reported any trail parallel to MH17 of Ukraine’s military planes, but Russia did not and we therefore assume no trails existed. Hence we conclude there could only have been a double spy spotter active from Ukraine. Therefore “Birdie coming towards you” must have come from Ukraine.




Reply on: admin // August 23, 2015 at 7:21 pm //

Admin said: ‘So why would Russia be the first to show an IL76 on Rostov radar? That would be a target for the BUK and a very good reason to shoot. So I can imagine Russia wipes this off the recording. An SU-25 is interesting to show to suggest this shot down MH17 (I am sure SU-25 did not shot down MH17)’

Good thinking. Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk radar will also keep its mouth shut though also they possess primary radar and of course know about IL-76. Now, if ‘the birdie story’ is true Ukraine would not take the risk of a BUK attack on its IL-76, which plane would take another course. So remember, Russia black mails Ukraine with their tapes of the track of IL-76 and Ukraine black mails Russia with separatists deliberately willing the IL-76 to shoot. NATO and Russia have full proof from their satellites while we are stubborn engaged with radial speed. We must wait for further inspiration, could be an interesting scenario :)


- (Obsolete): 
But after a substantial course correction of MH17 to the right, suddenly it flew right on to the BUK: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hh06SqVx_1Q [at(0:45/1.22)]. This significantly increased radial velocity. The command for this course correction must be found on the cockpit voice recorder. Mh17 was shot down near the village of
Grabove, about 15 km from Shishne at the Russian border.

The radial velocity shot up and in panic eventually the shooter of the BUK struck the red button. For it could be a SU-25 targeting the BUK.

- But the real misunderstanding must be the operator of the BUK thought a military plane approached at lower altitude.

- So indeed, if the spotter of the BUK did not use Flightradar and did not ask for an explanation at Rostov radar and trusted his informant, then yes he would have given the shooter of the BUK command to shoot down MH17.

- As mentioned before, the shooter of the BUK TELAR had only a limited autonomous radar, which could not determine the altitude or correctly identify the aircraft. These two things play a major role in shooting down MH17. He was totally dependent upon spotter information.

- In this most realistic scenario, a Ukrainian double agent must have misled the spotter of the BUK. He knew the spotter did not use FlightRadar and the operator on the BUK was misled by IFF. The Ukrainian spy looked at the radar and knew exactly what aircraft came nearer.

- Then the spotter inadvertently designated the wrong plane as a low-flying Antonov to the operator on the BUK. That's why the shooter later shouted in despair a civilian aircraft did not fly there anymore (below 9700 meters). For he thought he had shot down a low-flying Antonov. And he himself could not determine altitudes on his radar.

ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIPkwhVHpJs&feature=youtu.be


Published on Oct 27, 2014


Russian terrorists accidentally confirmed they shot down MH-17 after Kremlin-backed media channels had posted a video of the downed Ukrainian AN-26 according to the words of self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic's leader Igor Girkyn-Strelkov, but deleted it as soon as they found out it was Boeing-777:




- When the separatists have shot down the MH17 this can only have happened by a drunken gunman in the BUK or on instigation of a spy of Ukraine deceiving the spotter of the separatists.






http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230525.htm

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, thank you very much. On the subject of sanctions with respect to Russia, we are very understanding of our friend, Australia’s deep, deep anger and its need for justice with respect to what has happened. This is an unconscionable crime on a huge international order that findings already, without the full investigation being done – and we are pressing for a full investigation, because nothing is complete until you have a full investigation. But there is no question – and we’ve said this publicly previously, but that this type of weapon and all the evidence of it was seen on our imagery. We saw the takeoff. We saw the trajectory. We saw the hit. We saw this airplane disappear from the radar screen. So there’s really no mystery about where it came from and where these weapons have come from.


========================================


Map of a Tragedy:















How MH17 Came Apart Over Ukraine


The Wall Street Journal cataloged and mapped some of the debris of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which fell across three Ukrainian villages after the Boeing 777 was brought down on July 17, allegedly by a surface-to-air missile.












Report MH17 crash:





Report MH17 crash:




Comparison of damage between IL-86 (Almaz Antey) and MH17 (DSB)



Brendan, thanks for replying
> Eugene, as you’ve said, the Boeing 777 and AA’s Il86 were struck from different detonation locations. So any comparison between the damage to any part of the two aircrafts is not really comparing like with like.
With increased distance to the detonation point the density of fragments hitting the plane should only be sharply reducing (by the inverse square law). What struck me was that not only the density did not reduce but was noticeably higher in the AA test, with the detonation point positioned farther than in the real life.
The wrong positioning of the detonation point by the DSB is assumed, of course. 


 Eugene // April 17, 2016 at 1:29 pm // Reply

The damage in the AA test does look to be smaller than the observed on the Mh-17 wreckage.

http://tinyurl.com/hgqa6f9




Want to stress the distance dependence so that it sinks better.
If the DSB moved the detonation point away by a factor of two then the Mh-17 hole density needs to be FOUR times grater than on the Il-86, but instead it is noticeably smaller.
According to AA the detonation point needs to be up-to three times closer than where the DSB put it. This should lead to up-to NINE times increase in the hole density on the Mh17, but instead it is noticeably smaller.
I guess I’ve annoyed you enough, so there must be several people badly wanting to prove me wrong. Go ahead.


1. A closer location of detonation requires a wider beam of frag spray in order to cover the same area. Hole density is therefore approximately proportional to the distance of detonation, not to its square.
2. Analysis is complicated by the fact that a closer location also makes the frag spray more uneven in order to account for the pattern of damage to MH17. The area under the left hand cockpit window, in the photo that you link to, must have been hit with a very high fragmentation density per square metre. The area inside the cockpit, on the other hand, has a much smaller impact density (I’m assuming that most, if not all, of the fragments fired directly through the window had enough kinetic energy left to cause a hole or dent on the the floor and seats that they struck).
3. Large parts of the skin closest to the detonation were not found, so we don’t know what the hole density there is. Those are the area below the window in front of the captain, as well as nearly all of the left hand side of the cockpit roof.
Even after taking those points into account, to my eyes the overall damage on MH17 still looks noticeably less than that on AA’s Il86. However I’d prefer a more objective study than to rely on appearances, which sometimes can be deceptive.

Brendan,
[1. A closer location of detonation requires a wider beam of frag spray in order to cover the same area. Hole density is therefore approximately proportional to the distance of detonation, not to its square.]
Sounds logical, but how does this relate to Hopkinson-Cranz? Where damage is related to hole density?

Basic, I had to look up the Hopkinson-Cranz rule, but that has to do with the blast wave, not the density of fragment strikes.
What I was talking about was more like simple geometry, although it’s not so simple when you also have to consider the non-uniform frag spray and the complex shape of a target like a 777 cockpit.

> Hole density is therefore approximately proportional to the distance of detonation, not to its square.
Brendan, hole density is proportional to inverse square of the distance. I am sure it’s enough to point out your slight mistake (not the typo) and you’ll find where you are wrong in your thinking. If not, I’ll elaborate. Otherwise, a rational comment, thanks.

Eugene // May 17, 2016 at 11:53 am // Reply
Hopkins Cranz is indeed inverse cube of the distance, not square. But to understand why one needs a good understanding of physics of the explosion, and generally good understanding where the laws come from. I don’t think many readers here would have it. Basically Hopkinz Cranz strange dependence is explained by the energy/impulse leaking from the explosion wave front and turning into a non-destructing form behind. Hopkinz Cranz stops working at a distance where the shock wave speed reduces to that of sound (in our case it’s several meters away), the transition from Hopkinz Cranz to 1/r^2 is gradual. Hopkinz Cranz also does not work in vacuum.

To make it more relevant to our case. For a Buk the 1/r^2 regime fully starts at around 10-15 m (this has been estimated on a video of a Buk explosion). At our distance of ~1.5-2 meters Hopkinson-Cranz is still fully on, but only applicably to the damage caused by the explosion shock wave (ripped off skin, very large holes). The damage caused by the fragments is still strictly a 1/r^2 law. So in the end we have quite a mixed distance law, but it is always at least as bad as 1/r^2.

Brendan // May 17, 2016 at 12:59 pm // Reply
I should have said ‘inversely’. For a *given* warhead, the hole density is inversely proportional to the *square* of the distance because it decreases in two dimensions.
In the case of MH17, the width (ie. in one dimension or axis) of the damage are approximately known and fixed. So if we decrease the distance (from the DSB’s location to AA’s location) we have to adjust the warhead *model* to increase its beam angle, in order to match the width of damage. Increasing the beam angle means that hole density is increased in one axis but not the other.
That’s different to a real, single, given warhead with a fixed beam angle that causes hole density to change with *square* of distance to target.
Apologies to everyone who’s bored or confused by all of this.

Brendan, what you say is a bit confusing, I think. For a 1/r^2 to be valid it is sufficient for all fragments to fly radially (=from a same point). Then you take three neighboring fragments and observe that the area of the triangle that they form grows as r^2. Thus the 1/r^2 law for the fragment density.
I’ve made another picture for visual density comparison, to get closer to the layman.
http://savepic.ru/9820561.png





Bu the way, thanks for a constructive discussion, this is exactly what I was after. Unfortunately, I’ll be very limited in time for the next couple of days.

Brendan // May 17, 2016 at 2:42 pm //
Eugene, maybe we’re talking about different things. You might be accepting Almaz-Antey’s detonation (at the location estimated by the DSB) as genuine and accurate, and looking at the effect of moving the missile in towards the closer ‘correct’ location. I was thinking of a model where the frag spray could be widened to match the actual damage to MH17.



 Liane Theuer // April 10, 2016 at 11:40 pm //
“So what is faster, the shock wave or the transport of shrapnel?”
The shock wave on a short distance. The greater the distance the more likely the fragments overtake the shockwave.


===================

MH17: SHOCK WAVE LIKELY BROKE UP THE MH17


SPEEDS OF MH17, MISSILE, SHOCK WAVE, SOUND AND FRAGMENTS:

- MH17 was traveling 915 km/h = 255 m/s = 0.255 m/millisecond

- BUK missile speed = 600 m/s (1 m = .0016 sec).

- Speed of shock wave unknown but faster than fragments (2000 m/s).

- Fragments go 2000 m/s = 2 m/millisecond = 1 m in 0.0005 seconds. So, fragments of warhead reached the MH17 already in 0.0005 seconds.

- Speed of sound in very cold air is about 300 m/sec = 0.300 m/millisecond.

- The sound of the detonation reached the plane in 0.0033 seconds (0.0033x300=1m)


- In this post we suppose the warhead detonated at a distance of 1 meter from the plane. Then in 0.004 seconds (4 x 0.255 = 1.02 m) the MH17 reached the earlier position of the warhead.

Note: After detonation the MH17 went forward with 255 m/s and reached the earlier position of the missile in 0.0039 seconds, which constant must be subtracted evenly from all speeds (0.0039 x 0.255 = 1 m)

In this analysis the BUK missile is positioned very close to the windshields of the cockpit. We think of about 1 meter. 

CONCLUSIONS FROM A DETONATING WARHEAD AT 1 METER FROM THE MH17:

- The shock wave reached the MH17 earlier than fragments in less than 0.0005 seconds.
-  Fragments of warhead reached the MH17 in 0.0005 seconds.
- The sound of the blast by detonation reached the MH17 in 0.0033 seconds. 

Note: The sound of the shock wave on the first sound peak is only received by CAM.
The sound of casing parts impacting the cockpit is received by all microphones. This sound factually is the combined factor of casing parts, primary fragments and the crashing missile.

Note: Casing parts are launched before primary fragments like bow-ties, fillers and squares, which in turn impacted before the crash of the BUK against the cockpit.

RANKING THE IMPACTS:

1: Shock waves are the fastest (> 2000 m/s).
2: Then follows fragments from the casing of the warhead (2000 m/s).
3: Primary fragments follow casing parts in time (2000 m/s).
4: Co-propagating shock waves follow primary fragments (> 2000 m/s).


5: Sound waves in cold air are not important (300 m/sec) .

===================



On the above image (IMHO) the lowest density of shrapnel hit area of MH17 is being compared to highest density shrapnel area of IL86.
To me it seems the most dense fragment impact area of MH17 seems so heavily affected that almost nothing remains of it. Mainly the edges of the impact area (low density) were covered for reconstruction by DSB.





Also one must note that fast (2400m/s + light weight) shrapnel hit the same area than slow (1100m/s + heavy weight) shrapnel in the IL86 case.
When missile and target move against each other fast (~2540m/s?) and slow (~1320m/s?) shrapnel hit slightly different areas.
So, result looks different.

Some old stuff:










(Also one must note that explosion might have pushed windows into the cockpit before slow shrapnel fly to them.)

Exploding 1m from the surface of the cockpit match the damage we see.
Example:


http://tinyurl.com/j7aqy4w






Sotilaspassi, thanks for the pictures.

Relative velocity between plane, missile and shrapnel is less important if flying time of fragments goes to the limit of nil: 0.00075 seconds for a detonation point of 1.5 meters. This is because then time almost stands still. Then we are allowed to compare static and dynamic detonation for windshields at a distance of 1.5 meters for MH17 and 3 meters for AA.
We expect the BUK of MH17 on shorter distance to be much more powerful to destroy the left windshields than the BUK of AA. But the opposite happened and the windows were not destroyed:

http://tinyurl.com/zgvyvnb
http://tinyurl.com/oaey37u

Even in its most dense green area the BUK of MH17 was unable to destroy the windows from 1.5 meters, while the BUK of AA in green destroyed the second left windshield already from about 3 meters.
Let’s accept green is light shrapnel and yellow are heavy fragments. Then window 2, the second of the left for AA is broken by green or light fragments. But both left windshields of the Boeing 777 are not broken by green or light fragments, even if distance was halved. Would Boeing simply have better windshields?
It might be in 0.00075 seconds the lancet of the BUK of MH17 had less time to develop than that of AA with 0.0015 seconds. This is relevant for the place of green and yellow on the planes, but does not affect the difference in strength of green between both warheads. Though, might be light shrapnel of MH17 was still in the acceleration phase.

I think it is very doubtful that warhead 9N314M was used for the MH17 if windshields are comparable.
Also lighter SAM or A2A would be completely useless if penetration of this piece of steel from 1.5 meter was impossible:

http://tinyurl.com/j7aqy4w

We don’t know much about fragment rotation, and I believe that we don’t need to know much.
Consider the math. Let’s assume the explosion and other forces spin the average fragment at 5,000 revolutions per minute. Assume also the fragment flies 1.5 meters at a closing speed of 2,000 meters per second before striking MH17. At that speed and distance it reaches MH17 in 0.00075 seconds. 5,000 r.p.m. is 83.33 revolutions per second. In 0.00075 seconds this fragment makes 0.0625 revolutions before striking MH17. That is only 22.5°.
Go ahead and play with the numbers. Assume a fragment rotates at 10,000 rpm and travels 3 meters at 2,000 meters per second before striking MH17. The fragment travels this distance in 0.0015 seconds. In that amount of time is has completed 1/4 of a revolution, a mere 90°.
Bottom line: A warhead with about 2,000 bow-tie shaped fragments definitely will have made bow-tie shaped holes in the skin of MH17.
Where are the bow-tie shaped holes?

Agree. Fragments cannot spin too much so that they don’t leave a distinctive impression. By a large margin. Even if a fragment is accelerated by being hit at one edge only, this still will not give enough rotation. Besides, in the AA test there are bowtie holes. There is no reason to believe that the 6% speed increase will drastically change the picture.



http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/dsb-final-report-doubts-location-of-explosion/


------------------------------------------------------
But one doesn’t need to move much closer to increase the damage. This is because the damage falls as a square of the distance (or even worse, see below). Let’s say that the observed damage in the AA test looks to be half of that on the Mh17. If we want to place the detonation point twice as close then we’ll need to actually halve the warhead mass if we want to match the damage observed on the Boeing wreckage. And, remember, we want to place the bomb up to three times as close. Therefore, one can conclude that we need a smaller warhead than that of a Buk, not larger. The only alternative to reducing the warhead size is believing the DSB detonation point, and after you’ve drown your own lines it’s pretty hard.
Here is more information on the detonation range versus explosive mass dependence. When it comes to explosions there are various scaling laws, that are often used to extrapolate results of small explosions onto the the explosions of bigger sizes. One of the scaling laws is the Hopkinson-Cranz Scaling Law. Check out the applet here:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/hopkinson-cranz/
In the applet you can enter the explosive weights of 1 kg and 8 kg, and calculate the safe ranges for the two blasts. You’ll see that even if you’ve increased the explosion weight 8-fold, the safe distance (that is the distance of a constant and small damage) only doubled. That should give you the feel for the very sharp dependence of the damage on distance.

 Eugene // April 17, 2016 at 5:07 pm // Reply

The DSB have misrepresented the data about shrapnel cones supplied by AA. The data supplied by AA would not allow even with the use of an unknown matching method to move the detonation point away, because the simulated damage strip would be too wide. Therefore the DSB had to shrink the cone. You can almost see a nontrivial maneuvering job the DSB had to do to come up with a justification for a BUK warhead. And, indeed, when AA placed the warhead into the detonation point found by the DSB the resulting observed damage strip was too wide. For example, in the AA test there were holes before the most forward structure rib shown here on Photo 1, or holes behind the cockpit door. Compare the areas covered by hits http://savepic.ru/8334698.png
As to the calculation of the confining angles, I personally would not trust any calculations, whether Split-X or yours, when a simple test explosion can be performed. One of the reason is that the Buk warhead may contain a primer booster, which is not taken into account by calculations, or may not. The best we can do here is either try to determine the cones from videos, or just trust AA.


 Eugene // April 21, 2016 at 11:47 pm //
>A serious problem with the albert-lex explosion coordinates is that a 70 kg warhead would have an even more devastating affect than we have seen in the pictures.
That’s the dilemma, isn’t it? You either have to accept that it was not a Buk, or move the detonation point away. This was the exact choice the DSB had, and we know what way they’ve gone. The problem is that then it’s very difficult to come up with the plausible reasons why stringing was not used (the DSB’s lame excuse was that the lines were not striaight) and why hits from their point covered a lot greater areas that were observed as damaged on the wreckage.
As to the unit0 calculations, myself a Russian speaker, did not get much further. At a first glance he uses at least a very incorrect fragment speed (1600 vs 2400 m/s). And I am pretty sure he does not know necessary flight characteristics, because they are not public (I have other questions about the simulation)


@Basic Dimension | 18-04-16 | 02:05
Ik vind deze bevindingen op zijn site veel interessanter:
Als de detonatielocatie zich inderdaad dichter bij het vliegtuig bevindt dan de OVV beweert door toepassing van de string methode heeft dan moet er als je dezelfde simulaties in acht neemt m.b.t. het schadepatroon een aanzienlijk lichtere raketkop zijn gebruikt. De kracht van een explosie t.o.v. schade verhoudt zich kwadratisch met de afstand.#enpassant | 18-04-16 | 02:52 



http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-photos-of-mh17-rooftop-in-russia-today-documentary/#prettyPhoto


New photos of MH17 rooftop in Russia Today documentary


In the Russia Today documentary ‘MH17 A year without truth‘ some previously unknown parts of MH17 were seen. These parts are part of the cockpit roof and were found near Petropavlivka






STA = Station from the nose:





http://tinyurl.com/hvlakdj


Grazing is understandable from the nearly parallel trajectory of shrapnel along the roof of the plane, but ricochets are more difficult to understand, for against what shrapnel had to collide before deflecting to the plane? The cause must lie in the short distance of detonation of the warhead. A lot of shrapnel parts must have collided against each other far above the plane and some must have deflected to the roof in the second instance. But this looks unlikely. Also it is possible earlier shrapnel reflected from the fuselage and caused later shrapnel – already far above the plane – to deflect to the roof. But also this is nonsense because earlier reflected shrapnel would be much too late to catch later shrapnel above the plane. Reflection from within the plane through the roof seems quite unlikely. So, I don’t understand how ricochets could be the cause of shrapnel holes far on the roof. Hence all shrapnel on the roof must be caused by grazing and the point of detonation must be in accordance.

 Wind tunnel man // October 21, 2015 at 1:31 pm // Reply
I think the term “ricochet” used by the Dutch refers to the shrapnel being deflected off the external surfaces of the forward fuselage and that would leave a grazing mark or a tear in the skin. I don’t think they meant a double hit, i.e. a hit deflected and ricocheting to another place on the forward external skin leaving a grazing mark (except perhaps due to the contours of the cockpit and damage in that external area produced by shrapnel coming from the calculated position of the warhead and making a double hit?)
Thanks, now I understand better: shrapnel was shot to the cockpit under a very sharp angle from the warhead. It bounced back into the air and caused by the resultant relative velocity between blast and airplane it came with tremendous force as tear or grazing on the roof of the plane.

 Wind tunnel man // October 21, 2015 at 4:17 pm // Reply
Yes shrapnel may have deflected off the contours of the cockpit and ricocheted anywhere on the port side of the plane. This was evident below the port side cockpit rear window where shrapnel penetrated the skin but was deflected out again when it encountered underlying structures due to it’s angle of approach.
However I think the damage to the forward roof was primarily caused by direct hits. At the aft end of those roof surfaces the direct hitting shrapnel grazed the skin and ricocheted away. In this instance the wording of ricochet damage (i.e. showing signs of the direct hitting, non-penetrating shrapnel hitting and then deflecting/ricocheting away) and grazing damage caused by direct hits are probably the same thing.


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/damage-of-mh17-does-not-rule-out-a-launch-from-zaroshenskye/


 Andrew // June 27, 2015 at 6:46 pm // Reply
(...)
I previously posted upthread two links to debris maps. Note debris in the following locations on the Wall Street Journal map:
Hrabove (just west of town) – center plane fuselage with wings and engines
0.5 to 1.0 KM south of Hrabove – aft fuselage, tail, left wingtip, horizontal tail wings, cargo door frame, crew rest bunks
Rozspypne (just south of town) – cockpit and lower nose
Petropavlivka – flight deck window with shrapnel damage, both forward door frames, overhead bins, engine pod parts, lower forward fargo floor
Petropavlivka (just north of town) – forward fuselage wall and roof and upper fuselage skin
(...)

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/is-this-a-window-part-of-mh17/#comment-9502

 Basic Dimension // September 27, 2015 at 7:43 pm // Reply
To NNW 48°12’15.6″N 38°30’14.4″E, by Kumshats’ke, of course it had a lot of drag and fell down about 8 km north of the plane crash which was at : 48º07’37.7 “N; 38º31’34.7 “E, SW of Petropavlivka.
Earlier findings:
Petropavlivka – flight deck window with shrapnel damage, both forward door frames, overhead bins, engine pod parts, lower forward fargo floor
9H314: 2 types: parallelepiped
9H314M: 3 types: I-profile (missiles 9M38M1)
I would say it is parallelepiped.








I then propose the following scenario for the crash. The plane is hit near Pol’ove. The small amount of debris behind this point is the small debris blown backwards from the initial impact by the explosion of the missile and decompression of the plane and crippling of the left engine. In the initial minute after impact, the plane slows from 900 km/h to 200 km/h as noted on Rostov ATC radar and also beings a slow curve left.  The average speed of ~550 km/h in this minute would carry the plane about 9.3 km. Within the first 30 seconds, the crippled cockpit and forward hull section is seperated from the main body of the plane and disintegrates. This tearing action causes the large amount of debris impacts between Pol’ove and Petropavlivka. The disintegrating front of the plane continues falling forward up to another 5 km to final impact of the cockpit and nose.
Meanwhile, the relatively intact center and rear of the plan glides forward and left, slowing to 200 km/h by the first minute and then continuing to fall and move forward at 200 km/h for the final two minutes. Due to losing the remainder of the nose, wind shear rushes through the fuselage and begins to tear the back of the plane off and in the final moments, the main body of the plane makes a final turn northwards to crash in Hrabove as the tail section continues forward and crashes south of Hrabove. At 200 km/h, this part of the plane moves 3.3 km per minute in the final two minutes. This gives a total distance of the plane in its last moments in the air around 16 km from point of impact to Hrabove crash site, which at 9.5 km from Hrabove to the field north of Petropavlivka and 6.5 km from that field to Pol’ove confirms by Rostov ATC recorded speed that the impact occurred near the top of the debris field noted on the maps I provided.
This time to crash also conforms to the time to fall from 10 km for the cockpit and nose section with no thrust or lift considering terminal velocity once it seperates from the rest of the plane. All front parts of the plane falls from 10 km high in 11 km or less of forward motion from missile impact with an initial 900 km/h speed – an almost perfect ballistic trajectory.
I welcome you or anyone else to poke holes in this reasoning.


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/an-overview-of-ukraine-air-force-flying-activities-in-period-july-14-july-17/#comment-5620


 Andrew // July 22, 2015 at 4:30 pm //
Rob:

“which is some 10 km away from the Dutch Safety Board last FDR location.”

And I explained why I thought this might be so based on the time aloft of the main section of the plane on radar and the speed reported of 200 km/h and thus the amount of total motion required to end up in Hrabove based on the speed and time aloft. You didn’t dispute any of those factors. Polove is just a convenient reference for the end of the debris trail, the plane may have been closer to Orlovo-Ivanivka which is in the same vicinity.

“That is when I pointed out that you forgot to include the drag equation, which started the whole discussion that you now seem to want to re-cycle again.”

[[In fluid dynamics, drag (sometimes called air resistance, a type of friction, or fluid resistance, another type of friction or fluid friction) refers to forces acting opposite to the relative motion of any object moving with respect to a surrounding fluid.[1]]]

[[In fluid dynamics, the drag equation is a formula used to calculate the force of drag experienced by an object due to movement through a fully enclosing fluid. The formula is accurate only under certain conditions: the objects must have a blunt form factor and the fluid must have a large enough Reynolds number to produce turbulence behind the object. The equation is
F_D\, =\, \tfrac12\, \rho\, u^2\, C_D\, A
F_D is the drag force, which is by definition the force component in the direction of the flow velocity,[1]
\rho is the mass density of the fluid, [2]
u is the flow velocity relative to the object,
A is the reference area, and
C_D is the drag coefficient – a dimensionless coefficient related to the object's geometry and taking into account both skin friction and form drag.]]


I didn’t forget drag equations. Pieces with different amounts of drag fell forward and down based on their drag to different locations. Those with more drag fell quicker and travelled less far forward. I am not proposing them wafting in the wind on a ballistic trajectory where an item falls 10 km down but 7 km NNW [BD: NorthNorthWest] when it was originally travelling very fast to the ESE. 





Do you suppose the debris fell in one minute to the 7 km mark? That would be a speed of 420 km/h. Where did that velocity come from? How about 2 minutes? Still 210 km/h. How about 4 minutes? 105 km/h. So the debris started at 915 km/h SSE and changed its velocity vector because of wind to 100 km/h NNW or possibly much, much more. How fast was that wind anyway, and what directions at what altitudes? You especially need to explain how dense human bodies were blown multiple kilometers in the wind to north of Petropavlivka.





On the other hand, I think the wind would have blown them to the left side as they went forward, which is consistent with the debris trails visible in the field on July 20 which have a general trajectory between 75 and 90 degrees.
If we use a wind speed of 60 km/h, we get 1 km vector of travel in the direction of the wind during the presumed ~1 minute it would take a piece without lift to fall from 10 km. If you want the fall to take longer you are proposing the debris piece has some sort of lift. Your beloved drag equation mostly serves to limit the forward motion and is  rather indeterminate due to changing drag as the piece tumbles in the air.

“As pointed out before, given the laws of physics and specifically the drag equation, and the prevailing winds at the time, that the MH17 debris field is entire consistent with the Dutch Safety Board’s report of the last FDR [BD: Flight Data Recorder] location, and INCONSISTENT with your Pol’ove intercept location.”

You claimed this from authority with no proof at all.
You still have not provided any sort of citation of the supposed last FDR location or how it was derived.
Please also reread this quote from the Canrfield paper I cited (“Revisiting trajectory analysis – Evolving the Cranfield model”):
“NATO and the US DOD define a ballistic trajectory as the “trajectory traced after the propulsive force is terminated and the body is acted upon only by gravity and aerodynamic drag.” [28]. Clearly this definition is appropriate when considering wreckage created through midair breakup. Exceptions to this definition would include an aircraft which is damaged but still producing propulsive force and components which are capable of generating lift. The latter point is an important one – in the subsequent analysis, the components will be considered to be acted on by drag alone; no lift force will be included. In addition, the ‘tumbling’ of parts whilst falling will also be discounted and instead replaced by a single drag coefficient.
“Both of these assumptions are deviations from reality. Whilst they might accurately describe the behaviour of a high mass, compact body (one with a high value of ballistic coefficient – see later), a lighter part with a large area capable of producing lift (such as a section of fuselage skin with stringers) is clearly very likely to produce lift and tumble as it falls such as a sheet of cardboard might do if dropped.
“Any trajectory model must depend upon some estimation of the drag coefficient of the part, which is often difficult to achieve. This is compounded by the fact that when objects tumble they effectively present a variable drag coefficient. Given the unavoidable inaccuracies inherent in drag coefficient estimation, it is arguable whether a more advanced calculation technique is necessary. However, there is no reason not to minimize as many errors as possible, as long as the other inaccuracies and limitations are understood.”


=========================================================


The ballistics of the BUK

Almaz Antey: BUK missiles factory 

MIC-report in three dimensions:

http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/68332.htmlРасследования / Выпуск № 46 от 6 мая 2015Expertenbericht von russischen Raketenbauingenieuren und Militärexperten;
Russian rocket engineers MIC (ВПК - Военно-промышленный комплекс: Military Industrial Complex; Translated into Dutch by A. Grebenchtchikova @Nicolaewna,
mathematics & linguistics.

Publiced in http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2015/05/kak_du_lai.html by Van Rossem.

This remarkable analysis of the ballistics of the BUK is be discussed belowrecently
translated into Dutch by Nicolaewna (A. Grebenchtchikova) at the request of GeenStijl. 

Earlier report of Erik Toonen in two dimensions:

This interesting report has a brilliant predecessor in
https://eriktoonen.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/analys/
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByibNV3SiUoobnpCVDduaHVORHM/edit?pli=1
It must also have been derived there from. 

Other articles:
http://web.archive.org/web/20150630214707/https://eriktoonen.wordpress.com/
http://delangemars.nl/2015/07/23/mh17-een-jaar-later-door-erik-toonen/

Which permutation in this concatenated series of events is correct? Have separatists shot down an unknown civilian plane on the same day they dragged the BUK seemingly aimless and with lots of tam-tam as a fairground attraction across Donetsk? Or MH17 was shot down by the SBU with another BUK installed at Zaroshchens'ke, to shift the blame to the separatists? 

Or has the SBU delivered misleading intelligence to the separatists about the MH17 as a military AN-26 transport aircraft approaching from Kiev or elsewhere? This because they were notified, the separatists had no spotters these days. They also knew separatists did not take advantage of Flight Radar, required for identification of planes at 10 km and above. They only were equipped with binoculars for low-flying Antonovs and could not identify airliners. This quite apart from the fact on July 17 - may be not coincidentally - it was a cloudy day.


Where and how separatists got the information about MH17 in this permutation? That is the key question in this study. Who answers this question probably rolls up the rest of the permutation. And these reports make an important contribution. 


Does the Public Prosecutor's Office (OM) prove the innocence of the separatists?


The SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) and the OVV (Dutch Safety Board) work closely together in the investigation into the circumstances of the attack on the MH17. The OM (Public Prosecutor's Office), the Internet and the Dutch people search for the perpetrators. To this end, the prosecution (OM) asked the AIVD (Secret Service of the Netherlands) information which was flatly refused.

Then the OM called the people of Donetsk to identify the crew of the BUK (separatists), designated by the SBU. The prosecutor (OM) wants to know if this BUK really was in the south of Snizhne when the MH17 was shot out of the sky. A second BUK outside Donetsk certainly would have been detected by the SBU, but this is not the case. Based on ballistic information the prosecutor (OM) will possibly have to conclude that the separatists cannot have shot the MH17 down.

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/07/16/in-their-own-words/

From a collection of testimonials around Snizhne: 
Conclusion: Though each piece of social media evidence described in this article is not conclusive on its own, a clear pattern emerged and matches the widely accepted narrative of July 17. A Buk anti-aircraft system was located in Donetsk in the late morning, headed east through Shakhtarsk, moved through Torez at around 12:10, and headed south out of Snizhne later that afternoonA rocket was fired—both seen and heard by locals supporters of separatist forces—from south of Snizhne immediately before the downing of MH17.


The BUK of the separatists

According to the Secret Service of Ukraine, the SBU, the BUK of the separatists came with a trailer at 1:00 AM at night at Sjeverne on the day of the disaster, on July 17, 2014. During the night and early morning he drove to Donetsk.

At 9.08 AM the SBU intercepted a telephone conversation in which the leader of the expedition ordered to bring the BUK back to Snizhne. The subordinate on the phone feared recognition of the BUK by the public. Sjeverne is located near Snizhne close to the Russian border. Had the BUK driven directly from Russia to the backyard of Snizhne, nobody would have noticed. This is an incomprehensible and illogical action.

Combine this with the later flight of the BUK back to Russia on July 18, a distance of only 20 km:


http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/re-examining-the-luhansk-video/#comment-4725
 Andrew // June 28, 2015 at 8:51 pm // Reply(...)You would think that a tainted BUK south of Snizhne needing to be quickly smuggled into Russia would simply proceed down Route T0522 to Stepanivka under the cover of darkness and then cross the border, as it is just 20 km, as opposed to making some sort of meandering journey to Krasnodon via Lugansk of over 160 km.(...)


At 12 o'clock in the middle of the day - after 6 hours of meaningless touring - the BUK arrived at Snizhne where he was unloaded and drove south independently (self-propelled artillery). Between 12:00 and 16:20 PM,  the BUK was in southern Snizhne.

This is the official version of the SBU, apparently sufficiently supported by the Dutch Safety Board (OVV), but it is a vulnerable version because it has committed to the coordinates south of Shizhne, allowing the BUK-rocket with long chords: 9M38M1 belonging to the SAM "Buk-M1 " could not reach the MH17. (The action radius of  9M38M1 is 35 km and of 9K37M is about 24 km)To this end, said reports have appeared.


http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-603-dutch-safety-board-release-mh17-report/#10438

Report MH17 crash:

The Dutch Safety Board report on the downing of MH17 has several clear conclusions:
- MH17 was destroyed by a 9N314M warhead carried by a 9M38 series missile, fired from a Buk, which was manufactured by the Russian Almaz-Antey company.
- The Buk was launched from somewhere within a 320-square-kilometer area.
Interestingly, both Russia and Ukraine were asked to assist in the investigation into the possible launch area of a hypothetical Buk. According to the report, while Russia did not confirm the use of a 9N314M warhead, they did provide a possible launch area which is in fact considerably smaller than yet consistent with the Dutch Safety Board's projections. Ukraine's estimate was even more exact.



The Launch Spot

http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/this-is-how-dsb-determined-the-location-of-explosion-of-the-buk-missile/#comment-17031





Eugene // May 14, 2016 at 8:24 pm //
It was an R27 missile (fragmentation based) shot likely from a Su-27, that was hovering at a medium altitude (~3km, above clouds but below reach of Russian radars) somewhere between Torez and Zaroschenske.
There were Ukrainian Su-25’s in the area near crash, but they had nothing to do with the crash, they likely did not even know what’s was going on. The theories that the plane was shot by a Su25 gun were abandoned weeks after the crash by sensible researchers. It’s only people like you or solispassi keep mentioning it nowadays.
Question for you? Russia would know that there are Ukrainian military radars capable of detecting a Buk launch, and still decided to shoot the airliner. You think this is plausible? Or is it more likely that Ukraine claims they switched off the radars because they don’t want to show recordings proving their planes were still flying?
The density of the bowtie shaped holes on the Mh17 wreckage should be the same as the density in the AA test. Of 300+ documented holes on 777 there should be dozens of bowtie holes. There is not a single one.


 Charles Wood // April 26, 2016 at 12:57 am // Reply
I’m curious why all models assume a launch from the South.
What specific reasons exclude the missile being launched from the north on a reverse track?
I assume the damage pattern would be very similar?
  •  Eugene // April 26, 2016 at 1:11 am // Reply
    This is a good question. It is possible to make practically the same side-arm of the shrapnel beam with a missile coming from the other direction. The difference is that the rear-facing jet of shrapnel is much less intense that the forward one. This is because the missile speed is subtracted from shrapnel speed and because the forward spray is much more intense due to the warhead firing slightly backwards (if we take Buk). The conservation of momentum says that the forward bit of the missile needs to be intensely thrown forward to compensate for the warhead shooting slightly backwards. As we see quite a lot of damage on the left wing, it is more likely that the missile came from ahead or right.





     IsThatSo // April 21, 2016 at 11:12 pm // Reply

    If I understand correctly (there’s a language barrier) unit0 has calculated a launch point at a position a little south of a village named Red October.
    This village (“Chervonyi Zhovten” on some maps) is located 7 km south of Snizhne, in the black zone of the map that unit0 posted at http://s017.radikal.ru/i408/1604/64/32f2950401e7.png
    Per unit0’s calculations the launch point is most likely in the black zone followed in order of probability by the red, yellow, green and white zones. Unit0, please clarify if I have misunderstood.
    I recall that Red October is where Reuters, Bellingcat and Kyivpost say that witnesses saw a missile in flight that, according to one witness “it wiggled around, then some kind of rocket stage separated, and then, somewhere toward Lutuhyne, Torez, I saw the plane fall apart in the air.” Please, consider the sources of this questionable report.

    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-airliner-idUSKBN0M81XF20150312
    https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/03/13/vladmir-babak-and-reuters-missile-launch-witnesses-how-do-they-fit-with-what-we-know-about-mh17-so-far/
    http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine-abroad/reuters-from-red-october-village-new-evidence-on-downing-of-malaysian-plane-over-ukraine-383268.html
    A serious problem with the albert-lex explosion coordinates is that a 70 kg warhead would have an even more devastating affect than we have seen in the pictures. If albert-lex is right that the coordinates were that close to the cockpit then he is also right that the missile was not a Buk.




     Eugene // April 21, 2016 at 11:47 pm //
    >A serious problem with the albert-lex explosion coordinates is that a 70 kg warhead would have an even more devastating affect than we have seen in the pictures.
    That’s the dilemma, isn’t it? You either have to accept that it was not a Buk, or move the detonation point away. This was the exact choice the DSB had, and we know what way they’ve gone. The problem is that then it’s very difficult to come up with the plausible reasons why stringing was not used (the DSB’s lame excuse was that the lines were not striaight) and why hits from their point covered a lot greater areas that were observed as damaged on the wreckage.
    As to the unit0 calculations, myself a Russian speaker, did not get much further. At a first glance he uses at least a very incorrect fragment speed (1600 vs 2400 m/s). And I am pretty sure he does not know necessary flight characteristics, because they are not public (I have other questions about the simulation)


    Below you can see the projected launch area. Black is the area calculared by the Dutch Safety Board. Blue is the area calculated by Russia, apparently with the help of Almaz-Antey. Purple is the area calculated by Ukraine:







    2015-10-13 13:55:27
    The problem, however, is that the Russian government has once again been caught in a contradiction. In a briefing today by Buk manufacturer Almaz-Antey, the Russians made the already-debunked case that the missile which brought down MH17 was fired from Zaroshchenskoye.





    >>The Almaz-Antey simulated flight paths for the 9M38 and 9M38M1 missiles are marked by the red and blue outlines (respectively). The 9M38M1 area was 63 square kilometers
    What is a reason how you mark a launch areas for 9M38 and 9M38M1. Do you sure that is not a swap?
    • Wind Tunnel Man // September 5, 2016 at 4:37 pm // Reply
      unit0:
      I suggest that you read page 145 of the DSB report where it says that the area from which a 9M38 was calculated to have been launched was approx 20 square kilometers and for a 9M38M1 63 square kilometers.
      However what is important about those calculations was that Almaz Antey assumed the same warhead on both types of missiles, i.e. 9M38 and 9M38M1, and the detonation characteristics of that warhead was based on the TNO calculations.








    Witnesses and the course of the Boeing-777










    Sotilaspassi, If the range is close to 26km, and I believe you are right, then it cannot be a 9M38 missile. According to this: http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/
    If this information is correct, these missiles have a range of 5-24 km. If not, then what do we know about a BUK M1 for certain?

    You do not have to make such data as the final truth. Airliner is very easy target, and range of defeat can be much larger.
    Furthermore, these data are included in direct conflict with the calculations of AA in its presentation.
    http://s011.radikal.ru/i315/1604/6d/9e1b4c1a27f1.png
    http://s017.radikal.ru/i435/1604/c8/3715855bfaa5.png
    According to these data, 9M38 missile has great energy capabilities than 9M38M1. This is very important nuance.
    This is why the DSB lingers with the exact type of missile. Because all of the options are bad.
    Rocket 9M38M1 due to a lower speed and larger the angle of inclination at the same distance in the problem of the search starting position shows in the direction of Ukraine. The warhead 9N314 (without bow-tie) also mix the starting point in the direction of Ukraine in calculation.
    Option, which is suitable to accuse pro-Russian forces in the downing MH17 – is a chimera, a missile 9M38 with a warhead 9N314M1.
    However, the manufacturer (AA) states that such an option was never produced. 9M38 missiles are always equipped with a warhead 9N314, and 9M38M1 rocket always with warhead 9N314M1.
    And further, in the Russian missile 9M38 on the application has been removed from service, but still there in the Ukraine.

    sotilaspassi // May 28, 2016 at 10:01 am //
    A-A said UA had 991 M1 missiles in 2005 and wanted more.
    So why would they use the dead super old non M1 model.

    Basic Dimension // October 14, 2015 at 2:48 pm // Reply











































    Normally I would trust organizations as DSB, but damned I can’t. I don’t trust the Russians but I don’t trust DSB either. So I have to let calibrate this stuff for some time waiting for inspiration.
    The report certainly has a lot of good elements, but that is more a kind of thorough administration. The framework of the Boeing is perfectly done, but that’s an order for a steel manufacturer, it’s not DSB.
    So I’m in despair, waiting for inspiration of admin. For example: are there no butterflies or bow-ties found in the wreckage? But what does that mean? Has it been a 9M38 with warhead 9H314?
    It is only the Russians who sabotage or are they clashing with the SBU of the DSB?

    butterfly frags found means 9N314M warhead,Russia has them as does Ukraine,The erratic claims of the Russian side has now become little more than embarrassing nonsense.

    Yes, thanks, but the question is have butterfly holes been found in the fuselage and in the bodies?



    found in human remains ergo they are part of missile strike,entry hole can be any shape

      Almaz-Antey maintains its criticism and concludes that the left engine cannot have been hit from Snizhne. (But that’s strange because the left wing lies in the path of the rocket chord).
      A-A also claims the Boeing 777 has no shrapnel butterfly holes (double T or bow-tie), which definitely are found on the IL-86 hull. What would indicate an old warhead 9H314 without butterflies and no 9H314M1. Therefore, if butterflies are shown in the bodies, how did they get there in the first place?
      Because a detonation from Shizhne would have given about perpendicular shrapnel images on the cockpit on a very short distance, it is very unlikely no butterflies would be found. Here A-A certainly has a point to be taken seriously.

       Hector Reban // October 15, 2015 at 11:53 am // Reply
      NLR report states the damage to the left wing is consistent with a ¨secundary fragmentationpattern¨ if a BUK 9M38(M1) with a 9N314M warhead exploded 3 meters above the left side of the cockpit.
      The secundary fragmentationpattern is an area in the direction of the missile, so straightforward. But it contains mainly dust and parts from the missile itself.
      Remarkable enough it was just this primary and secundary pattern that was consistent with a Zaroshchenskoye launchsite according to the 2D model of Metabunk´s Mick West, as can be seen in an article on this website in june.

      Hector, that’s correct.
      http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/damage-of-mh17-does-not-rule-out-a-launch-from-zaroshenskye/
      I demand an explanation for missing butterflies on the Boeing hull!

       Basic Dimension // October 15, 2015 at 1:17 pm //
      DSB: ‘Air-to-air gun/cannon fire does not produce fragments in the shape of cubes or bow-ties as were found in the wreckage and in the bodies of three of the crew members.

      Not interested in the wreckage but in holes in the hull, the fuselage, the outside of the plane.
      How many butterflies are found in the cockpit, please offer statistics and photos. How many butterflies are found in bodies? Are butterflies found in violated corpses? Statistics?

       BigaC // October 15, 2015 at 4:09 pm // Reply
      Seems many bowtie shapes in AA experiment.
      http://cdn2.img.sputniknews.com/images/102850/10/1028501068.jpg
      Only DSB didnt find such ones or MH-17 debris really lack such shaped holes?







      DSB selected high energy (warhead) objects. They found 72 high energy objects or parts of them in the cockpit and in the bodies of the crew. They were selected on same size, mass and shape.

      Persons with shrapnel in cockpit:

      Captain Team A: hundreds of metal fragments found.
      First officer Team A: 120 mostly metal fragments.
      Purser: > 100 metal objects.

      Within this group (72) they found 15 high energy objects in the bodies of the crew. Further they found one object in a passenger and 56 in the cockpit wreckage: 15+1+56=72.

      The origin and the elemental composition of these 72 selected cockpit fragments, together with 21 other reference (probably cockpit) fragments (e.g. aeroplane metal structure, cockpit glass) was examined by the NFI (Dutch Forensic Institute) using a scanning electron microscope and energy dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) system. Further examinations were conducted on cross-sections on fragments using a Focused Ion Beam (FIB).

      As said, 15 high energy ferrous objects or parts of them were found in the cockpit crew: the captain, the first officer and the purser. And it seems the body of the captain contained only one bowtie element, the other was found in the cockpit wreckage.

      But what is the total number of bowtie elements found on the whole crash site? Do we have statistics? Let’s refer to the appendix:

      http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/appendix-x-nlr-report-en.pdf

      6.11
      Bowtie fragments
      [In the wreckage of flight MH17 several non-aircraft related, foreign fragments were found that are assessed to be the high-energy objects, or parts of the high-energy objects, that penetrated the aircraft from the outside. A number of these fragments found in the cockpit area have a distinct butterfly or bowtie shape, as the one seen in Figure 46. These fragments are recognized as one of the three types of preformed fragments used in the 9N314M warhead of the 9M38 and 9M38M1 missiles. Figure 47 shows these bowtie fragments in an inert 9N314M warhead. Accounting for deformation and abrasion due to explosion and impact, the bowtie fragments found in the wreckage of flight MH17 match the 9N314M warhead bowtie preformed fragments in shape, size and weight. ]

      Used techniques are interesting but will not prove a causal relation between 9N314M and MH17, since the crash site and the bodies have been unattended for a long period of time and techniques only were used qualitatively (naked eye inspection). Hence for causal relations DSB comes with zirconium in the bowties from the windows of the cockpit.

      The origin and the elemental composition of the 72 selected fragments were determined only qualitatively. It was found 43 of the 72 examined fragments consisted of unalloyed steel (rusty = warhead); hence, 29 were not from a warhead (stainless steel and one otherwise). That ‘otherwise’ fragment was non-metallic (coal-slag).

      http://tinyurl.com/jznr3cn





      Only 4 (FOUR) of these 43 ‘had distinctive shapes: cubic and in the form of a bow tie’. As said, they were found in the cockpit. Hence, nowhere else in the wreckage bowties were found. I mean, we have no information. So, only two bowties have been found to support 9N314M. One in the body of the captain of team A and one in the cockpit wreckage.

      And in 20 rusty, out of the 43 rusty, out of the 72 selected objects, fragments of unalloyed steel, aluminum and/or GLASS LIKE DEPOSITS were present. They have been inspected by the Focused Ion Beam (FIB). On 14 of these fragments, the glass deposit consisted of sodium, aluminum, silicon, oxygen and ZIRCONIUM.

      Hence on 14 rusty, out of 20 rusty, out of 43 rusty, out of 72 selected objects THEY FOUND ZIRCONIUM. BUT… POSSIBLY NOT ON THE BOWTIES:

      ‘The chemical composition of 20 selected fragments which had either a very distinctive shape (including the two bow-tie shaped pre-formed fragments) or a layer of deposits OR BOTH was determined. This was determined by means of laser-ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry.’

      This is the Dutch text:

      ‘Van 20 geselecteerde fragmenten met OFWEL een zeer uitgesproken vorm (waaronder de twee fragmenten in de vorm van een vlinderdas) OFWEL [[EN/OF; BD]] een laagje afzettingen werd de chemische samenstelling vastgesteld.’

      Is it ‘and’, is it ‘or’ or is it ‘and/or’?

      We don’t know if the bowtie had a layer of deposits. If not, we don’t know how it came into the body of the captain. May be no zirconium was found on the two bowties. Maybe they did not come through the window but through the skin of the cockpit. Maybe they were shot into the body of the captain of team A by criminals. We have no information from this research.

      Now earlier was said 15 high energy objects were found in the crew of the cockpit. We also know 14 of the 20 had zirconium. So 6 out of 15 high energy objects, found in the crew possibly had no zirconium. One of them might be the bowtie found in the captain’s body.

      So it turned out zirconium was found in 14 out of 72 pieces of possible warhead shrapnel. Hence and to be fair, if zirconium has been found on the bowtie in the body of the captain, it might be an important clue. But this zirconium has been demonstrated only qualitatively and it has not been cross checked by independent institutes. Hence this will not be enough to convince the judges. At most there could be a correlation between 9N314M and MH17; causality is not proven.

      Now they found the shrunken experimental group (20) and the control group (21) (probably cockpit wreckage) had the same kind of aluminum, but this was not checked scientifically but only with the naked eye. Here and there they took at will somewhat material. But maybe they first must prove significant differences are to be expected between several kinds of aluminum of planes, using their Focused Ion Beam (FIB), for shrapnel could be transported into the wreckage otherwise.

      Next it seems they SOMEHOW divided the 20 sample elements (n=20) into two groups of fragments. This is ABACADABRA in a scientific report.

      They apparently took m=8 kind of independent variables as metal dimensions. A dependent dichotomous variable seems to indicate the difference or similarity between groups. That dependent variable could be the principal component on which groups can differ or agree. It looks like multiple regression or discriminant analysis but then not optimized because of PCA.

      A number of techniques have been developed enhancing differences or similarities between groups, but sample size always influences significance in the first place.

       Basic Dimension // April 9, 2016 at 7:43 pm //
      Basic Dimension // March 26, 2016 at 11:11 am //
      Basic Dimension // October 16, 2015 at 11:04 am // Reply
      [Next it seems they SOMEHOW divided the 20 sample elements (n=20) into two groups of fragments. This is ABACADABRA in a scientific report.
      They apparently took m=8 kind of independent variables as metal dimensions. A dependent dichotomous variable seems to indicate the difference or similarity between groups. That dependent variable could be the principal component on which groups can differ or agree. It looks like multiple regression or discriminant analysis but then not optimized because of PCA.
      A number of techniques have been developed enhancing differences or similarities between groups, but sample size always influences significance in the first place.]

      What could have been their design?

      n= 20 subjects:

      I propose they had a subject group with shrapnel in their bodies (n1=9) and a cockpit group of pieces of aluminum (n2=11). They want to know if groups differ.

      They had m=8 metal variables as vectors from the origin, and might have extracted up to 8 principal components in that 8-dimensional metal space. Discarding unique factors there might remain p=2 components reducing the variable space to 2 dimensions. PCA is a form data reduction.

      Now for example you may project iteratively your n=20 individuals (2 groups) from a 20-dimensional subject space into the m=8 dimensional variable space. This converges into a solution in which the n=20 individuals as vectors from the origin are plotted onto the p=2 factor space. Hence, in this iteration from subject space to variable space and back, you will find the factors in the p=2 factor space, as the reduced variable space.

      So you might have n1=9 elements of shrapnel from 9 subjects and n2=11 elements from the aluminum cockpit frame. Now you project these 20 vectors onto the resulting 2-dimensional factor space. And now it is interesting if the 9 shrapnel elements from the subjects agree with the 11 pieces of aluminum of the cockpit frame. For example they agree if they score randomly on the p=2 factors. Or in the same bundle of vectors. If the 9-subject bundle scores only on the first and the 11- cockpit bundle on the second factor than groups do not match on metal.

      On the other hand if there is no combined bundle and a random mess results,it also may be caused from your poor design and from too less sample elements. So only if these small groups are amazingly different on the factors it gives information. It seems they were not different, so DSB did not gain any insight.

      Remember in the social sciences Principal Components Analysis is an explorative technique only meant for a lot of individual subjects n, about ten times more than the number of variables m. So we needed about 80 sample elements. But disregarding statistics it all is possible.

      Hence, statistical testing is not the main purpose of PCA, only getting an idea how subjects score on the reduced metal factor space.

      After this explorative analysis there are a lot of techniques to find optimal differences or optimal agreement between groups. But remember you need parameter free tests if you have very few subjects. And I think this study is only for explorative use. So if they got the idea groups were the same this is no hard evidence and other tests had to follow. But why, if they were already satisfied these groups looked the same on metal?

      So they concluded groups did not differ. Can we conclude shrapnel came through the hull or through the windshields? No, they don’t know, for the crash site has not been guarded adequately from the beginning.
      Hence now they also must prove the aluminum and zirconium in the cockpit of MH17 differ significantly from thousands of other airplanes in the world, which all can have changed their window shields. This is an impossible dead end in research.

      If there is no significant difference between planes, perpetrators could have smuggled shrapnel and bowties from every other plane in the world.

       Deus Abscondis // April 11, 2016 at 3:13 pm //
      Basic Dimension and others, thanks for the considered replies.
      DB, I feel like I was propelled back to an experimental methodology class at Uni 😂 I’ll need to read it twice❗


      There are 43 qualified shrapnel fragments allegedly found in the MH17 and concluded by DSB as from the same origin. Some selected fragments:
        

      http://tinyurl.com/jznr3cn






      I think DSB did not control the type of unalloyed steel in the first place, but rather checked for cockpit glass. This means all shrapnel came through the hull and windshields as a guaranty of conditional probability. What can be doubt by their PCA analysis and their pipe staring activities with the naked eye.
        
      Following the standards of Almaz Antey for 9M38 (9N314) and 9M38M1 (9N314M) different types of steel grades have been used for preformed fragments of different fractions (light and heavy). So the kind of aluminum must be checked better.

      Also, A-A could have meant different standards for 9N314 and 9N314M by construction or different time effects as recently suggested by Deus Abscondis, but then A-A would have been more illuminating.

      So, we choose for different steel grades between bowties and big squares versus little squares and fillers. This time conditional probability is not important, only the relation between kinds of shrapnel within the MH17.

      http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr





      This means for MH17, found fillers and little squares has to be metallurgically different from bowties and big squares. 

      What is our question?

      1: Are the 4 allegedly found heavy elements, especially the found bowtie in the body of captain A, metallurgically different from all other qualified parts of shrapnel found in the wreckage?

      http://tinyurl.com/jngmagj











      The naked eye can see that shrapnels from 3 image are made from entirely different metal than shrapnel from image 1 and 2. So if 1 is BUK shrapnel than 3 are from another missile.


       sotilaspassi // August 14, 2015 at 8:44 pm // Reply
      Metal generates rust in different way when being under the sky vs being in a human body.




      - Following A-A, they must differ from light shrapnel. If not, ALL selected shrapnel found in MH17 must come from demolished bowties and big squares. Or DSB organized a wrong metallurgic analysis. The latter seems true as DSB did not perform a proper steel analysis.

      And as doradcar concluded earlier it is very doubtful the four allegedly found heavy fragments are metallurgically comparable. That's what DSB implicitly decided. As we see the picture we may doubt these results. Especially the issue between doradcar and Sotilaspassi about the effects of blood on metal is relevant. All bowties in bodies are weirdly different, while the bowtie in the cockpit looks rusty.


      DSB Main report:
      Page 89 of 279
      Figure 37:
      Four distinctly shaped fragments. Top left: cockpit. Top right: Captain’s body. Bottom left: Purser’s body. Bottom right: First Officer’s body. (Source: NFI). Scale is in millimetres.

      2 .16 .1  Forensic examination:

      A distinct group was identified as small pieces of metal that were suspected to be high-energy objects, or parts of them. These fragments were extracted from the Captain from Team A, the First Officer from Team A, the Purser, who was present in the cockpit at the time  of  the  crash,  and  from  the  cockpit  wreckage  (Figure  37). These  fragments  were found to be ferrous.]]

       Basic Dimension // October 16, 2015 at 7:49 pm // Reply

      In the report of DSB high energetic objects are described jointly. As a consequence, the chemical composition of the two bowtie elements is shrouded in darkness; they are disguised in the group. This is completely unacceptable, given the huge importance given by DSB itself to bowties for the distinction between 9H314 and 9H314M. Also PCA analysis is not revealing for individual elements.

      On many places in the report, DSB relies with great confidence on the presence of these bowties. For example they are used as proof to negate air to air missiles. Therefore DSB should be urged to give separate  chemical analyses of each bowtie separately.

      Undoubtedly, this data will be provided to the JIT. But in case specific data comes not available for the public and bowties are not cross-examined by independent institutes, legal proof for 9H314M will be invalidated.

       Basic Dimension // October 17, 2015 at 1:06 am // Reply

      The DSB report:
      10 Conclusions
      10.2 Supporting conclusions (causes of the crash)

      6. Fragmentation spray of pre-formed fragments.

      ‘(…) The objects that hit the aeroplane from the outside with high energy, as found in the aeroplane wreckage and the bodies of the crew in the cockpit, were made of unalloyed steel. Some of these showed evidence of having passed through the aeroplane’s exterior surface and/or cockpit windows. (…)’

      This is a very strange conclusion. How else than through the plane’s exterior surface and/or through the cockpit windows, high energy objects could have entered the bodies?

      Or did they pass without any damage? Isn’t that amazing if you have available a scanning electron microscope, an energy dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) system and a Focused Ion Beam (FIB)?

      Possibly, this means not all shrapnel found in the cockpit or in the crew bodies came in as expected. Maybe only some shrapnel came in through the plane’s exterior surface and/or through the cockpit windows. Maybe a lot of shrapnel found in the bodies entered in a very peculiar manner…

       Basic Dimension // October 17, 2015 at 12:11 pm // Reply

      DSB report:

      3.6. Weapon systems
      3.6.5. Surface-to-air weapon systems common in the regio.

      We know the following:

      ‘The Buk system’s missiles (the 9M38 and 9M38M1 missiles) carry a 70 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead, composed of a high-explosive detonator surrounded by layers of pre-formed fragments. The 9N314 and 9N314M warheads are composed of two layers of pre-formed fragments. The inner layer of pre-formed fragments in the 9N314M warhead is composed of bow-tie shaped fragments together with square shaped ‘filler’ fragments. The outer layer consists of larger square shaped fragments (see Figure 5).’
      Now it is obvious that the larger shaped cubes (8x8x5 MM) on the outside of the warhead of 9M38M1 first arrived at MH17. They made the first holes through which the bowties could penetrate the cockpit freely. But remember bowties are much bigger (13x13x8,2 MM). In which case there must have been found a lot of butterfly impressions on the skin of MH17. Maybe Almaz-Antey forgot to place the larger square shaped fragments (8x8x5 MM) on their warhead, since bowties were very well visible on the IL-86, but that aside.

      Now, how DSB will prove 9H314M if bowties only were non-perforating fragments on MH17?

      10. Conclusions
      10.2. Supporting conclusions (causes of the crash)
      10.2.5. Fragments from one location

      The aeroplane was struck by a large number of small fragments with different shapes and sizes (cubic and in the form of a bow-tie) moving at high velocity. The direction of both the perforating and the non-perforating fragments originated from a single location outside left and above the cockpit. The fragments caused damage to the left hand side of the cockpit, the left engine intake ring and the left wing.

      How has 9H314M been proven?

      10.2.10. Weapon used

      ‘The aeroplane was struck by a 9N314M warhead as carried on a 9M38-series missile and launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile system. This conclusion is based on the combination of the following; the recorded sound peak, the damage pattern found on the wreckage caused by the blast and the impact of fragments, the bow-tie and cubic shaped fragments found in the cockpit and in the bodies of the crew members in the cockpit, the injuries sustained by three crew members in the cockpit, the analysis of the in-flight break-up, the analysis of the explosive residues and paint found and the size and distinct, bow-tie, shape of some of the fragments.’

      A: The registered sound peak has nothing to do with 9H314M especially and is within margin errors and looks like tunnel vision, since the velocity of shrapnel from the blast is much too high for science fiction in the cockpit: Dismissed as circumstantial evidence for proof of 9H314M especially:

      2. Sound peak
      The Cockpit Voice Recorder recorded a 2.3 millisecond sound peak. Signal triangulation showed that the noise originated from outside the aeroplane, starting from a position above the left hand side of the cockpit, propagating from front to aft.

      B: The ‘damage pattern found on the wreckage caused by the blast’ dismissed as circumstantial evidence for 9H314M: tunnelvision:
      Since, the DSB report gives no model for 9H314:

      3.9 Blast damage
      ‘By reviewing the observed damage on recovered parts of the aeroplane and by investigation of the blast pressure evolution for a number of discrete points on the aeroplane’s contour, the effects of the blast of the warhead was analysed. This was achieved by means of a so-called computational fluid dynamics simulation performed to provide a high-fidelity quantitative description of the blast loading. The computational fluid dynamic simulation takes into account the altitude, properties of the 9N314M warhead, velocity of the aeroplane, velocity of the warhead, and shape of the aeroplane.
      The position and orientation of the detonating warhead relative to the aeroplane was taken from paragraph 3.8.3, model II.’

      C: The damage pattern found on the wreckage caused by the impact of fragments itself: dismissed for court as proof of 9H314M, since it proves 9H314 much better.

      For, the impact of fragments on MH17 misses bowties!

      Both 9H314 and 9H314M have big cubes on the outside of the warhead: 8x8x5 mm. They come first and make the first holes.
      But additionally 9H314 has even bigger cubes of 13x13x8 MM, which looks more like the damage on MH17. BTW have cubes 13x13x8 MM been found in the cockpit? Not reported.
      Also besides cubes: 8x8x5 mm, 9H314M additionally has bowties (13x13x8,2 MM) and little filler cubes (6x6x8,2 MM), both which are not visible on the skin of MH17. That’s remarkable since bowties are much bigger than cubes from the outside layer of warhead 9H314M. May be A-A forget to place outside cubes because bowties are very well visible on the IL-86, but that aside.

      D: Bow-tie and cubic shaped fragments in the cockpit and the body of the captain: dismissed for court without explicitly proven and double checked zirconium and aluminum profiles.

      It must be said the cube found in the body of the First Officer is 6x6x8,2 MM. Might be from 9H314M or from a criminal suspect.

      Up till now there is no prove bowties in the cockpit and in the body of the captain came from the supposed 9H314M. They may have been placed by criminals at the unattended crime site, or may have been shot into the captain before making Rontgen photo’s, since there was no control anywhere.

      E: The injuries sustained by three crew members in the cockpit: until now and without clear evidence not convincing for 9H314M, dismissed.

      F: The analysis of the in-flight break-up: questionable because of willful thinking and too many free parameters. Might be circumstantial evidence. Might fit 9H314 as well.

      G: Explosive residues and paint found at the crash site: Dismissed because of unguarded crash site and also could be from 9H314.

      This proof is a complete mess…

       Hector Reban // October 18, 2015 at 11:43 am // Reply
      Then you even haven´t mentioned the procedures around the obtaining of paint and explosive samples:
      “As for the paint matching, the DSB says it tested “missile parts found at the wreckage area” with “fragments recovered from the aeroplane”. It concludes : “the paint samples taken from missile parts could not be distinguished from those found on the foreign objects extracted from the aeroplane”. How and when the two sets of samples were found, and by whom, is left unsaid.
      The testing of the explosive residues is just as faulty, or even worse, depending on your forensic standard: “A total of 126 samples were reportedly swabbed from parts of the plane wreckage. Just 30 of these tested positive for two types of explosive – RDX and TNT.A “few” are now reported to have shown traces of the explosive PETN. However, on the missile parts which the DSB claims to be proof of Buk, “traces of RDX was [sic] found. On the missile part [sic] TNT or PETN could not be identified.” The significance of the missing explosive evidence is left unexplained. But the DSB report concedes that “the objects from which the swab samples were taken had been exposed to the elements for a long period of time.” Just how long from crash to recovery the Dutch don’t say. “The possibility of contamination during transport and by the fact that the wreckage lay in an area of armed conflict is a concern for the explosive residue analysis.”
      http://johnhelmer.net/?p=14322
      It certainly is a mess. Much of the evidence is inadmissable in court, but in international politics the report has served its purpose.
      I have seen in the report some 20 points of doubt so far regarding the detonation, damage patterns, investigation procedures and results, its kind of dazzling to me.
      One thing we know for sure: the Bellingcat evidence is not taken seriously and US evidence is totally absent.

      > Rebels tried to collect every visible bowtie and opened the captain to dug those out also from him.
      The report kind of indicates the opposite.
      Page 85:
      “Following identification, it was found that the body of the Captain from Team A was not one of the four bodies that underwent detailed examination. The body of the Captain from Team A had undergone an external and internal examination to remove foreign objects. This examination showed a great deal of fragmentation in the body. In addition, hundreds of metal fragments were found. Several bone fractures and other injuries that were observed in the Captain’s body were judged to be related to the impact of metal fragments travelling at a high velocity.”
      It can be interpreted like this: After no bowtie fragments were found in human remains, all of the sudden it was noted that the fragments from the captain’s remains had already been removed elsewhere. How the fragments were assigned to the captain’s remains is unknown.


      http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News

      22 July 2014

      INTERPOL response team in Ukraine starts identification process of flight MH 17 victims

      KHARKIV, Ukraine – Members of INTERPOL’s Incident Response Team (IRT) in Kharkiv, Ukraine have started the disaster victim identification (DVI) process following the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH 17.

      The remains of victims recovered so far were labelled and numbered before being transported in refrigerated freight wagons from Donetsk to the designated centre of operations in Kharkiv where the INTERPOL IRT, along with other international DVI teams in place, will carry out preliminary examinations.


      The 10-strong IRT is currently comprised of three Dutch DVI specialists, one of whom is the IRT leader, four INTERPOL officials, a Brazilian forensics expert and current chair of the INTERPOL DVI Steering Group and representatives from Europol and the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP).



       Prosto Tak // October 18, 2015 at 2:53 pm // Reply
      Actually, both versions seem to be incorrect. It has already been a point of controversy and seems to come out of the way the English text of the report was formulated.
      It’s rather clear that the Captain’s body had been examined by the investigation’s expert themselves who found all those objects there but without knowing it was exactly the Captain’s body, and separately from a special examination of the presumed four bodies of the flight teams; it became clear afterwards, after the identification.
      The Guardian had a story on this — and they’ve made a correction to that point: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/mh17-report-suggests-efforts-were-made-to-cover-up-causes-of-disaster
      “The subheading and text of this article were amended on 14 October 2015. An earlier version wrongly stated that a “bungled autopsy” had been carried out on the pilot of Malaysian airlines flight MH17. In fact, Dutch forensic scientists carried out the autopsy on the body and removed “foreign objects”. The error was due to a difference in translation between the Dutch and English versions of the Dutch Safety Board’s report into the disaster.”

       Basic Dimension // October 18, 2015 at 4:27 pm // Reply
      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/mh17-report-suggests-efforts-were-made-to-cover-up-causes-of-disaster
      ‘Among the fragments of missile shrapnel examined, two were in the shape of a bow tie, which the Dutch board found to be characteristic of a particular type of Buk missile warhead. However, the Russian manufacturer had earlier denied that any such fragments were found, and insisted an older Buk model was used, one that was no longer in service in the Russian armed forces.’

      DSB report page 85:
      ‘(…) Following identification, it was found that the body of the Captain from Team A was not one of the four bodies that underwent detailed examination.(…)’

      Now, think about it.
      1: Where was the captain found? Not in the cockpit? And how come he was not identified as the captain?
      2: Was his body examined by inexperienced students? Searching for shrapnel?
      So, only DSB mistakenly thought to investigate the body of the wrong person. But the captain was of Malaysian origin. How many Malaysian males were at the plane? How come this terrible mistake? What is the chance of such an error made by professionals?

      And isn’t it an amazing coincidence the Russians are positive there was no bowtie in the captain’s body? Hence, the Russians must have identified the body as from the captain. Otherwise they would not know.
      Unless no bowtie has been found in an earlier stage, what the Russians generalized to the captain. So DSB suddenly must have done their amazing find after the Russians first got the impression no bowties were found.
      So we definitely conclude the bowtie must have been detected in two steps: First phase no bowtie found, second phase eureka. Unless the Russians did not speak the truth…

      So, in the second instance DSB examined his body again, searching for bowties and guess what, they found a bowtie. And in addition they found another one in the wreckage of the cockpit. But maybe they first found one in the cockpit wreckage then reexamined the bodies.

      It is fairly certain this follows not the product rule of independent chances:
      1: (p = 10%) They misidentified the captain times
      2: (p = 40%) in the second instance they found the only human bound bowtie just in his body = 4 % chance.
      This chance is low, unless as said we suppose some legitimate covariance between dependent chances. Now a legitimate covariate might be the captain was placed in the left chair (?), so if there was a bowtie to be found the biggest chance was in his body. That’s correct reasoning.

      But of course, in that case you first inform the Russians about your plan for a second autopsy on the captain’s body, for a child can understand a bowtie from heaven would not be accepted by the Russians. So, is this silly administration of research by DSB without notarial record, or is this something else?
      What is terribly missing is a logbook, an administration of findings from which later can be inspected what happened chronologically.

      For now I refuse to believe fraud has been committed with research data. That goes way too far. But I demand a chronological explanation of DSB aligned with the Russian earlier perception that no bowtie was found in the first autopsy on the body of the captain.

         Prosto Tak // October 18, 2015 at 7:31 pm // Reply
        > Where was the captain found? Not in the cockpit?
        — Obviously, not in the cockpit, as there was no cockpit any more. His body was found on the ground.
        > And how come he was not identified as the captain?
        — Do you understand what has remained of many of the bodies reduced to charred remains on the ground?
        > Was his body examined by inexperienced students? Searching for shrapnel?
        — What on the Earth made you think so?
        > So, only DSB mistakenly thought to investigate the body of the wrong person.
        — Why do you think they “mistakingly thought” anything? They’ve just examined an unknown body and found lots of ‘Buk’ warhead fragments within it. Later, they found out it had been the captain. Or, actually, A  captain, as there were two separate flight teams, and two captains.
        > And isn’t it an amazing coincidence the Russians are positive there was no bowtie in the captain’s body? Hence, the Russians must have identified the body as from the captain.
        — Do you have any data stating that the Russians were meddling into the investigation and did their own separate autopsies of any bodies and even identifying them before giving them away to DSB?
        If you do, it would be an evidence into a criminal case against the Russians having tampered into the official DSB investigation. Please supply the data.

        Prosto:
        Thanks for your friendly reaction. I always appreciate your expertise in this area. We all have a role to play. We all want to find the perpetrators what unites us on this blog.

        > Where was the captain found? Not in the cockpit?
        [— Obviously, not in the cockpit, as there was no cockpit any more. His body was found on the ground.]
        Okay, accepted, though you have no proof.

        > And how come he was not identified as the captain?
        [— Do you understand what has remained of many of the bodies reduced to charred remains on the ground?]
        Well, many persons were recognizable. But maybe you’re right as far as it concerns the cockpit. But on the other hand the first person they looked for must have been the pilot. So it is illogical.

        > Was his body examined by inexperienced students? Searching for shrapnel?
        [— What on the Earth made you think so?]
        I don’t believe professionals just cut open bodies in series to collect shrapnel, of course not. They definitely must have had an idea it was the captain or someone from the cockpit.

        > So, only DSB mistakenly thought to investigate the body of the wrong person.
        [— Why do you think they “mistakingly thought” anything? They’ve just examined an unknown body and found lots of ‘Buk’ warhead fragments within it. Later, they found out it had been the captain. Or, actually, A  captain, as there were two separate flight teams, and two captains.]
        I think it was the captain of team A, who was also the pilot in function in the left chair, since on him they “found” the bowtie. And if someone was difficult to identify on that plane it had to be the pilot in function on that chair. So they were warned it could be the pilot.

        And remember the crucial argument of the Russians is DSB found the bowtie only in the second instance. If it was an honest action then it was stupid not to involve the Russians at that moment. That’s my point, cause if Jit really thinks the Russians are the perpetrators they missed an opportunity to involve them.

        > And isn’t it an amazing coincidence the Russians are positive there was no bowtie in the captain’s body? Hence, the Russians must have identified the body as from the captain.
        [— Do you have any data stating that the Russians were meddling into the investigation and did their own separate autopsies of any bodies and even identifying them before giving them away to DSB?
        If you do, it would be an evidence into a criminal case against the Russians having tampered into the official DSB investigation. Please supply the data.]

        Straw man argument.

        On Oct 13, 2015, The Guardian also wrote about an autopsy (“bungled”) and cover-up. Next day, it published a correction, placing it at the very bottom of the article. This is the corrected version:
        http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/mh17-report-suggests-efforts-were-made-to-cover-up-causes-of-disaster
        The text of the Guardian correction:
        The subheading and text of this article were amended on 14 Oct 2015. An earlier version wrongly stated that a “bungled autopsy” had been carried out on the pilot of Malaysian airlines flight MH17. In fact, Dutch forensic scientists carried out the autopsy on the body and removed “foreign objects”. The error was due to a difference in translation between the Dutch and English versions of the Dutch Safety Board’s report into the disaster.

        abcd, even their “correction” is incorrect. The guardian is blaming DSB for a mistake they made themselves. “Due to a difference in translation between the Dutch and English versions of the Dutch Safety Board’s report”, this is stuff where conspiracy theories are made of.


         Basic Dimension // October 19, 2015 at 3:59 pm // Reply
        http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/report-mh17-abouttheinvestigation-en.pdf
        3.3 Analysis and assessment
        2. What hit the aeroplane of flight MH17 (and what did not) (page 35)

        It looks like DSB in the results mingles:

        1: fragments of shrapnel (splinters).
        2: bowties and cubes.
        3: fragments or parts of a missile.

        Fragments of shrapnel:

        Part 1:

        ‘Metal fragments
        The shape and size of the metal fragments made it possible to issue statements about their source. A NUMBER of these fragments had a special shape, which can basically be described as CUBIC AND BOW-TIE SHAPED. Knowledge of weapons was used to establish that fragments having THIS SHAPE are released at the detonation of a certain type of warhead. Using knowledge about different types of weapons, a corresponding weapon was sought that could contain fragments WITH THIS TYPE OF SHAPE. Traces (of aluminium and glass) THAT WERE DISCOVERED ON THE FRAGMENTS were also relevant, because this enabled the investigators to deduce whether, and with what, the fragments had collided’.
        Here ‘THE’ definitely refers to a certain group of fragments extracted from the whole: bowties and cubes. Hence they have proof the bowties came through the cockpit window and/or the outer skin of the plane.
        But what comes now: fragments of shrapnel or fragments of a missile?

        Connecting Part II:

        ‘The Dutch Safety Board attempted to obtain reference material of the suspected weapon in order to further substantiate the origin of THE fragments. The objective was to establish that the chemical composition of THE fragments was consistent with that of the suspected weapon. This was not achieved, so this verification could not take place’
        Does this mean bowties chemically did not match 9H314M? Or missile fragments did not match 9H314M or the missile? No, it definitely has been concluded bowties were not of the same chemical composition as a warhead. But that’s not important. Only important is if the two bowties are covered with aluminum and zirconium of MH17. And that’s they confirmed.

        Connecting Part III:

        ‘During the recovery of the aeroplane, OTHER OBJECTS were found that correspond with parts of a specific missile in terms of shape and appearance. Two shards were discovered in the aeroplane (in the cockpit and the left wing tip). The paint and traces on the shards and traces on pieces of the wreckage were compared with paint and traces of an explosive on THE OBJECTS that were found. These analyses were performed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) at the request of the Public Prosecution Service and shared with the Dutch Safety Board.’
        Now we are sure OTHER OBJECTS are part of the missile and metal fragments (shrapnel, inclusive bowties and cubes) chemically were NOT involved in a warhead or a missile. We also know aluminum and zirconium of MH17 were found on the bowties and cubes. Maybe Jit has some proof which it does not want to reveal to the public now. Maybe they also have proof of butterflie images on the fuselage…
        What we see is JIT keeps its powder dry because, since as has been argued previously in this place they have no legal position. Would they now already lay their cards on the table suspects would take a stand to crumble their arguments.

         Basic Dimension // October 19, 2015 at 6:05 pm // Reply

        It is unlikely large debris has been stolen from the crash site. More likely is DSB had some reason to wait 4-8 months with their collection of debris, which meanwhile disappeared somehow. This moment many parts of the plane’s fuselage are missing which have not yet photographed. That’s because they are missing.

        It might be JIT already confiscated some parts. Although DSB already found two bow ties with aluminum and zirconium, it’s too meager in court. So I predict February 2016 JIT will report to have found butterfly images on some yet undiscovered parts of the fuselage. But remember I have no proof; it’s just a projection from what we know now.

         Basic Dimension // October 20, 2015 at 10:41 am // Reply
        The interview was meaningless. Joustra made it appear as if the DSB had numerous important measurements to do at the crash site and only getting half an hour of the separatists was inadequate. Therefore, one had to wait many, many months. But I remember that when they finally arrived they were mostly flotsam to loading.
        When it was objected that Australians and Malaysians all direct could be walking around at the crash site for seven consecutive days, he said that these people had a different task. The Dutch Ministry of Defense has discouraged DSB to go to the crash site.
        There are only two bow ties and two cubes found while the rest is scattered in the unit. That may be, but that does not apply to the outer skin of the plane. BTW have I found a bowtie in the middle of this photohttp://tinyurl.com/pbs9atp (on page 20 of 72 of appendix X. (figure 15))?





        As a sidenote, Basic Dimension:
        Yesterday I went throught the tweets from Bellingcat’s “Daniel Romein” who shows us a real example of a bow-tie shaped hole.
        https://twitter.com/daniel_b_cat/status/664043486832791553
        I remarked maybe the two holes above this “bow-tie” were 2 cubics perforated side by side, and if his were true, his bow-tie was really tiny.
        Of course, I don’t know if what I said was true, but the problem is: neither does he. He shows something without context, without measurements, without knowing what the other damage represents (possible cubics).
        Thats the way Bcat is doing their investigation: searching for context-less, illogical and unscientific established leads to confirm their hypothesis (which becomes a dogma by this way). Its appalling.

        Hector, good comment. That hole is too small, true. It does not even look to be directed correctly. One needs to look at the holes along the direction of their velocity.
        As I previously noted, if there was one, just one, bow-tie shaped hole it would be meticulously measured and photographed from all angles by the DSB, given the obvious drive to prove the Buk warhead. The fact that we don’t see this in the report speaks quite loudly there there are no such holes. The report is rigged.
        Yes, that hole is probably the exit hole for entry hole that is just on the right from it. The entry hole does not exhibit any bowtieness.
        The way those guys try (unsuccessfully) to find anything resembling bowtie holes is quite telling.


        Sotilaspassi,
        Definitely from the cockpit floor…
        http://tinyurl.com/j2f8rsw

        https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeroenakkermans/16246067893



        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-is-the-location-of-this-part-of-the-cockpit/




        Also it can be the hole of the broken piece above…

        You’ve got two images combined together there, but the front one is part of a bulkhead beam on RHS of cockpit roof
        http://www.flickr.com/photos/jeroenakkermans/16246067893


         Basic Dimension // October 22, 2015 at 7:46 pm // Reply
        http://www.npo.nl/mh17-het-onderzoek/13-10-2015/KN_1675251
        At (05.58 / 50.41) of the interview Mr. Joustra says DSB is pretty sure 9N314M is the warhead used. The question of the reporter whether he is 100% sure about 9N314M is avoided and Mr. Joustra keeps a detailed story in which the most important fact is the discovery of two bow-ties and two cubes. Only 9N314M has bow-ties. Further, the unsatisfactory cooperation with the Russians is discussed.

        Apparently, already in an early stage DSB theoretically decided to 9N314M, the warhead with the bow-ties. But this means later JIT is expected to show to the court an exuberant amount of evidence of this proposition and JIT should be able to exclude numerous grounds of falsification of research data.

        Hence, JIT should cite irrefutable physical evidence of the bow-ties just related to this very plane. Since aluminum and zirconium on the bow-ties can also be obtained by shooting a warhead against an identical Boeing after which the bow-tie could have been brought into the body of the captain of team A. Not that this is very likely but DSB – as a research institute – has taken a gigantic risk by possible backing the wrong horse. JIT certainly better comes with newly found butterflies on the wreckage.

        TNO concluded the warhead exploded exactly in front of the plane on the horizontal X-axis, but then 3.7 meters above the plane on the vertical Z-axis, and 2 meters to the left on the Y-axis. The rocket came about head on, with -27 degrees Azimuth from Snizhne and ascended lightly with 10 degrees elevation.

        In summer 2015 a draft of the report was sent to participating countries for remarks on the report. Ukraine and Russia have re-calculated and occasionally adjusted the models of NLR and TNO. They also concluded about the launch site of THIS design.

        The RF came to -.40 on the horizontal X-axis and high: 3.7 on the Z-axis and -3.5 to the left on the Y-axis. It is about the same results as TNO and NLR but apparently RF only controlled the math delivered by DSB. It not necessarily was their conception of reality.

        But here is our problem: It seems by re-calculating the math Russia implicitly was expected to endorse 9H314M as the warhead of MH17.
        How possibly such a misunderstanding can result?

        Uncertainty about on the one hand controlling the computational model of TNO and on the other hand endorsing the content of the DSB-model suggests a disturbed relationship between DSB and Russia.
        Perplexed DSB noted in her report: ‘The Russian Federation provided this data to the Dutch Safety Board without confirming that a 9N314M warhead, carried by a 9M38-series missile and launched from a Buk surface-to-air missile system, had caused the crash.’

        Well, if DSB organizes a panel it is her responsibility to prevent eventual misunderstandings in the first place. Apparently where model parameters were discussed Russia only simulated the model presented and gave no conclusions about the choice of 9N314M or 9N314.

        Like us, the Russians also must have missed any proof of 9H314M in the (first draft of the) report. So, why should they agree with this kind of canvassing in non-information? Why should they confirm bow-ties without proof? Hence, apparently they only agreed with the presented model but not with its premises.

        It was the responsibility of DSB to arrive at some diplomatic understanding and now they are not in the position to place inappropriate remarks in their report. Better DSB also ordered simulations of 9H314 to prove this type of warhead could not explain the results optimally.

        http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/04/16/boekraket-had-mogelijk-ander-doel-dan-mh17-1609314

        De berekende stand van de raket in de ruimte heeft de OVV steeds gerelateerd aan de stand van het vliegtuig. Hij wordt uitgedrukt in graden ‘elevatie’ en ‘azimut’. Een raket die dwars op de lengteas van het vliegtuig inslaat heeft een azimut van 90, een die recht van voren op de vliegtuigneus botst heeft een azimut 0 graden. Een raket die recht van voren maar schuin van onder nadert heeft een azimut 0 en een elevatie van, zeg, 45.
        De reconstructie van de finale raketstand is geen sinecure. Je moet weten met welke snelheid de fragmenten bij de explosie worden weggeslingerd, hoe hard de Boekraket vloog toen hij bij de Boeing arriveerde en natuurlijk ook wat de snelheid van het vliegtuig zelf was. Alleen die laatste was precies bekend (915 km/u), de rest moest worden geschat.
        Uiteindelijk zijn bij opvolgende exercities azimutwaarde berekend die oplopen van 17 tot 35 graden, met 27 als meest aannemelijke waarde. Aan de hand hiervan kan de lanceerlocatie worden berekend als de positie en de koers van de Boeing bekend zijn. De laatste positie van de Boeing bleek uit de Flight Data Recorder en de stand van het vliegtuig kan worden berekend. De magnetische koers (‘heading’) was volgens een tabel 115 graden en de ‘drifthoek’ 4 graden. De drift werd veroorzaakt door van rechts komende zijwind die het toestel tot een enigszins scheve stand in zijn baan dwong. In het betreffende gebied (Donetsk) heeft het kompas een afwijking van 8 graden in oostelijke richting. De ware koers (ten opzichte van de meridianen) van de Boeing was daarom 119 (115 + 8 - 4) graden. Dit blijkt ook precies zo in de OVV-illustraties ingetekend en deze zijn dus geschikt voor verdere analyse. Bedenk dat een raket-azimut van 27 graden ten opzichte van de Boeing zich dankzij de drift manifesteert als een hoek van 31 graden met het gevlogen traject.

        De gradenboog laat zien dat een raket uit het centrum van het gereconstrueerde afvuurgebied met een azimut van ongeveer 16 (zijnde 20 - 4) graden bij de Boeing zou arriveren


        http://johnhelmer.net/?p=14340


        By John Helmer, Moscow
        (...)This is despite the DSB’s reluctance to do so in its report; and despite the refusal to date of Australian and Dutch police, coronial investigators and pathologists to release the detailed autopsy evidence they have gathered of the shrapnel which struck the aircraft and the bodies of those on board. According to the DSB report, shrapnel killed the crew in the cockpit, and three pieces of shrapnel, characteristic of warhead type 9N314M , were found in the bodies of the pilot and co-pilot. No crew member or passenger in the aircraft, outside the cockpit, was struck by this shrapnel, according to the DSB.

        On these three pieces of metal hangs the case for a Buk missile detonation as the cause of crash; the cause of death; and Russian culpability for the shoot-down. But a search through the DSB records, and through the technical reports of shrapnel impact and blast simulation on which the DSB has based its conclusions, together with interviews with spokesmen for the Dutch investigations, finds that the only evidence for the source of the three metal fragments turns out to be a classified military secret of the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

        Questioned today for the source of its evidence for the firing of the 9M38 or 9M38M1 model missile , and for the detonation of the 9N314M warhead, NLR spokesman Jan Venema said the NLR will not disclose how, and from what source, it had obtained the missile and warhead data for its detonation and shrapnel testing, and for the conclusions it has reported. 

        Almaz-Antei has reported several times in public this week that the 9N314M warhead cannot be operated from the 9M38 missile series. The two cannot be connected electronically, according to the missile manufacturer. In addition, Almaz-Antei has confirmed that in the warhead types containing the distinctive shrapnel — the Russians are calling this “I-beam”, the Dutch “bowties” and “butterflies” — there are approximately 7,800 elements in total. Of this number, not less than a third, or 2,600 fragments, are of the bowtie type, again according to the manufacturer. If the DSB and its consultant analysts are all telling the truth, the identification of just three in the cockpit crew’s bodies, and one other fragment in the cockpit wreckage, is inexplicable. Almaz-Antei says its computer modelling, as well as its physical blast simulation, make this impossible.

        Asked today to explain how the evidence of Almaz-Antei that the missile model and the warhead type cannot be combined operationally and fired together, Venema said NLR is prohibited from answering questions by an agreement with the DSB.

        A third Dutch report by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), a semi-government operation, has been published as an appendix to the main DSB dossier. The TNO claims it simulated the missile warhead detonation against a Boeing airframe by computer modelling, according to a programme called AUTODYN version 14.5. TNO reports that “in consultation with the DSB, the modelled warhead is type 9N314.” No explanation for selecting that warhead has been provided by TNO. 




        https://eriktoonen.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/analys/





        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/#prettyPhoto

        http://tinyurl.com/hworsr2 




        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr




         Basic Dimension // April 14, 2016 at 10:55 pm // Reply
        Liane:

        Buk-M1 = SA-11 = BUK system.
        Missiles: 9M38 = only Ukraine.
        Warhead: 9N314.
        Missiles: 9M38M1 = in possession by Ukraine and Russia.
        Warhead: 9N314M1.


        http://tinyurl.com/hworsr2 (not up to date)
        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr (Almaz Antey)


        [The configuration of missile’s submunitions was identified fairly quickly. The extracted submunitions are very similar to those of Buk-M1.]

        BUK-M1 is a system, not a missile or a warhead. It has two kinds of missiles 9M38 and 9M38M1 with resp. warhead 9N314 and 9N314M.

        [Ukraine has such Buks in its defense, but of course, there were none of them near Torez, in the rear of the occupied area, only Russian ones.] 

        Must be missile 9M38M1 with warhead 9N314M (bowties) since Russia does not use 9M38 with 9N314 on a regular basis any longer.

        Buk-M1-2 = SA-17 = BUK system
        Missiles: 9M317 = only Russia (by Almaz Antey).
        Warhead: 9N318. http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr
        Missiles: 9M38M1. (not up to date)
        Warhead: 9N314. http://tinyurl.com/hworsr2 (must be 9N314M).


        [By an operation the details of which have not been yet disclosed, a warhead of a Buk-M1-2 missile of Russian production fell into hands of investigators. When it was disassembled, it turned out that submunitions that hit the Boeing are exactly the same as those of the warhead of this modern Russian anti-aircraft missile.]

        Nowhere in any table is stated warhead 9N318 contains bowties. So Butusov must mean 9N314M, which warhead (with bowties) is already known to Ukraine.

        [This image shows real crumpled subammunition of the Buk-M1-2, extracted from the Boeing, and a whole subammunition, extracted from a missile warhead. There are much more images like this one in the file.]

        I miss all facts in this Censor.NET story.

         Sergey Tokarev // April 15, 2016 at 6:32 am // Reply

        Censor.net is a good resource to see that Ukraine is the most totalitarian place on the Earth ever, which is amazing, given that Ukraine has open borders. It it useful to see that there are no media in Ukraine, that propanganda is unrelated to reality; that all their numerous mutually exclusive versions of history, linguistics, genetics are fake. Other than that, censor.net has little value.

         Liane Theuer // April 15, 2016 at 6:51 am // Reply
        Sergey wrote : “… censor.net has little value.”
        Censor published the x-ray and leaked pictures of the reconstruction and fragments.So they had access to very sensitive data. Analyzing Butusov´s statements has the value that you can imagine how Ruvin may has duped the DSB.

         Deus Abscondis // April 15, 2016 at 6:09 am // Reply
        Time to put the troll myth ‘Russia does not have/use 9M38M1 to bed once and for all. Nobody said it.
        Almaz Antey speaking in the context of declassifying data on the 9M38M1 said, in translation, ‘we don’t use the 9M38M1’. This is true. The context is important, “we” refers to Almaz Antey. Almaz Antey doesn’t use the 9M38M1 as the former manufacturers ceased production of it in 1999 whence the replaced missles, the 9M38 (no doubt refurbished) were onsold to third parties. Hence as it is of no use some 9M38M1 data could be declassified.
        This is the only sensible interpretation. At the end of production and onselling of the 9M38 Russia didn’t then sell it’s entire new fleet of 9M38M1s. What would they have left?
        The missile Russia doesn’t have and Ukraine allegedly does is the 9M38.
        The 9M317 started production in 1998 and the gradual replacement of the 9M38M1 has taken place. As the 9M series have 25 year lifespans of course Russia has 9M38M1’s. However, you will be hard pressed showing them used except in training and exercises – it makes sense that old stock 9M38M1’s are shot off for training and exercises while the newer more capable 9M317 are used for active command duty. You will be hard pressed finding batteries of 9M317’s in active command duty as they are normally under camouflage. You can’t tell a 9M38M1 from a 9M317 using public satellite images.
        The extent of the replacement cycle of 9M38M1s by 9M317 is unknown but the end of production, 1998, and the 25 year lifespan is a guide.
        There has been lot of misinformation about this issue and Bellingcat still, despite my informing them otherwise, pushes the dumb propaganda that ‘Russia said they don’t have them’. Lack of clarity in Russian media hasn’t helped as well as confusing the 9M38 missile with the TELAR BUK-M1
        It makes no sense for Russia to deny having or using the 9M38M1 as it’s the most ubiquitous missile seen on the internet as training and exercises attract attention and photographs.
        @Deus_Abscondis

         Rob // April 6, 2016 at 5:18 pm // Reply
        The correct designation of the two types of warheads is 9N314 and 9N314M. According to Alma-Antey, the 9N314 warhead belongs to a 9M38 missile and the 9N314M to the 9M318M1 missile, they should never be mixed. But the Ukrainian experts said they can be mixed. DSB left the matter unresolved, they chose for “9M38 series”. A ridiculous decision because a 9N314M is not a variant, its an upgrade. In the simulations made by Almaz-Antey, you can see the relevance of the distinction (DSB p 145-146). However, DSB mixed up the results: the 20 square kilometers area belong to the 9M38M1 simulation.
        Now, if can be proven, a Russian 9N314M contrary to a Ukranian, is indeed never combined with a 9M38, you know either it wasn’t a Russian missile or it wasn’t launched near Pervomaisk.















        Report MH17 crash:









        The albert_lex report

        http://albert-lex.livejournal.com/68374.html


        IsThatSo // May 25, 2016 at 7:21 pm // Reply



        What you’re calling the VK report is perhaps better known as the albert_lex report or the Albert Naryshkin report. If you check the document properties the author is “Uzzer” and the title is Министерство обороны Российской Федерации (Russian Ministry of Defense).

        The report’s string analysis and hole analysis have already been discussed. It probably would be more widely discussed if it was available in an accurate English translation.

        Even with its language limitation the report annoys Buk conspiracy trolls and forces questions to be asked such as “How could a 70 kg Buk warhead detonating 3-4 meters away produce the pattern of damage seen on the Boeing’s skin?” and “How could a Buk warhead detonating 3-4 meters away produce grazing marks that point to a detonation point about 1 meter away?”

        As for the credibility of the AA test, no amount of transparency would have removed all suspicions that it was a less than honest experiment. Questions would arise if the experiment was repeated with DSB/JIT experts on hand and broadcast live by all networks. Buk conspiracy theory trolls would ask, “How do we know AA didn’t tamper  with the warhead?” and demand the impossible — for AA to prove a negative.



        albert_lex

        (The albert_lex report published by a Russian journalist  Albert Naryshkin)

        It is all more complicated. Following the normal distribution of squares from

        albert_lex there results only one parallelepiped of 8x8x6 mm, which is exactly the content of the Russian warhead 9N318. 


        http://albert-lex.livejournal.com/68374.html?page=4

        http://tinyurl.com/jv22t82





        This normal distribution indicates the use of only one parallelepiped with sides 8x8x6 mm. (ic.pics.livejournal.com). This means we must think of the modern Russian warhead 9N318 or the BUK is too heavy and it must be a lighter 40 kg warhead.



         Basic Dimension // April 28, 2016 at 11:12 am // Reply
        Rib length and diagonals of squares (8x8x6 mm) in a visualized relation to the histogram of the aircraft fragments largest transverse dimension (albert_lex).
        – Holes must get the measure perpendicular on the direction of impact:
        http://tinyurl.com/o7ndf9u
        http://tinyurl.com/z8k9yqb
        http://tinyurl.com/hsxr2pq

        http://tinyurl.com/hn25huv





        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr










         IsThatSo // April 28, 2016 at 6:08 pm // Reply
        Basic Dimension and I were discussing on this page what is possible based on the conclusions of the albert_lex report. Not what is probable.
        Here’s a brief recap of the conclusions of the albert_lex report:

        1. Based on string analysis the warhead exploded 0.8 to 1.8 meters from the pilot’s window.
        2. The distribution of hole sizes is unipolar, so the warhead contained only 1 size of submunition.
        3. The submunitions were cube-shaped with 8x8x6 mm sides, give or take 0.5 mm. The minimum size was 7.5×7.5×5.5 mm. The maximum size was 8.5×8.5×6.5 mm. The minimum mass of each submunition was 2.4 g. The maximum mass of each submunition was 3.7 g. That is assuming submunitions made of steel.
        4. The calculated mass of the submunitions was between 4.88 kg and 14.80 kgAt a 95% confidence interval the overall mass of the warhead was between 10 and 40 kg. There’s a 2.5% chance it was smaller than 10 kg and a 2.5% chance it was larger than 40 kg.
        5. The quantity of submunitions was between 2000 and 4000.
        The closer the detonation coordinates are to the aircraft the less submunition mass is needed. The albert_lex report calculates that if the detonation was 0.8 meters away then the observed damage is consistent with a submunition mass of only 4.88 kg. At double that distance (1.6 meters) the calculated submunition mass is 14.80 kg, which is 3 times as great.
        The reasonable size of the warhead is very sensitive to the detonation coordinates. The closer the detonation coordinates, the more likely the Buk scenario is wrong.
        Whatever missile it was, the actual warhead did not rip the aircraft to pieces all by itself. It caused an instant loss of flight control. Because of the loss of flight control the 777-200 exceeded its design limits and natural forces did the rest. It isn’t necessary for a missile warhead to rip apart a high speed target.
        We concluded that if one assumes the albert_lex report is accurate then it is strictly speaking possible for MH17 to have been shot down by either a Python missile or a Buk 9M317 missile with a 9N318 warhead. We said possible, not probable. The conclusion is correct.

         IsThatSo // April 28, 2016 at 9:52 pm //
        First an error correction. I wrote “0.8 to 1.8 meters”, but the actual range of dimensions in the albert_lex report is 0.8 to 1.6 meters.
        “albert_lex reported about 2000-4000 fragments of 3 gram. With 2000 fragments the fragments would weigh 6 kg. That leaves 5 kg for the explosives.”
        In section 4.3.1 the report cites a range of sizes and weights:
        7.5×7.5×5.5 mm weighing 2.4 g. 2000 of them would weigh 4.8 kg.
        8x8x6 mm weighing 3 g. 2000 of them would weigh 6 kg. as you noted.
        8.5×8.5×6.5 weighing 3.7 g. 2000 of them would weigh 7.4 kg. 4000 of them would weigh 14.8 kg.

        Although the report specified 2000 to 4000 fragments it specifies a maximum quantity of 3650 in section 4.3.2. The minimum size isn’t specified, but considering Figure 16 it appears the calculated minimum is 2350.
        “Also, judging by the stringing, the warhead exploded around 2,5 meters from the cockpit. It would require over 14,80 kg of submunition.”
        If the warhead exploded 2.5 meters from the cockpit then far more than 14.8 kg of submunition would be required to produce the observed hole damage. The explosion coordinates are absolutely critical! Albert_lex calculated 0.8 to 1.6 meters based on a quantity of 6 tangential (grazing) strikes in section 4.2.1. The explosion coordinates need very careful attention. Are there known tangential strikes that albert_lex didn’t use? Or did albert_lex draw the lines incorrectly? This is an area where your future Python article should go into significant detail.
        A Python article will force you to address both technical and political considerations. The starting point for the political evaluation is whether the event was an accident or a false flag. If it was an accident then the choices narrow down to either Ukraine or separatists. If it was a false flag then the pool of suspects is larger and you have to consider qui bono (who profits?). The conflict was and is far larger than Ukraine vs. separatists. There is way more at stake than a small chunk of eastern Ukraine. We don’t know whether it was accident or false flag, but we do know that the cover-up has been extensive. The cover-up points to a false flag although not with certainty.
        When you include a false flag motive, as I believe you must, then it becomes harder to label the Python scenario as nonsense. The best way to “kill” the Python scenario is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the explosion occurred farther than 1 meter from the cockpit.

        =============================================

        Photo published for European experts ask Trump to back new independent inquiry into MH17 crash — RT News
        03:19 - 24 jan. 2017



        https://www.rt.com/news/373111-mh17-site-dutch-journalists/

        https://www.rt.com/news/374893-trump-letter-mh17-investigation/#.WIc4GyAoA08.twitter

        European experts ask Trump to back new independent inquiry into MH17 crash:  

        Notably, the open letter calls for a forensic investigation into the impact holes on the fragments of the MH17 wreckage, and suggests the same damage patterns should be reproduced in a shooting test.






        Almaz Antey's experts said that judging by the T-shape strike elements [found on their Antonov, but missing on MH17, BD], the missile was an old Buk-M1 model fired from a Ukraine-controlled area, contesting the preliminary theory by Dutch investigators. “If the Malaysian Boeing was downed by a Buk missile, it was done with an old Buk model which does not have double-T iron strike elements,” CEO Yan Novikov told a media conference in Moscow after the experiment.


        http://mh17crystalball.blogspot.nl/2016/07/mh17-albertlex-histogram.html
        http://mh17crystalball.blogspot.nl/2016/10/tweede-russische-reactie.html


        Basic Dimension:

        Remember, albert_lex is a thorough investigation into shrapnel holes of the MH17 by the Russian Ministry of Defense. From their research I come to a different conclusion:





        We ruled out 

        Old Ukrainian warhead 9N314


        Proceeding with the albert_lex research.


        Following the histogram of albert_lex we can forget about the old BUK-warhead 9N314 because category 6 (33) is missing:

        http://tinyurl.com/h2vg9f3





        Little squares (8x8x5MM) of old Ukrainian warhead 9N314 have insignificant mass and so their velocity vector was bent straight through the hull. This means the pile of category 6 cannot be caused by category 5 of this square. 
        Category 5 is from 4.5 - 5.5. Our conclusion is the old warhead 9N314 has not been used to shoot down the MH17. This conclusion is in line with the albert_lex histogram which states: "The results of evaluation of hole sizes available in the photos suggests that the submunitions were in the form of a parallelepiped with sides 8x8x6 mm with a tolerance of +/- 0.5 mm.
          












        Also warhead 9N318 from missile 9M317 was falsified. This because its rib of 6.5 mm cannot be narrower and I guess albert_lex found mostly 6 mm ribs. Nearly all 6.5 ribs would have fallen into (6.5-7-7.5) which received only two observations:


        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr







        That leaves us with 9N314M, the warhead with the bow-ties. 

        But remember, only the profile of 9N314M is confirmed by albert_lex, not the warhead itself. So, in theory there might be other warheads with the same profile. Only if it definitely is a BUK, than it is proven the BUK with the bow-ties.



        Warhead 9N314M (bowties: Ukraine and Russia)

        But can we also forget about bowties in the albert_lex histogram? Forget about warhead 9N314M? I'm afraid not. Following the requirement of conditional probability we did not found butterflies in the hull, but the facts of albert_lex do not make the profile of 9N314M impossible. 

        And if we cannot discard the profile of 9N314M there might come a moment we also have to accept bowties. But remember, warhead 9N314M self is not proven, because other warheads with the same profile can have done the job. With the research of albert_lex we only proved the conditional probability of the profile of 9N314M, not of warhead 9N314M self.

        Hence, in the sample of albert_lex warhead 9N314M is not impossible:






        =============================================


        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/questions-for-dsb-having-no-answers-in-final-report/#comment-11512

         Basic Dimension // November 4, 2015 at 10:51 am // Reply


        RESTORING PERPENDICULARITY OF IMPACT HOLES

        NLR (Dutch Aerospace Laboratory) and TNO (The Netherlands Organisation of Applied Research) developed their clever 9N314M theory mainly on the basis of raw data obtained from the cockpit hull of MH17. But they only developed an interesting after the facts hypothesis, which still had to be tested in a practical experiment. That’s why AA did an amazing job with all shortcomings. At the end of our hypothetical research plan AA, together with NLR and TNO will test 9N314 against 9N314M (already done), paid by third parties.

        The Netherlands has emotionally called for closer cooperation with the Russian Federation in the investigation into the cause of the disaster of the MH17. Well Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, grab your chance, here your plan:

        In science it is common to make raw data available so others can replicate findings. If not, research will be rejected in the field, but also in court. Therefore, I urgently request NLR to make available the raw data referred to in this comment. Raw data are barely needed to test whether the – after the facts – hypothesis 9N314M can be true or must be rejected in favor of some alternative hypothesis as 9N314.

        NLR is urgently invited to make publicly available on the Internet all raw data of 350 independent holes found in the cockpit of MH17. We would like the following information for each independent hole in the file:

        The file of raw data:

        – From all holes we want sharp pictures taken from standard distance of about 10 cm: (http://tinyurl.com/nwpyyqd).





        – Holes must be scored dichotomic as left side (0) or right side (1) on this picture: 

        (http://tinyurl.com/q4gfzse).

        – Holes must get coordinates in above two dimensional plane.

        – Holes must get the measure perpendicular on the direction of impact: 

        (http://tinyurl.com/o7ndf9u).





        – Holes must get the Azimuth value of the supposed direction of impact in the above plane: (http://tinyurl.com/q4gfzse).

        – Holes must get an estimate of the (acute) angle of direction of impact, after which in three dimensional space we shrink and frame this impact dimension to normal perpendicular values again for each individual hole. Hence, we will manage to look from aside holes with acute impact to above holes with perpendicular impact.

        – We expect most holes to have about the same angle of direction of impact, what means we can easily reconstruct perpendicular impacts for 350 holes together. But directions may vary on the basis of the underlying theory of 9N314M. But in the end we see all holes as with perpendicular impact. As a consequence we might get more realistic measures of shrapnel on the hull.

        – Speed might differ somewhat for bowties and filler versus cubes. Categorical solutions might be needed in the interaction between speed and angles of direction of impact. But the expectation is with some trial and error we will find the real adaptations for kinds of shrapnel. Remember speed might be relevant because it can elongate the trace at very acute angles.


        NLR-CR-2015-155-PT-1 (Appendix Y report = NLR)

        Page 11:

        The Dutch National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) was asked by the Dutch Safety Board to participate in the investigation of the impact damage due to high-energy objects on the wreckage of flight MH17.
        The work was performed as follows: First, the damage on the wreckage was thoroughly examined and quantified.

        Page 13:

        2.1

        Types of observed impact damage
        The impact damage due to the high-energy objects was investigated on the wreckage of the cockpit:

        Four types of impact damage were identified:
        1.Piercing damage.
        2.Plugging damage.
        3.Non-penetrating damage.
        4.Ricochet damage.


        Page 33:

        -Over 350 hits are present on the wreckage of the cockpit and over 800 hits are estimated in total, accounting for the structure of the cockpit that was not available.
        -The size of the penetration damage indicates that the objects that caused the damage to the cockpit had a size in the range of 6-14 mm:

        http://tinyurl.com/jpgrhab






        http://tinyurl.com/hr4s8bu


        One can argue bowties (13x13x8.2) of 9N314M are difficult to see on the hull, and they correspond with cubes (13x13x8) from 9N314. Both warheads also have the same little cubes (8x8x5). But in addition 9N314M has fillers (6x6x 8.2). Now we see the frequency distribution of found holes in the hull of MH17: 
        (http://tinyurl.com/nahug3m).

        DSB says:[The size of the penetration damage indicates that the objects that caused the damage to the cockpit had a size in the range of 6-14 mm]


        Because they measured but one side of shrapnel they run into difficulties of separating kinds of shrapnel. Also diagonals are disturbing. Now it becomes critical if they manage to identify fillers from cubes and cubes from bowties.

        They gave no raw data so we have to infer: There were 350 impacts. In the tabel there are three colums of 14, one colum of 13.5 etc. Hence 350/31=11.3 impacts per column. This add to 354, so with some corrections:


        14x3=34   

        13.5x1=11
        13x1=11
        ============ + (56 impacts >= 13 = bowties)
        12x4=45      
        11.5x3=34   
        11x1=11
        10.5x2=23
        10x8=91    X
        9.5x1=11
        8.5x2=27
        8x3=34      X
        ============ + (61 impacts of 8 and 8.5 = cubes)
        7.5x1=11
        6x1=11

        6x6x8.2 mm filler
        8x8x5 mm cube 

        13x13x8.2 mm bowtie

        As said, they measured but one side of shrapnel so this tabel is worthless. And there also are diagonals as side. So 6x6 filler has one diagonal of 8.5. What we do is we only take equal sides as norm.

        13 and higher is bowties (56).  56/360=.155 bowties (slight underestimation)
        8 and 8.5 is cubes (61). 61/350 cubes, forget about cubes.

        Number of bowties (13x13x8,2) in warhead 9N314M:
        1870/7840= .24 (real quantity)

        Number of cubes in warhead 9N314: 1790 (13x13x8mm)
        1790/6530=.27 (real quantity)

        If we had systematic organized and standard pictured raw data we could add diagonal values etc.

        We only can ask DSB to split the frequency distribution for the left (bowtieand filler) and the right side (bowtie, filler and cube) and show us the significance of their difference. What they already know, or course.



        Page 18:

        2.6 Size of penetration damage

        On the piece of cockpit skin with the highest number of penetrations, the size of the holes caused by these penetrations was measured (Figure 12).
        Only the damage that was assessed to be the result of single objects fully penetrating the plate was taken into account. Of each hole the dimension perpendicular to the impact direction was measured: (Figure 13): (http://tinyurl.com/o7ndf9u).
        Only this dimension gives an indication of the size of the object that caused the damage. The larger dimension, parallel to the projection of the impact direction on the plate, is the result of the speed and the angle at which the object impacts the plate. As can be seen in Figure 14, the size was found to range from 6 mm to 14 mm.


        Now we know the following: NLR/TNO postulated this: (http://tinyurl.com/q4gfzse), corresponding to this: (http://tinyurl.com/p464ekg) (Above is the left side of the picture). This is done very well.

        Only this dimension gives an indication of the size of the object that caused the damage. The larger dimension, parallel to the projection of the impact direction on the plate, is the result of the speed and the angle at which the object impacts the plate. As can be seen in Figure 14, the size was found to range from 6 mm to 14 mm.

        [The size of the penetration damage indicates that the objects that caused the damage to the cockpit had a size in the range of 6-14 mm.]

        But remember this can be done much better and with simple means to derive more complete forms of fragments.

        They measured but one side of shrapnel, and now they run into difficulties of separating kinds of shrapnel (from 9N314 or 9N314M). Now it becomes critical if they manage to identify fillers from squares and squares from bowties. That’s why I propose the intermediate step of restoring perpendicular impacts by correcting for speed and the angle at which the object impacted the plate. So they have to fit the larger dimension in a single general correction.

        NLR, please release the raw frequencies for the whole table:

        (http://tinyurl.com/nahug3m), but also broken down for to left and right side of the cockpit on this picture: (http://tinyurl.com/q4gfzse).


        Are frequency distributions significantly different?

        NLR, will you please make all cross tables for us and ask for significance tests between tables? If they differ significantly it must be because of the big cubes (8x8x5 MM) on the right side if we adhere to 9N314M: (http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr).

        This is what we are looking for:

        Bowties (red) and fillers (blue) are seen on the front portion of the cockpit hull (left at the picture).
        Bowties, fillers and squares (yellow) are seen on the rear portion (right at the picture): (http://tinyurl.com/q4gfzse).
        I understand these areas as the typical fract distribution delivered by 9N314M warheads: (http://tinyurl.com/p464ekg).


        9N314M gives: 6x6x8.2 MM filler diamond/cube fragments, which we expect on both sides left and right at the picture. Together with the bowties they form the inner layer of the warhead.

        9N314M also gives: 8x8x5 MM diamond/cube fragments. These are the big squares in the outer layer of the warhead and are only to be expected at the right side of the picture: (http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr).

        9N314 gives: 13x13x8 MM big cubes as inner layer, to be found left and right at the picture. And it gives 8x8x5 MM cubes only to be found in the outer layer to the right. But the latter is not certain and we are not yet proving 9N314 in the rebound. We only want to reject 9N314M. Falsifying a hypothesis does not force to prove another one.

        NLR, you conclude fillers on the left side of the table, this means:

        – NLR first must have discriminated fillers (6x6x8.2 MM) from diamond/cube fragments (8x8x5 MM) on the right side significantly. NLR might have found 5 MM elements at the right side. But cubes with 5 MM are not to be found on the left side.
        Hence, if NLR did not detect cube fragments (8x8x5 MM) on the left side this confirmed their theoretical grounds, otherwise 9N314M is disconfirmed. But remember confirming a hypothesis does not mean it is the true state of nature, only the theory has not been falsified.

        All the way we see NLR/TNO run into big trouble without corrected impact holes.

        It also is possible NLR did not discriminate significantly between fillers (6x6x8.2 MM) and cubes (8x8x5 MM) on the right side. Then they possibly found the proportion of fillers/cubes on the right side is significantly greater than on the left side. But now NLR runs into trouble because the distribution of 9N314 is not known. May be 9N314 has a completely different frag distribution, which we go explore with the Russians.

        Remember in the total frequency table fillers (6x6x8.2 MM) and cube fragments (8x8x5 MM) are messed up in category 6 MM, because fillers have a bigger minimum (6) than cubes (5). That’s why we want a breakdown of the 6 MM frequency column, broken down in 6 and 5 MM. It would be strange no cube fragments (8x8x5 MM) were gone through the hull at their 5 MM side: (http://tinyurl.com/o7ndf9u), but it is possible.

        This all must be corrected by estimating perpendicular impacts. Maybe butterflies can be reconstructed too.

        If raw frequencies are broken down for the left and right side of the picture and differentiated to 6 and 5 MM we have the following questions to NLR:

        To resume:

        NLR, are fillers (6x6x8.2 MM) and little cubes (8x8x5 MM) significantly different on the right side of the picture? I.e. can you identify fillers on the right side? Can you identify any 9N314M shrapnel on the right side? Can you identify bowties?

        NLR, can you prove/disprove fillers on the left side. Are there any fragments in the 5 MM category on the left side?

        NLR, remember if you found 8 MM on the left side it can be bowties (13x13x8.2 MM) (or 13×12.75×8 MM) (http://tinyurl.com/phvmqfh), but also diamond/cube fragments (8x8x5 MM) or big cubes (13x13x8 MM) of 9N314.

        If you cannot identify fillers (6x6x8.2 MM) on the left side as different from little cubes (8x8x5 MM) on the right side the hypothesis 9N314M is not confirmed. It might be true but is not confirmed.

        With the methodology of reconstruction of perpendicularity of impact holes we have a powerful instrument which can shed new light on the case, if it works.

        But first NLR/TNO, you give us the raw data, you have the key to cooperation. We expect you to provide this information to the world out of respect for the victims. We expect the Dutch parliament, if necessary, to be to your assistance.


        Basic Dimension, a fair remark. What I meant, though, is that the DSB were in a good position to precisely measure physical hole sizes, and the best they could do is 6-14 mm? Come on. A lot of warheads will fit this course “statistics”. What I meant is to have a sort of histogram, like albert_lex has. “over 800 hits” can make a very good histogram that can tell us a lot. For example, it can confirm or exclude the presence of a right amount of holes made by the bow-tie shaped fragments of 9N314M.
        The DSB only coming up with the 6-14 mm range looks a sloppy job to me.

         Eugene // April 16, 2016 at 12:53 pm // Reply
        As to the supposed “histogram” http://tinyurl.com/nahug3m
        It looks like it was constructed out of data for 31 holes. Hardly can be called a statistics. Compare to albert_lex :
        http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/albert_lex/73995734/248616/248616_original.png

         Basic Dimension // April 16, 2016 at 1:37 pm //
        Eugene thanks, I agree and did not know about albert_lex.


        Report MH17 crash:


        “Based upon the damage examination it is concluded that the impact damage on the wreckage of flight MH17 is caused by a warhead with various types of preformed fragments in the 6-14 mm size range, including one type with a bowtie shape detonating to the left of, and above, the cockpit.”
        “The damage observed on the wreckage is not consistent with the damage caused by the warhead of an air-to-air missile in use in the region in amount of damage, type of damage and type of fragments. The high-energy object damage on the wreckage of flight MH17 is therefore not caused by an air-to-air missile.”
        “Of the investigated warheads only the 9N314M contains the unique bowtie shaped fragments found in the wreckage. The damage observed on the wreckage in amount of damage, type of damage, boundary and impact angles of damage, number and density of hits, size of penetrations and bowtie fragments found in the wreckage, is consistent with the damage caused by the 9N314M warhead used in the 9M38 and 9M38M1 BUK surface-to-air missile.”

        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/questions-for-dsb-having-no-answers-in-final-report/#comment-11905


         Basic Dimension // November 10, 2015 at 2:17 pm // Reply

        MH17: 9N314M DEBUNKED AND FALSIFIED

        DSB’s preconception of the launch of a BUK from Snizhne with warhead 9N314M turns out to be a distortion of the facts. A launch from Zaroshchenske with warhead 9N314 might fit the data better:

        http://tinyurl.com/oq35vma
        http://tinyurl.com/okx7sgq


        if DSB’s conception of how MH17 is shot down is disconfirmed, accusations will be worthless in court and the Dutch people should reckon with bitter disappointments. It concerns the launch site (Snizhne) and the postulated warhead (9N314M).
        There are a number of legitimate arguments against a launch from Snizhne. But here we focus on disconfirming 9N314M.

        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr

        How must scientists cooperate with militaries and politicians? Can they put scientific stamps on unvalidated theories? Of course not, because then they implicitly would take responsibility for immanent assumptions.

        So, how is MH17 linked to politics and the military?

        DSB report Appendix, Z page 13:

        4.3 Warhead
        [Starting point for the terminal ballistics simulation [by TNO:The Netherlands Organisation of Applied Research] is a warhead with preformed fragments. In consultation with DSB, NLR [Dutch Aerospace Laboratory] and the Netherlands Ministry of Defence warhead 9N314M of Surface to Air Missile(SAM) type 9M38M1 has been modelled.]


        Page 3:

        [This study uses classified data as meant by the Wet Bescherming Staatsgeheimen (state secrets act). The text of this report is inspected and released for publication by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.]


        TNO as a scientific institute accepted insufficient substantiated assumptions of the 9N314M model from political and military institutes. In this way, TNO granted the predicate ‘scientific’ to a form of tunnelvision.

        TNO better started with the facts from scratch. In any case, it would have been better if TNO also explored 9N314 as kind of control on 9N314M.

        In the following we debunk warhead 9N314M as form of tunnelvision of DSB and show how TNO easily could have disconfirmed 9N314M. As follows:

        The Russians say not to use 9N314 warheads any longer, which are still in use by Ukraine. Like Ukraine, Russians use the modern 9N314M. So if DSB can prove 9N314M downed MH17, Russians are involved as possible perpetrators.

        The main difference between warheads 9N314 and 9N314M is a piece of steel in the form of a bow-tie, also called the double T or butterfly:

        http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr

        This bowtie is only to be found in 9N314M. Hence, the real fight is not about the BUK but about the bowties. Who can prove 9N314M involves the Russians, otherwise 9N314 could point to Ukraine.

        DSB is a political institute. A scientific institute would provide the world with raw data of impacts on MH17. Then theories about bowties could be confirmed or falsified. Only on logical grounds we will refute the hypothesis of: ‘bowties found in MH17 as coming from the missile used’.

        Time is running out and soon there will be no control on raw data of MH17 any longer. Now DSB already made an extra hole in the forward pressure bulkhead (the nose of MH17) inadvertently.

        Bowtie evidence of DSB is very doubtful, since they only found two bowties and two cubes of (apparently) 9N314M. But their chemical analysis of aluminum (hull) and zirconium (windshield) on the bowties sticks to a qualitative assessment of the origin. It seems to be based on face value with the naked eye through a microscope.
        Now the problem is the probability of bowties in the cockpit (p(b)) is dependent on – or conditional on – the passage of bowties through the cockpit hull (p(bh)) or through the windshield.

        In theory we also could accept the passage of fillers through the hull (p(fh)), because they correlate perfectly with bowties. Then, DSB has to prove the conditional probability (|) of: p(b|bh)>0 or p(b|fh)>0. In other words DSB has to prove butterfly holes or filler holes in the cockpit hull.

        That’s to say, fillers are acceptable as stand in for bowties only if we don’t know how many bowties are to be expected. That’s why we need exact quantities. And because the number of bowties projected perpendicular on the cockpit hull – from a very short distance of only 3 meter – is exactly known, we demand full proof of butterflies in the hull.

        If DSB cannot prove this conditional probability > 0 – for example because pieces of the roof are lost or missing(?) – then the single bowtie in the captain’s body must have penetrated in a different way.

        Because DSB refuses to give the raw data of holes in the cockpit hull in a orderly and systematic manner, we use logical reasoning to debunk 9N314M. We think warhead 9N314M is not confirmed. What not means we attach to 9N314.

        DSB report Appendix X

        Report no NLR-CR-2015-155-PT-1


        Page 60

        6.17 Matching modeled and observed fragmentation damage
        [The best match was obtained for a detonation location of the warhead of 0.25 metres ahead of the aircraft’s nose, 3 metres to the left of, and 3.7 metres above the tip of the nose.]

        The English translation of the letter and attachment is online at http://www.favt.ru/public/materials//1/6/c/0/3/16c0341512fcae3c1ebd64fd2a486136.rtf.


        'The engagement conditions (the detonation area and orientation of the missile in relation to the aircraft) indicated in the final report contradict the technical specifications of the proximity fuse used in Buk missiles. Under these conditions, the warhead detonation point could not be closer to the nose tip of the aircraft than 3 to 5 meters.'


        Regarding metabunk discussion, important point is mentioned at the end of linked thread (from Appendix V of AA report):
        Argumentation:
        It appears that during the simulation no consideration was given to the specifics of the proximity fuse. The main feature of the proximity fuse of 9M38 and 9M38M1 rockets is that on receiving the required number of response impulses by the reception antenna, a functional delay is activated.
        The time of the functional delay is optimized on such condition that when firing at head-on courses the detonation point would be at least 3 to 5 meters from the front part of the aircraft in the direction of the tail unit.
        The delay may change only in case the response signal of the proximity fuse disappears. (when a target is flying on crossing courses). In this case an immediate detonation of the warhead occurs. The distribution of fragment spray is optimized with a functional delay. Given the summarized speeds of the rocket and the target in the range of 1000 – 1200 m/s, the spay of fragments will be directed perpendicularly to the rocket movement
        vector.
        Thus, in the case of the encounter conditions between the aircraft and the rocket, described in section 3.7.4, the detonation point of the rocket warhead should have been 3-5 meters further from the front part of the aircraft towards the tail unit.
        This behaviour can be easily seen in many anti-air missiles, Russian or US, thus making the only possible point for detonation as observed to happen on crossing course (thus refuting forward point of Shnitze, and pointing to Zaroschenskoe).

        IMO, the 3…5m extra delay would cause the missile to start missing some of it’s intended targets.
        And if launched from Zaroschenskoe the proximity fuse detects Boeing777 about 17 meters before fuselage. So it’s absolutely sure the shrapnel would hit from right to left if launched from there.
        https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2waS1FT2tjWEh0bk0





        Sotilaspassi,
        No, absolutely not. Following the state of the art, that’s Eugene and me, the launch site was between Zaroshchenske and Snizhne. Then shrapnel hits the left side. I offer you these pictures :)

        http://tinyurl.com/joakl6v



        http://tinyurl.com/z67fsk5




        You think BUK proximity fuse look sideways 90%?
        Where have you got that idea?

        Even with 50 degrees it works:
        [The delay may change only in case the response signal of the proximity fuse disappears. (when a target is flying on crossing courses). In this case an immediate detonation of the warhead occurs.]
        If the proximity fuse disappears it detonates too early just in front of the cockpit:

        http://tinyurl.com/haon6lu



        sotilaspassi // May 23, 2016 at 6:57 pm //
        My brain does not compute it the same way.
        https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2wWExYZnJtdTdGR0U






        Fourth attempt to post this, now to the end of thread.
        Related to discussion of BUK approach in 50deg angle and
        https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2wWExYZnJtdTdGR0U

        TELAR “lights” the whole target with it’s radar, I’ve read at max range that is 180m area around the Boeing777. Missile sees the sum of reflected radar signal, in practice it means missile target the center of Boeing777 echo.

        When missile comes closer to target, it starts to focus on the strongest signal reflected from target. That can be the engine area or the nose of Boeing777, nose becoming more likely when coming closer to target in an angle. The guidance of missile proceeds like that until proximity fuse detonates the warhead.

        Proximity fuse use it’s own radar transmitter built in the missile. So, when any metal comes to it’s view and reflections are received, detonation process is started according to built in delay.
        Proximity fuse detection beam must be at least “long” enough to cover 17m kill range to the sides, this would mean minimum of some 20m+ signal forward in 30deg-60deg angle (depending on missile design), in practice the beam is not “limited” to 20m, it most likely detects targets up to 40m (to the side, 50m~in forward angle) or so, because warhead has capability to cause damage to that range.

        For missile to work reliable the logic needs to be very simple, more so with decades old missiles.
        BUK missile is designed to kill cruise missiles (<<10 meter long & 300m/s speed & 1000m/s collision speed) and maneuvering fighter jets (15 meters long & 1300m/s collision speed).
        If fuse delay is (up to) 7ms like DSB somewhere stated, it means missile travels 7 meters vs approaching target before it detonates. Against cruise missile 7ms delay cause BUK to be able to hit only the tail of the approaching missile. + Almaz-Antey delay, it would miss the target.
        Also against supersonic fighter jet 7ms delay + Almaz-Antey delay would cause the missile to miss the target or damage only the tail of the fighter jet.


        Detonating warhead after proximity fuse received signal is lost would seem to be too late. (emergency action by missile, hoping that some of the shrapnel from warhead tail would still hit the target while 95%+ of fragments miss the target)

        That's roughly what I've learned.
        I might be wrong, just waiting someone to dig facts to prove it if I'm wrong.
        (preferably in english)



        Most interesting discussion. But in my view the BUK-missile is semi-active homing and reacting on the radar impulse from BUK-TELAR. I suppose this is reflected by the nose of the target. So, the proximity fuse will not react on the right side of the cockpit. I do not think active homing cutting corners is involved.
        http://tinyurl.com/haon6lu




        Sotilaspassi,
        The missile already identified from TELAR ‘the sum of reflected radar signal, in practice it means missile target the center of Boeing777 echo’. It would be illogical if this information about ‘the center of target’ was neglected with the onset of the proximity fuse.
        [When missile comes closer to target, it starts to focus on the strongest signal reflected from target.
        That can be the engine area or the nose of Boeing777, nose becoming more likely when coming closer to target in an angle.]
        To avoid confusion the target of the proximity fuse will be brought in agreement with the earlier received radar center from TELAR. Only when TELAR stops emitting radar pulses then the proximity fuse has to choose its own center.
        Which all means the fuse might see the right wing, but it knows it must detonate on the nose. And now the horizontal course angle with the launch site becomes important, since below 50 degrees azimuth BUK-TELAR will aim at the nose of the plane.
        The delay story is indeed somewhat weird. I would say detonation starts when received pulses converge to their maximum rate at the target, that’s the nose.

        Basic, to me that seems absolute nonsense.
        From my learnings, BUK proximity fuse use it’s own radar transmitter and is fully independent from TELAR sent signal.
        It reacts when it’s own signal is reflected from any surface on it’s view.
        Proximity fuse does not choose any center. It’s function is to detonate warhead when detects “metal”. (more so with decades old missiles)
        If TELAR radio guidance is lost, warhead detonates immediately.
        If TELAR sent radar signal receiving is temporarily blocked warhead should not detonate.
        If proximity fuse does not trigger the warhead, missile most likely continue flying on set track until it is out of TELAR guidance radio signal or hits ground and then detonates.
        But if documented better know-how appears, it’s welcome.

        Sotilaspassi,
        Thanks, I think you’re right with the fuse detonator. Does this mean in your opinion the missile might have approached from the left side?

        http://tinyurl.com/haqwbgj





        Basic Dimension,
        This sotilispassis discussion about fuse workings seems to be a bit amature. For example, he writes a lot but he doesn’t know that the impulse trigger slit antenna also measures distance, which is also taken into account while determining the detonation time. Secondly, the trigger beam may bounce off the body when touching at a shallow angle and need a relatively normal hit point, we don’t know. So overall, sotilaspassi’s arguments cannot be considered serious, but just another load of noise.

        sotilaspassi // May 26, 2016 at 3:36 pm //
        No. Only possibility is from ahead. About 0… 30deg to the right of flight path.
        Navigation methode of BUK takes it to the other side of the plane’s nose before detonation, when target does not maneuver.
        Unless I find any hard proof stating otherwise.




        Like this: TNO report appendix Y, page 7:http://tinyurl.com/pyrhmr2)

        [The missile was travelling at a speed of approximately 700 m/s in the opposite direction to the direction of flight of the aircraft [azimuth 118], approaching 7 degrees from below and 20 degrees from the right [azimuth 318] with respect to the aircraft forward axis.] (like this: http://tinyurl.com/oq35vma)


        The requirement of perpendicularity

        But if a BUK was launched from Snizhne with azimuth 318 dgr and elevation 7 dgr and the warhead was a cylinder, then a lot of shrapnel was projected nearly perpendicular on the cockpit hull.
        This because the distance between warhead and aircraft was only three meters and they were nearly parallel. Hence one side of the warhead, a slice of about 50 degrees of the longitudinal axis of the cylinder was exactly parallel with the hull of MH17:

        http://tinyurl.com/nuvn9t8
        http://tinyurl.com/qffwbg6


        Note the slice exactly corresponds to the theory of 9N314M: On the left side we only see bowties and fillers and on the right side we see bowties, fillers and cubes:

        http://tinyurl.com/oxxy56l

        But it is very sad no roofparts were found in the wreckage:

        http://tinyurl.com/qbdbtfg
        http://tinyurl.com/pcwlxvw



        No swirls or tumblings

        As said, about such a short distance no swirls or tumblings of shrapnel are to be expected, since thrust of the blast is much stronger than aerodynamic drag. Then in a statistical sense we may forget the side views of bowties, fillers and cubes since they will not have turned in this short distance. But this means most shrapnel entered the hull as we see their upper side on the warhead:

        http://tinyurl.com/p464ekg

        Hence we expect, NO WE DEMAND most shrapnel elements to have made holes in the cockpit hull WITH THEIR TOPSIDE. So in this restricted area we definitely demand BUTTERFLIES IN THE HULL.

        But we need some cockpit roof to falsify 9N314M.

        http://tinyurl.com/qzhydqk

        So, in this 50 degree area projected on the hull of MH17 we expect following measures:

        To the left we expect to see:

        Bowties 13x13x8.2 MM
        Fillers 6x6x 8.2 MM


        To the right:

        Cubes 8x8x5 MM
        Bowties 13x13x8.2 MM
        Fillers 6x6x 8.2 MM


        Hence, if there was a roof we could perfectly test the hypothesis (9N314M) for the restricted area of:

        http://tinyurl.com/pypyptf

        The warhead

        Page 54:

        6.12
        Number and density of hits.

        [The 9N314M warhead is composed of approximately 7800 preformed fragments of three different shapes which are arranged in two layers. A digital reconstruction of the 9N314M warhead fragment arrangement can be seen in Figure 50:]

        http://tinyurl.com/p464ekg
        http://tinyurl.com/q8uh4qa
        http://tinyurl.com/ncmtkjs


        [The inner layer consists of bowtie and filler fragments and spans the entire length of the warhead. The outer layer consists of squares and spans approximately three quarters of the warhead length as can be seen by the change in diameter on the top half of Figure 49:(http://tinyurl.com/qdpdc5r). The number and density of hits on the wreckage of the cockpit is consistent with the number and density of hits expected from the detonation of a 9N314M warhead.]

        Last remark has not yet been proven, as I asked NLR in the earlier comment.


        What are the proportions of hits expected from detonation of a 9N314M warhead?

        Following AA: (http://tinyurl.com/oqwc6qr),
        9N314M has 7840 shrapnel elements:


        Cubes (4100) + bowties (1870) + fillers (1870) = 7840

        Calculation surface of different kinds of shrapnel:

        Cubes 8×8= 64 x 4100 = 262400 MMSQ
        Bowties 13×13= 169 x 1870 = 316030 MMSQ
        Fillers 6×6= 36 x 1870 = 67320 MMSQ


        (Bowties + fillers) – cubes = 383350 – 262400 = 120950

        Cubes / (Bowties + fillers) = 262400/383350 = .68 = 70 %


        This agrees with: ‘The outer layer consists of squares and spans approximately three quarters of the warhead length as can be seen by the change in diameter on the top half of figure 49.’

        Hence, 32 % of bowties and fillers are lying free from cubes. And 68 %lies under cubes.

        Now, we have an estimate for the ratio between shrapnel on the left and on the right, but not yet for the expected frequencies. For less than half the shrapnel goes to the aircraft.


        What quantities are to be expected from the 50 degree projection?

        As said earlier, we think 50/360 = 14%of the shrapnel comes nearly perpendicular on the plane:

        http://tinyurl.com/pypyptf

        To the left we expect to see:

        Bowties = .14 x .32 x 1870 = 84
        Fillers = .14 x .32 x 1870 = 84


        To the right:

        Cubes = .14 x .68 x 4100 = 390
        Bowties = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178
        Fillers = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178


        We definitely can expect 84 + 178 = 262 butterflies in our 50 degrees segment and there are no excuses. Presence of fillers is no longer sufficient. Bowties must be shown also.

        How the wreck looks:

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNNOX2O1cFQ


        Now we all know DSB made a mess of the investigation. They waited 6 to 8 months with gathering the wreckage. Meanwhile a lot of wreckage has disappeared inexplicably. If journalists and mourning relatives of victims had not made pictures we would have lost a lot of evidence to falsify 9N314M.

        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-photos-of-mh17-rooftop-in-russia-today-documentary/#prettyPhoto

        http://tinyurl.com/nvc99fm

        But we are very lucky to have saved some pictures of the roof on the left side of the plane and we have the left front windshield of the cockpit. And guess what, it all falls directly within our 50 degree area, so in the rebound we can test the 9N314M hypothesis.

        There can be NO escape for butterflies on the roof any longer. There are NO acute angles, NO ricochets and there is NO non-penetrating shrapnel. If there were bowties, they must have massively left butterfly impressions. And we know by what quantities.

        All the preconditions are met and all obstacles have been removed. If not any butterflies are visible in the roof, 9N314M is definitely debunked.

        http://tinyurl.com/n9q79c3
        http://tinyurl.com/owyaxvn
        http://tinyurl.com/phagxf6


        Falsifying 9N314M gave big problems, for our slice of 50 degrees of the longitudinal axis of the cylinder projected on the hull (the roof) seemed to be gone by the enormous bombardment. But fortunately the left front windshield covers half of the left side of our hypothesis: it must have let passed half of the bowties and half of the fillers, which quantities we estimate as 42 bowties and 42 fillers:

        http://tinyurl.com/pa42zge

        The results

        The left side of the 9N314M hypothesis:

        http://tinyurl.com/ofelwmp

        The front windshield on the left side of the plane has been saved more or less:

        http://tinyurl.com/oaey37u

        It has been quite possible to estimate the right quantities of fillers and bowties.

        http://tinyurl.com/o3fb54r
        http://tinyurl.com/oy6tnnf
        http://tinyurl.com/oaey37u
        http://tinyurl.com/nngv55z
        http://tinyurl.com/q4r9o2t


        Because the nearly perpendicular projection from the warhead on the plane contains 14%of the shrapnel, this means 84 bowties and 84 fillers have to give rather perfect images as holes on the plane at the left side. Half of that left side consists of the windshield. Following our estimation we expect 42 bowties and 42 fillers. But badly counting on the windshield gave an overestimation of 170 holes.

        http://tinyurl.com/ncctzo3

        Because we don’t know what impression bowties have to make in glass we conclude 9N314M has not been confirmed. 9N314M could be the true state of nature but has not been confirmed. It is not yet falsified.

        The right side of the 9N314M hypothesis:

        DSB report Page 57 of 279:

        [Upper left hand cockpit fuselage (1)
        A portion of the cockpit fuselage’s top section (STA236.5 to STA332.5) was located in the south-western region of site 1 (Figure 15). This part was not recovered. The fuselage showed evidence of perforation from the outside. The aft side of the fuselage skin was bent upwards and a number of formers and stringers were missing from the fuselage. The upper side of the fuselage showed traces of soot:]


        http://tinyurl.com/ox73ruu

        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/new-photos-of-mh17-rooftop-in-russia-today-documentary/#prettyPhoto

        http://tinyurl.com/ox5q2kc
        http://tinyurl.com/pg7tptm


        On the right side we expect:

        Cubes = .14 x .68 x 4100 = 390
        Bowties = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178
        Fillers = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178


        The wreckage is from near the door so we might expect less shrapnel:

        Cubes = .14 x .68 x 4100 = 390 = 195 cubes = 100 cubes
        Bowties = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178 = 90 bowties = 50 bowties
        Fillers = .14 x .68 x 1870 = 178 = 90 fillers = 50 fillers


        No bowties are detected in this 50%area. We know the holes butterflies must make on aluminum and therefore we must decide 9N314M is falsified.

        The DSB research is based on wrong assumptions, tunnelvision twisted the facts. Then NLR and TWO pressed their scientific stamp on it. We cannot comment on 9N314 based on this investigation.


        Report MH17 crash:

        Butterfly or bow-tie shrapnel found in the bodies of the captain, the purser and the first officer in the cockpit:

        http://tinyurl.com/jngmagj








        The naked eye can see that shrapnels from 3 image are made from entirely different metal than shrapnel from image 1 and 2. So if 1 is BUK shrapnel than 3 are from another missile.


         sotilaspassi // August 14, 2015 at 8:44 pm // Reply
        Metal generates rust in different way when being under the sky vs being in a human body.




        DSB Main report:
        Page 89 of 279
        Figure 37:
        Four distinctly shaped fragments. Top left: cockpit. Top right: Captain’s body. Bottom left: Purser’s body. Bottom right: First Officer’s body. (Source: NFI). Scale is in millimetres.

        2 .16 .1  Forensic examination:

        A distinct group was identified as small pieces of metal that were suspected to be high-energy objects, or parts of them. These fragments were extracted from the Captain from Team A, the First Officer from Team A, the Purser, who was present in the cockpit at the time  of  the  crash,  and  from  the  cockpit  wreckage  (Figure  37).  These  fragments  were found to be ferrous.


        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/overview-of-mh17-body-recovery-autopsy-and-identification-process/#comment-16744

         Basic Dimension // April 14, 2016 at 11:01 am // Reply

        I must admit under the circumstances it all looks very respectful and cared for. I would like to express my thanks to all rescue workers of Donetsk and all pathologists anatomist who have done this difficult work. But it is not our task to give compliments. We must control the process on methodological shortcomings.

        ‘Soon after the crash happened the local emergency authority Ukrainian State Emergency Services (SES) started recovery of the bodies.’

        Bodies were taken to roads and covered in toxic formaldehyde to delay the decomposition of the bodies in the summer heat.

        ’37 bodies were found near the location where the cockpit and part of the business class was found (village of Rozsypne).’

        http://tinyurl.com/jt42kjx
        http://tinyurl.com/hqlhqg2

        ‘These bodies were transported to the Kalininskiy mortuary of Donetsk. This happened at July 17 and 18. Likely the bodies of the cockpit crew and purser who were in the cockpit were part of those 37.’

        The 37 victims from Rozsypne got a very special treatment in the Kalininskiy mortuary by taking ribs for identification. To me this looks a bit ridiculous, but it’s not my profession.

        And after treating 11 bodies the Dutch noticed there were 298 bodies in total to take off ribs and they apparently decided this was too much work what had to be completed in the Netherlands:

        ‘At July 18 the identification of the 37 bodies brought to the Kalininskiy mortuary started. A section of rib was removed from 11 bodies as part of the identification process. This is a common local working procedure. The Dutch decided to stop the id process and perform identification in the Netherlands.’
        So, this must have been a local Ukrainian working procedure. Were it separatists from Donetsk? We have no information. Who in the world would start taking off ribs from 298 people in Donetsk? And why they started with the crew? What was their interest? We must conclude someone only wanted to commit section on crew members.

        ‘Likely the bodies of the cockpit crew and purser who were in the cockpit were part of those 37.’

        The still unknown body of captain A with the later found bowtie was in the group of 37 bodies. This because it was the cockpit. That must be the real reason why they transported the bodies of the cockpit in the first place. They possibly wanted to identify and mark the pilot on the left seat. Why?

        The captain of team A was one of 11 persons from 37 bodies from whom ‘A section of rib was removed as part of the identification process.’ That’s a remarkable: 11/298=.03. So this approach hit the only two bow ties found in the victims. Is this coincidence?

        But now the bodies of the captain of team A and other crew members are contaminated in Kalininskiy mortuary. And no foreign pathologists anatomist was reported working there:

        ‘From July 17 till July 21, 282 bodies were recovered and 87 body parts. Besides the local emergency team of SES, also Dutch and Australian teams searched for bodies.’

        This means no conclusion from these bodies can be trusted anymore by judges. This ruins the DSB report completely. And this information comes not from the DSB-report, but from Dutch RTL.
        I have no information about international teams sending the 37 bodies to Kalininskiy mortuary. So here responsibilities diverge which ruined the DSB set up for 9N314M.
        For the contamination of the bodies of the crew it does not matter who was in charge in Kalininskiy mortuary: separatists or the Ukrainian government.

        ‘At July 21 around 18:00 the train with bodies leaves Torez with destination Kharkiv. Malaysian police officers and Dutch people are on board the train. Kharkiv was controlled by Ukraine.’

        ‘Ukraine government spokesman Andriy Lysenko said Kharkiv was ready to receive the bodies. “We have everything in Kharkiv, experts from international organisations and from Ukraine,” he said. “They have all the facilities ready for all the forensic investigation and examination. “If the train is dispatched and arrives we are prepared to receive it.” (source)’

        Or course, the 11 bodies from which a rib was removed were marked. So the Ukrainian authorities in Kharkiv easily identified the bodies of the crew. Were they really of great help?

        ‘The train arrived in a Malyshev tank factory ! The factory is owned by Ukraine’s state arms industry, UkrOboronProm. The preliminary disaster victim identification (DVI) work on the remains is started here by INTERPOL’s Incident Response Team (IRT). The 10-strong IRT is currently comprised of three Dutch DVI specialists, one of whom is the IRT leader, four INTERPOL officials, a Brazilian forensics expert and current chair of the INTERPOL DVI Steering Group and representatives from Europol and the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). (source)’

        The preliminary disaster victim identification (DVI) started their work in a weapon factory of Ukraine. How macabre it can be. I don’t get closure about the remark of Andriy Lysenko. Were Ukrainians somehow involved into the identification process or not? Did Ukraine deliver workers and nurses who possibly identified the crew members? And I miss the identity of the four INTERPOL officials. Were they Ukrainians?

        ‘In Kharkiv all bodies arrived packed in body bags. All bodies were scanned in an X-ray machine to make sure there were no bombs in the body bag. The body bags in which the victims’ remains had been packed by the local SES were not opened before they were airlifted to the Netherlands. (source). However this reads different.’

        The Ukrainian government was afraid separatists put bombs into the body bags. That is a reasonable fear.

        We have to conclude all fragments related to bowties are found in the contaminated group of 37 individuals, earlier ‘treated’ in Kalininskiy mortuary. And they were easily identified in Kharkiv. Though I would not trust the separatists or the Ukrainians, I also have no reason to trust the Dutch NFI. We trust nobody, only facts from which JIT has reports, though we already know they are contaminated by the facts.


        Report MH17 crash:








        Wed Oct-14-2015



        Anyone can show me  damage showing clear x-shaped, bowtie, butterfly holes? Like this from AA test. 





        Integrating these two reports MIC-report and the Erik Toonen-report, creates much more insight. The key to solving this drama could lie in these reports.

        (Obsolete: the drag equation) But the reports have quite a few open ends. Of course MIC-report has no access to the wreckage, but it also gives no formulas under which the aircraft falls back to Earth after impact. Further, it is not clear which route the BUK follows towards the MH17, of which the horizontal and vertical course angles are dependent. 

        Then it is unfortunate that much wreckage at the crash site was left behind. The vertical and horizontal course angles depend to a large extent on the dispersion of submunitions of further removed parts as the wing and tail.

        Possibly, this incomplete recall results in inaccurate coordinates of the launch site, which can no longer be retrieved. Hopefully, sufficient wreckage can be obtained to record all entry and exit holes as input for modeling the point of detonation and both course angles.

        Under the heading "The ballistics of the BUK" has tried to show in a simple way how the researchers think to determine the location of the launch of the BUK. 

        The Russians argue the BUK cannot be fired from Snizhne because it is too far for a BUK missile 9M38M1 (35 km) or a 9K37M (32 km). Also, the frontal course of the BUK would slice the nose of the cockpit. Based on the damage profile of the cockpit they conclude a horizontal course angle of 73 degrees from Zaroshchens'ke just below Shakhtars'k.

        Is it still relevant to find out who fired the BUK in Zaroshchens'ke? No, definitely not, that's passé. This because the SBU already found the first BUK in enemy territory (Donetsk), and certainly would have detected the second on the tiny disputed area underneath Donetsk, the stamp Zaroshchens'ke (10x10 km). Concluding, as the Ukrainian army operated alongside the separatists it certainly would have noticed the movements of a second BUK of the separatists.

        And then Ukraine would have reported two BUKs to the Security Board (OVV), in which case the Prosecutor now sought for two BUK crews. The probability that the separatists on July 17, had a BUK at Zaroshchens'ke therefore is almost zero, and from Snizhne they cannot have hit the MH17. 




        http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11732678/One-year-on-MH17-evidence-against-separatists-appears-overwhelming.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter


           Thursday 16 July 2015



        (October 13,2015)

        Retweeted

        We went to  this weekend: villagers didn't witness -launch previous to crash  & say Ukrainian army was 4-6km out.




        The MIC-report of the Russian engineers

        One can calculate the trajectory of the BUK on the basis of the damage to the wreck of the MH17. Then it turns out it cannot have been fired from Snezhnoye (Snizhne), but must have come from the area of Zaroshchens'ke, which is near Shakhtars'k. On July 17, 2014 this area was disputed between Ukraine and the separatists. 

        Note, although the BUK was fired on the MH17 at the beginning of the yellow trajectory, it finally arrived after 21 seconds, and hit the MH17 (14:20 GMT) with 73 degrees in the horizontal plane at the start of the green range:

        Erik Toonen-report:
        https://eriktoonen.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/analys/
        https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByibNV3SiUoobnpCVDduaHVORHM/edit?pli=1





        NB: Course airplane - 115 degrees in preliminary report of the International Commission, where Flight Radar keeps it at 11degreesAnd 115 degrees results in a poorer horizontal course angle for Zaroshchens'ke.

        The data on the flight data recorder showed that the aircraft was flying at an altitude of FL330 at a constant rate displayed by 115 degrees and a constant speed of 293 knots calculated air speed (ground speed 494 knots or 915 kilometers per hour)The data stopped abruptly at 13:2003 hours. " 






        Track 118 graden: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hh06SqVx_1Q [0;50/1;22]









        (If there was a vertical launch of the BUK with a travel time of 10 seconds, the green segment as a whole was shifted to the left and would occupy half of the yellow area, now which is, after all, 21 sec.)

        https://eriktoonen.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/analys/





        The MIC-report:

        The rocket moved crossing the course of the aircraft:

        Of interest are three things: the horizontal and vertical heading (course angle) at which the missile approached the aircraft and the point of detonation of the warhead of the missile.

        The horizontal course angle:
        The BUK approached the MH17 in the horizontal plane as a car coming from the right, almost at right angles to 73 degrees (horizontal 72-75º): a side collision, the BUK approached somewhat from the front.




        Zaroshchens'ke

        2.5 km from north to south and 3.5 km from west to east.
        horizontal plane (75 -78 degrees);


        The vertical course angle:
        And if MH17 had been a ship the BUK came as a torpedo at a very slight angle of 23-24º degrees to the surface (vertical 20-22º or 22-25º).

        Model of the distribution of the current of fragmentation: vertical 20-22º.
        Further calculation with improved model22-25º.
        For all the simulations, however, is assumed 20-22º.


        http://tinyurl.com/hg39pfx






        A launch below 50 degrees likely would target the noise of the plane. A launch from Z. with 72 degrees indeed might hit the right wingtip:

        http://tinyurl.com/hoam85d









        http://tinyurl.com/hnkw4c9








        Point of detonation:
        Furthermore, it is known the BUK exploded at 3-5 meters from the front left seat of the cockpit and a few meters above the cockpit.



         Deus Abscondis // April 28, 2016 at 9:52 am //

        “A-A described insane way would cause misses of real military targets”
        No, they desribed how the proximity fuse worked in relation to MH17. The full details of the fuse algorithm are unknown.
        However, it is evident from other SAM missiles as well that the missile does not explode ahead/before of the target.
        The principle of the proximity fuse is to delay the explosion such that the spray of killing elements intersects the target.
        In the Zaroshchens’ke scenario the missile had to traverse more of the width of the plane (~6m) than in the case of the Snizhne scenario. This is why Almaz Antey believed in the Snizhne scenario the warhead should have exploded further back from the nose. This is a coherent explanation.
        Without the full fusing logic/algorithm decoded no one knows how any BUK missile’s proximity fuse will react to such a large fast flying target such as a commercial passenger plane.
        Sotilaspassi, your fragmented ideas in your reply has missed tbe target :)












        Furthermore, shrapnel explodes as a ring around the BUK in all directions, perpendicular to the motion vector of the missile. So BUK unfolds like an umbrella and the ribs fly away perpendicular to the stem in all directions. Shrapnel goes like a scythe through the cockpit with the same deviation of 23-24º from the vertically axis:

                              

        http://tinyurl.com/j5ezg6l





        http://tinyurl.com/hokkxku






        http://tinyurl.com/jfvh2er









        Report MH17 crash:










        Stringing


        Brendan // May 16, 2016 at 7:14 pm //

        If the velocities of the fragments and the target are assumed to be constant, the stringing method will not be affected by any of those factors that you mention. Straight lines on a static diagram can then represent the path of each fragment back to where it was fired from.
        The path lines will only be curved where there is acceleration or deceleration. The fragments do accelerate for some time at the start of their trajectory when the explosive propels them from the warhead. However that’s only for a fraction of a millisecond, which is much less than the total travel duration of several milliseconds towards the marks found on MH17.
        At one time I thought that all the different speeds, directions and distances of the different fragments, and also of the aircraft, might cause the grazing marks to point to different locations of the detonation. I’ve figured out now that it’s much simpler than that and that the stringing method is very accurate. 

        Wind Tunnel Man // May 16, 2016 at 7:52 pm //
        Brendan:
        “If the velocities of the fragments and the target are assumed to be constant, the stringing method will not be affected by any of those factors that you mention. Straight lines on a static diagram can then represent the path of each fragment back to where it was fired from.”
        That is true, such as firing a shotgun at a thick static target and each pellet penetration can be traced back exactly to the firing position using stringing. But now imagine tilting the target in either the horizontal or vertical planes and it moving toward the gun at high speed. Would stringing all the penetrations still point exactly to the firing position?

        Brendan // May 16, 2016 at 9:26 pm //
        I might have caused confusion by mixing two separate ideas in the one message. The (real but small) curvature of the trajectory due to acceleration/deceleration has nothing to do with the (mistaken) idea that speeds/directions/distances influence the results of the stringing method. I know, it’s still confusing, which is why I didn’t try to explain it in more detail.

        Brendan // May 16, 2016 at 9:33 pm //
        WTM: Yes, that’s why I included the target when I said “If the velocities of the fragments and the target are assumed to be constant (…)”. Target, as well as fragments, can be moving in any direction, but each one is moving at a constant velocity.


        http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/dsb-final-report-doubts-location-of-explosion/#comment-16840


        http://tinyurl.com/glm87ro






        http://tinyurl.com/z466rxx





        http://tinyurl.com/j2uten8





        http://tinyurl.com/hb28t8z





        Eugene // May 15, 2016 at 2:41 pm //               

        To me it seems that the Il86 piece has still higher hole density than the Mh17 piece. Do you agree with me?
        We know that the DSB had placed the detonation point too far away. The likely reason was to equalize the observed hole density to the hole density of a Buk warhead, if it was placed at the detonation point. But the higher observed hole density on Il86 tells us that they were not very successfully at the task, and the detonation point needs to be moved even further away to match Buk (while the stringing method and the damage cover area tell us the the detonation point needs to be moved 2-3x closer).
        In a nutshell, if calculations were done thoroughly and honestly, they’d show that the kill weapon warhead contained a lot fewer number of fragments than a Buk warhead. One can almost see the DSB’s hard job of balancing between various BADs to justify a Buk warhead as a kill weapon.

        Lets assume it was not a BUK. Other options include a different type of SAM or an A2A missile.
        Suppose it was an A2A missile, what type? What type has the characteristics which can make the damage as we see on MH17?
        I have not found any weapon capable. What do we know of fragments shapes and sizes of A2A weapens? Not a lot.

        admin // May 15, 2016 at 2:52 pm //
        There is a lot of circumstantial evidence which shows a BUK is not likely. But this is not common knowledge and in the public debate it has no status. It is also too complicated. Therefore, it is important to reformulate all arguments in a simple way so that people will understand. Most importantly, we must make a statement just at this moment of the MH17 investigation. It must be before JIT comes in summer with all kinds of allegations concerning the use of BUK. If we succeed to relativize or even refute the role of BUK then whistle blowers likely will give us the right types of SAM or A2A sooner or later. That is not our task, not at this moment of time.


        https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxNz0P5oVk2wU2xjUDByd1RhcTA/edit?pref=2&pli=1





         Basic Dimension // September 7, 2015 at 9:14 am // Reply

        Only if one thinks to have found the perfect theory one knows in advance what information must be gathered from the plane. This might be the case when shrapnel found in the plane and in the bodies certainly must come from a BUK-missile. Supporting evidence might be (?) the discovery of parts of a BUK-missile at the site.

        But as said earlier, then one has to prove also BUK-shrapnel has not been shot later into the fuselage and the bodies at the unattended crash site. If that is impossible to prove and the theory could be false then it might be too late to return to the site to collect additional parts for the next theory. And resembling ‘prove’ to support the most likely cause of crime (BUK) might come down to tunnel vision:

        [BUT they do have the relevant pieces, and if there is a piece that exonerates the accused, well it is up to them to find it to get a not guilty verdict.]

        Unfortunately this is a completely wrong conception of research and might be an exact form of tunnel vision where the damage is for the accused.

        A false dilemma involves a situation in which only limited alternatives are considered, when in fact there is at least one additional option.

        Now, if it is proven to be a BUK and only pieces of the fuselage with holes of shrapnel are collected than DSB might be satisfied but JIT is not, because for the horizontal course angle of the missile they have to prove there is no damage in the other parts. Hence the whole fuselage is needed to estimate the horizontal and vertical course angle to find and prove the place of firing of the BUK missile.









        http://www.avherald.com/h?article=47770f9d/010&opt=0




        http://albert-lex.livejournal.com/68374.html?page=4




        http://albert-lex.livejournal.com/68374.html?page=4





        http://albert-lex.livejournal.com/68374.html?page=4





          



        Eugene:
        More important: definitely different warheads

        http://tinyurl.com/zawsx38



        http://tinyurl.com/zretspm




        http://tinyurl.com/jhdlzml







        Eugene // May 16, 2016 at 2:40 am //
        Thanks, the holes do look to be different in character, true. I am amazed at how little people are interested in this issue!
        Almaz Antay had placed their warhead a lot further from the plane than the one that has detonated next to the Mh-17 in real life. We can tell this either by using a stringing method or just by looking at the damage cover areas. And yet the plane in the Almaz Antey test was sprayed with shrapnel in a lot denser fashion than the Mh-17 plane. Is this too difficult a subject for people to grasp? So that they can infer that the kill weapon needed to have fewer fragments than the warhead used in the field test of Almaz Antey (namely a Buk warhead). Seems so. I am quite speechless…
        > The damage in the AA test does look to be smaller than the observed on the Mh-17 wreckage.

        http://tinyurl.com/jcsda2f




        Yes, this is another simple indication that the DSB had placed the detonation point too far (my pic actually).
        I reiterate, placing the detonation point too far should result in observed hole density in the test with a real Buk warhead to be smaller. But we see it being greater. The differences do seem to be very noticeable too.
        And given the above we are not making any inferences?




        Report MH17 crash:




        From the course of the shrapnel impacts on the flight deck and the fuselage, the distance from the BUK to the aircraft at the moment of the explosion is estimated to be 3-5 meters. The BUK must have passed MH17 somewhat because the circle of shrapnel went like a scythe oblique through the left side of the cockpit, 23-24º deviated from the vertical axis. The dispersion of the submunitions entered the left engine, the fuselage, the left wing and the breech end. 



         Deus Abscondis // April 28, 2016 at 9:52 am //

        “A-A described insane way would cause misses of real military targets”
        No, they desribed how the proximity fuse worked in relation to MH17. The full details of the fuse algorithm are unknown.
        However, it is evident from other SAM missiles as well that the missile does not explode ahead/before of the target.
        The principle of the proximity fuse is to delay the explosion such that the spray of killing elements intersects the target.
        In the Zaroshchens’ke scenario the missile had to traverse more of the width of the plane (~6m) than in the case of the Snizhne scenario. This is why Almaz Antey believed in the Snizhne scenario the warhead should have exploded further back from the nose. This is a coherent explanation.
        Without the full fusing logic/algorithm decoded no one knows how any BUK missile’s proximity fuse will react to such a large fast flying target such as a commercial passenger plane.
        Sotilaspassi, your fragmented ideas in your reply has missed tbe target :)







        Now all parameters are fixed and the position can be calculated from where the BUK was fired. This is only possible from an area south of the village of Shakhtars'k for example Zaroshchens'ke (see below).


        Remember, for the determination of the launch site is vertically taken 20-22º:

        3.1.1 Location and parameters of movement of aircraft Boeing-777.
        The used location and parameters of movement of the aircraft are taken from the preliminary report of the International Commission.
        Course plane - 115 degrees;
        Speed - + - 905 km / h;
        Height - 33000 fyt (FL330), ~ 10060 meters
        Estimated coordinates of the plane - 48º07'37.7 "N38º31'34.7 "E (Petropavlivka)



        http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf

        Page 47 of 279

        The data on the Flight Data Recorder showed that the aeroplane was flying at 33,000 feet, on  a  constant  displayed  heading  of  115°  and  at  a  constant  computed airspeed  of  293  knots.11  The  recording  had  stopped  abruptly  at  13.20:03 (15.20:03  CET).  The  FlightData Recorder  showed  that  the  aeroplane’s  position  at 13.20:02  (15.20:02  CET)  was  48.12715 N 38.52630538 E.(to Snizhne = 21 km)





        3.1.2 Location and parameters of movement of the rocket
        The used location and parameters of movement of the missile are determined on the basis of the conditions at which the missile hit the plane (section 2.3 t / m section 2.5)
        The angles of hitting the plane:
        horizontal - 72-75 degrees;
        vertical - 20-22 degrees.


        Zaroshchens'ke

        2.5 km from north to south and 3.5 km from west to east.
        horizontal plane (75 -78 degrees);
        maximization of error of launch angle (2-3 degrees);
        course of the aircraft in the vertical plane (oblique angle: 20-22 degrees);




        Snezhnoye (Snizhne)

        The BUK cannot have been fired from the more distant Snezhnoye (Snizhne), because Snizhne lies in the path of the airplane, which would come to a frontal collision. Then, the ring of shrapnel would have cut off the nose of the fuselage in an instant. 

        Of the windows of the right side of the flight deck nothing would be left, while those still intact today. Also missing on the right side are the rash holes. In addition, shrapnel submunition would not have achieved the fuselage, the left engine and certainly not the wing or tail. From Snizhne, the angle of the almost head-on collision in the horizontal plane is 5-20 degrees. And because Snizhne lies further away the vertical angle dropped between 0 and 12 degrees. 





        Report MH17 crash:





        Possibly parts found of 9M38M1:







        Next question:

        DSB found the remains of a BUK-missile. If not mentioned elsewhere what are the exact coordinates of the site of the missile and the exact date of discovery. Also the question if the finder is inhabitant of Donetsk.

        Physical contact between the (remains of the) BUK-missile and the plane seems unlikely. But then the trajectory to the earth of an exploded BUK must be well known and must be in line with its trajectory before the crash. So, it can be known from what direction it has been fired.

        Probably the trajectory of the BUK-missile was straight forward and simple.

        Hence, fired from Snizhne the remains must have been found NW from Petropavlika, about 5 km against the flight path of MH17.

        Fired from Zaroshchens’ke it must have come down to the North and in the immediate vicinity of Petropavlika.

        Since it took about 10 months before the DSB reported the findings it can be questioned how they came there in the first place.

         Basic Dimension // September 25, 2015 at 11:30 pm // Reply
        Well, there is a big chance of a head-on collision with a launch from Snizhne, though we know it did not happen. Now, the question is: did a launch from Snizhne happen?

        In the research by AA (Almaz Antey) the launch of a BUK-missile from Snizhne is described. Not the left side of the cockpit, but the entire cockpit would have been cut off by the ring of shrapnel:

        ‘Snezhnoye (Snizhne)
        The BUK cannot have been fired from the more distant Snezhnoye (Snizhne), because Snizhne lies in the path of the airplane, which would come to a frontal collision. Then, the ring of shrapnel would have cut off the nose of the fuselage in an instant.
        Of the windows of the right side of the flight deck nothing would be left, while those still intact today. Also missing on the right side are the rash holes. In addition, shrapnel submunition would not have achieved the fuselage, the left engine and certainly not the wing or tail. From Snizhne, the angle of the almost head-on collision in the horizontal plane is 5-20 degrees. And because Snizhne lies further away the vertical angle dropped between 0 and 12 degrees.’

        But it is far more likely that the radar of the BUK-missile was aimed precisely at the nose of the cockpit, in which case a head-on collision is the most obvious. Then the BUK-remains were to be found in the wreckage of the cockpit.

        Therefore it could well be that both Snizhne as Zaroshchens’ke fall as a launching place. Hence, there might be a third candidate.


        The trajectory of a BUK-missile is well known. Also is known how it falls to earth from 10 km altitude after detonation. Also we know the remains of the missile have not been found in the cockpit or the fuselage. So, there was no head-on collision. Hence, all the way the missile moved in a completely free trajectory.
        The exact coordinates of the crash are known. The exact coordinates of a launch from Snizhne are postulated and the angle of an almost head-on collision in the horizontal plane would be 5-20 degrees. And, since Snizhne lies further away than Zaroshchens’ke, the vertical angle dropped between 0 and 12 degrees.
        Now we already have two points on a straight line and we know firing a missile from Snizhne at MH17 would be a very simple and straightforward trajectory. So we draw that line to where the remains would have crashed.
        Now it would be very tempting for someone to drop the remains of an exploded BUK-missile exactly at the end of the forecast fall to earth.
        DSB research is not about legal liability of parties but that does not relieve you from running into a preconceived fall of tunnel vision. So, what have you done to make sure that no BUK-missile remains have been placed as a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow?

         Basic Dimension // September 26, 2015 at 4:14 pm // Reply
        In the second instance, the BUK-remains are not on the straight line. After detonation BUK-parts lost thrust and were left with diminishing forward momentum. They underwent a changing velocity by diminishing speed by dragging and changing direction by strong winds. Hence the remains must be found NNW of the line Snizhne – aircrash.

         Basic Dimension // September 26, 2015 at 10:26 pm //
        If DSB was an independent scientific institute, the finding of remains of BUK would be accepted as really scientific proof of the direction from where the BUK was shot. We would be delighted and it would be the crowning glory.

        But we have an integrity problem; DSB is a hybrid between science and political opportunism. In the future the purely scientific part of such investigations should be outsourced to third parties, not to countries but to really independent institutes of good reputation. Rules of ICAO must be changed.

        We can reject the findings as possible scientific fraud of third parties but we better let calculate the various drag coefficients of found components in a wind tunnel by independent parties. We need all kind of photographs and physical measures as weight etc. Further we need the exact geolocations of all parts found.

        Then we trace the trajectories of the BUK-parts with their separate drag coefficients back to the point of detonation. And only if all converge into one point, only then we will know whether the ‘discovery’ might be considered as reliable.

        If DSB has failed to capture the geolocations the find must be rejected as negligent investigation.


         Basic Dimension // September 28, 2015 at 10:16 am //

        A BUK-missile 9M38 or 9M38M1 weighs 690 kg (1,520 Lb) and carries a relatively large 70 kg (150 Lb) warhead. The 9M38M1 is a modernized rocket with long chords (Russia and Ukraine). By detonation the ring of shrapnel will explode perpendicular to the missile but in forward conical projection.

        (Inspecting the damage to the cockpit this conical projection means the missile cannot be shot from Zaroshchenske but only in line with the flight path of MH17 from the direction of Snizhne. Launched from Zaroshchenske not the left side, but the right side of the cockpit would be sliced. Or rather, seen the point of detonation, the shrapnel would have missed the plane completely.)

        Exploding shrapnel has not the slightest influence on the direction of the missile remains. It is even doubtful if the explosion itself could lower forward momentum. With full thrust the missile had a speed of mach 3 = 3700 km/h, may be somewhat less since the fuel was already burned. After detonation the remains will lose forward momentum mainly by the lost of thrust, and not so much by dragging, since the remains will still be a very compact and heavy piece of metal. Also strong winds will not have much influence on direction.

        Velocity will only change by diminishing forward momentum by the lost of thrust. Now, what is the trajectory of 690 kg compact metal falling to the earth with a speed of 3000 km from 10 km altitude? That’s easy. Hence the remains must be found on the extended line from the launch site to the aircrash. And the place where someone found or placed the remains of BUK can be predicted to within a kilometer of the calculated  geolocation.

         sotilaspassi // September 28, 2015 at 10:32 am //
        Here is an example where the missile’s tail did not continue forward:
        https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CNAZ8FzWcAAq_YF.jpg

         Basic Dimension // September 28, 2015 at 10:39 am //
        The point of detonation approximately is within a few meters of the aircraft and it is a matter of milliseconds before the conical shape expands. Hence from Zaroshchenske, a factual perpendicular effect might still be possible.


         sotilaspassi // September 28, 2015 at 12:17 pm //
        Basic D:
        Note that proximity fuse sees 20…40 meters ahead in 30…60′ angle. From direction Z the detonation of warhead starts at least ~10 meters sooner than from S direction.
        It is also possible that from Z location the missile would hit closer to center, detonating when wing tip becomes in proximity fuse cone. (40m before fuselage?)

         Basic Dimension // September 28, 2015 at 1:06 pm //
        Sotilaspassi:
        Thanks for information. But isn’t it the proximity fuse aims on the radar in the nose of the cockpit? Then the wingtip would not be important. Z as well as S is not quite satisfying. How about a launch in line of Z but from the other side?

         sotilaspassi // September 28, 2015 at 2:00 pm //
        >But isn’t it the proximity fuse aims on the radar in the nose of the cockpit?
        Proximity fuse explode the warhead when some/any metal comes to it’s view. (IMO: exploded 2…5ms after the metal behind MH17 nose cone came into view.)
        Proximity fuse does not see directly ahead, because it’s radar (receiver) is in missile nose.
        Missile is homing towards strongest radar echo coming from target, radar signal is sent by TELAR.
        My “simplified proportional navigation” idea makes the missile to cross the target flight path slightly before target, when shot from ahead.
        This way, when missile is launched from slightly south of Snizhne, it will explode near pilot window,
        And when launched slightly north from Snizhne it will explode on co-pilot side.
        If launched directly from ahead, the missile would explode on MH17 center line or penetrate the cockpit before exploding.
        When approaching from side, it can be that strongest radar echo still comes from forward fuselage, but proximity fuse will anyway function a lot sooner vs coming from ahead.
        (we would not see explosive residue in cockpit parts like we now see. IMO: fireball radius of 70kgwarhead and 500kg rocket fuel exploding is only about 10m.)
        I doubt BUK uses highly complex math when it approach the target. It rather rely in speed & brute force.

         Basic Dimension // September 28, 2015 at 6:32 pm //
        Sotilaspassi:
        A BUK-missile 9M38 or 9M38M1 weighs 690 kg (1,520 Lb.) and carries a relatively large 70 kg (150 Lb.) warhead. If 690 kg means including 500 kg rocket fuel, the remaining weight before detonation is only 190 kg and the remains of BUK definitely will be subject to drag and wind.
        Will the exploding warhead ruin the rocket mantle? Hence, what are the remains of the missile which fall to the earth? That’s the question as you mentioned earlier.

         Basic Dimension // September 28, 2015 at 8:35 pm //
        Sotilaspassi:
        If the BUK-missile totally explodes at detonation, we must hope for heavy and compact elements which are not subject too much to drag and wind. In the first place we think of the proximity fuse, maybe the entire nose, which is very compact and will be separated from the rocket mantle after explosion. Another object is the rocket engine which is not compact. We expect the proximity fuse to come much further than the remaining rocket mantle.

        http://www.ultimax.com/whitepapers/2014_1.html
        ‘So GLOW [9М38M1] is 700 kg, with a 70 kg warhead (red-colored part in the figure below). It has 500 kg of propellant. Allocate 130 kg for everything else, airframe, fins, avionics/fuze/guidance, etc.’


        The MIC-report states from the south of Snizhne it is not possible for BUK to reach MH17, because it goes beyond the scope of the missile 9M38M1 of 42 km (9K37M  35 km). Snizhne is located more than 50km from the impact. Furthermore, the radar of the BUK TELAR can watch only 42 km far. Therefore Snizhne falls off. Except may be when ...

        (obsolete)
        mvdb22 maart 2015 om 12:08Een SA-17 met een 9M317 raket kan vanaf Rusland zijn gebruikt. Bereik ligt rond de 50km. Er zijn satelliet en fotos vanaf de grond genomen welke aantonen dat er RUS BUKs in de buurt van de grens waren. 
        (A SA-17 with a 9M317 can be used from Russia. Reach about 50 km. Satellite images prove the presence of Russian BUKs near the border.)





        LITHIUM SCENARIO


        Basic Dimension // May 23, 2016 at 10:22 am //

        rozem, thanks for your new composition.

        I understand copper is an ingredient of lithium batteries. You are a really sharp observer.

        I inspected lots of pictures from Flickr and have come to the conclusion I am not able to distinguish between whether or not soot. But I assume soot can be found by the trained eye.

        Despite my lack of knowledge I think to be able to indicate where the lithium scenario could fail:

        – Accepting soot we must be sure it is not confounded with fire on the ground after the crash. So, from all pictures in question we must know the location.

        – But not all locations are suitable because we only have to deal with the cargo compartment.

        – Parts of the cargo compartment fell down in Petropavlivka.

        http://tinyurl.com/hfoj5ps




        http://tinyurl.com/jgsrk5g




        – Concerning the timeline we must consider the following:

        – The cockpit was found near Rozsypne at 2.5 km from the last FDR point which means it must have been broken from the fuselage immediately after impact. The speed of the plane was 905 km/h and the trajectory to the ground was 10 km. Then the cockpit must have been deadweight without much drag to fall to the ground so quickly.

        – The crashsite of Petropavlivka is less than 1 km from last FDR point, which fall has to be corrected for strong winds and drag.

        – If the load of lithium batteries was involved in the crash then there was no time for soot to develop and possibly no time for fire. Lithium batteries must have exploded immediately what might be a problem because the hydrocarbon gases need time to develop. Only if lithium batteries can explode immediately by super hot shrapnel the scenario will be saved. I think nobody ever tested this variant in the literature.

        – In the unlikely event the lithium batteries would have exploded within seconds after impact the forward fuselage was blown up first and fell apart on Petropavlivka and directly thereafter fell down the cockpit.

        – All information about lithium batteries is very helpful for the investigation because up till now and following Ockham’s razor we must conclude the warhead itself somehow was directly responsible for the destruction of the plane in mid air.

        – This means we might have made errors in the calculation of the point of detonation. At the moment we cannot exclude a BUK with warhead 9N314M on the basis of current information.

        – Without your information I would not have reached this conclusion so soon. As Sotilaspassi noticed earlier we must better analyze the structure and frame of the cockpit to see if a light SAM or A2A might be able to disintegrate the cockpit if fragments impacted on the right spot. That’s the most parsimonious conclusion up to now.

        http://tinyurl.com/gn32r4o



        http://tinyurl.com/zu5n2xl





        http://tinyurl.com/j5ezg6l




        Can this really break down the cockpit within a minute?


        http://tinyurl.com/hb7ufe5







        Breaking off the cockpit

        The cockpit of the Boeing 777 has no self-supporting structure. In the air it needs iron bars to stay upright, just like this model;



        If we propose the lower half of the cockpit is the heaviest, then the green bars bear most of the cockpit attached to the fuselage: 


        So, if these green beams break at the red points, the cockpit collapses with its nose a bit down. If the plain has a speed of 905 km/h and there is a lot of drag then the fuselage breaks off the cockpit by pressing relatively upwards:




















        MH17: BUK AS BATTERING RAM

        Before the fuse detonator there was the contact fuse which allowed the warhead to explode on the target. Now we already know the missile detonated just before the MH17. But remember, the new height of albert_lex and a lot of internet scientists is very critical:







        From the wreckage we miss the cockpit completely from the upper left side just as big parts of the forward upper fuselage:




        We know BUK has not been developed for mega planes but for missiles and small fighter jets. We also know the newly agreed height of detonation could have severe consequences for the BUK as battering ramAre we sure BUK did not detonate its fuse within 1.5 meter before the cockpit and somewhat later torpedoed the left side just before the fragments reached the upper side of the cockpit?





        What could be the evidence for this scenario:

        - We found no butterflies in the hull of the cockpit, and there are missing butterflies in the windshields which could be caused by the slower speed of heavy fragments as bowties:




        -  Then, some early bowties could have entered the cockpit a very fraction of a millisecond later than BUK and got free entrance into the body of the captain of team A.

        - A foreign (rocket) part is found in the frame of the cockpit:




        -  I think by stringing, the impact of fragments has been measured accurately from the supposed and corrected point of detonation. But the angle of the missile itself is relatively undetermined. The missile may have been launched somewhat more from the north of Snizhne and otherwise we do not know exactly the approach mechanism of the fuse detonator. Maybe it tacked the plane, approaching from the left side beneath Snizhne but possibly it made a too strong correction and turned back into the fuselage of the mega plane:





        Now, for the requirement of conditional probability this all means there are no butterflies to be expected in the left side of the cockpit and in the forward upper fuselage. This simply because the battering ram was earlier or ruined the holes. Little squares (8x8x5) are faster than bowties (13x13x8.2) and could have been found below the left windshields. But then also we might have expected butterflies somewhat later amidst the holes on the roof from which we have only pictures. 

        Last but not least and following albert_lex we cannot falsify the profile of 9N314M, while we definitely falsified 9N314 and 9N318:










        So, maybe we must upgrade our pictures of Almaz-Antey with the coordinates of DSB:















        Then we also understand the following:

        Breaking off the cockpit

        The cockpit of the Boeing 777 has no self-supporting structure. In the air it needs iron bars to stay upright, just like this model which is only for illustration:



        If we propose the lower half of the cockpit is the heaviest, then the green bars bear most of the cockpit attached to the fuselage: 




        So, if these green beams break at the red points, the cockpit collapses with its nose a bit down. If the plane has a speed of 905 km/h and there is a lot of drag then the fuselage breaks off the cockpit by pressing relatively upwards:

















         Basic Dimension // May 28, 2016 at 8:58 am //


        CONSTRUCTION KIND OF PROOF LAUNCH FROM SNIZHNE

        We postulate the following premise:

        An A2A or even a BUK warhead of 70 kg is unable to separate the cockpit from a mega plane immediately after impact.

        By the way this has been proven already by Almaz-Antey with the IL-86:





        The immediate separation of cockpit and fuselage can be backed up by the following facts. We can calculate exactly the path to the ground of the cockpit from the following pictures. This shows us the cockpit must have been separated from the fuselage instantly:







        – The cockpit was found near Rozsypne AT 2.5 KM FROM the last FDR point which means it must have been broken from the fuselage immediately after impact. The speed of the plane was 905 km/h and the trajectory to the ground was 10 km. Then the cockpit must have been fallen as deadweight without much drag to the ground instantly.

        – The crashsite of Petropavlivka is LESS THEN 1 km from last FDR point, which fall has to be corrected for strong winds and drag. But after a missile impact into the cockpit we never expect the forward fuselage to fall down immediately:

        Petropavlivka – flight deck window with shrapnel damage, both forward door frames, overhead bins, engine pod parts, lower forward cargo floor.

        Petropavlivka (just north of town) – forward fuselage wall and roof and upper fuselage skin.

        In sequence:

        1: Upper Fuselage Skin.
        2: Forward Fuselage Roof.
        3: Forward Fuselage Wall.
        4: Lower Forward Cargo Floor.
        5: Flight Deck Window Cutout
        6: Overhead Bins.
        7: Left Hand Door Frame.
        8: Right Hand Door Frame.
        9: Overhead Bins.
        10: Engine Pod Parts.

        Also we know it must be seen as totally impossible any missile can turn off all communication from this mega plane in 20 milliseconds:




        Theoretically, only the physical confrontation between a BUK of 690 kg with a velocity of 600 m/s and the MH17 is able to establish these facts. Lighter SAM and A2A are excluded because they cannot generate enough forward momentum.

        The takeoff weight of the MH17 at Schiphol was 278691 kg and velocity was 905 km/h:



        If we can prove the power needed to separate the cockpit from the fuselage physically can be brought up only by BUK as a battering ram, then we have set a major step in making acceptable a BUK must have been launched from Snizhne, since no other launch site can combine fragments shot straight through the windshields and the missile successively torpedoing the plane.


         IsThatSo // May 28, 2016 at 12:05 pm //


        If a missile as massive as a Buk torpedoed MH17 as you have described, then would you expect to find physical evidence such as rocket debris in the bodies of the passengers?



         Basic Dimension // May 28, 2016 at 1:27 pm //


        IsThatSo // May 28, 2016 at 12:05 pm //

        Yes, indeed, but it depends on where the missile impacted the Boeing. We need to find the weakest part of the construction where it can break off the cockpit easily from the fuselage. That must be the place. I do not know if there were any passengers. Apparently not. But the missile itself did not explode; hence the parts did not necessarily spread through the victims.

        And remember, just where the missile allegedly impacted, all cockpit and forward fuselage is gone, and that is very weird. This would not happen normally. And indeed, if those parts of the wreckage would ever be found also we found the missile.

        So, our new complot theory is the missile must have been removed by the party which did not want investigators to explore the crashsite. Yes, the party who shot down the MH17 must have cleared the scene from the missile. That’s why it took them half a year. Of course, and then they placed the detonation point so absurd high that the public got the impression this missile disappeared in nowhere’s land.



        http://tinyurl.com/hdsjo2s













        Basic Dimension // May 29, 2016 at 4:14 pm //            

        WHO HIDES THE COCKPIT AND THE FORWARD FUSELAGE?

        [Land where cockpit was found was cordoned off by separatists for two days]

        [Officials investigating the incident believe large parts of the cockpit and every part of the fuselage were carried off questioning why such important pieces of evidence were tampered with.]

        Evicence-tampering on an industrial scale
        ( Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott) 


        In the same interview Michael Bociurkiw said something else interesting. 
        Going almost daily to the cockpit scene that has been at its stark the way in terms how it has been changed. When we first arrived there again a horrifying substantion of death the cockpit appears to have slammed down to earth. It was pretty much intact. Over the days we have seen that the piece of cockpit kind of spread out like this (spreading out gesture). Day two I believe it was there were actually many men hacking into with a power saw. They could have been actively in body recovery or human remains recovery we do not know. But even since then I would say in the last three days it has been spread out even more.





        7. Why were people using power saws cutting large parts of the aircraft?
        Many reports in the press of uniformed people cutting the aircraft with heavy equipment. Parts are reported to have been removed. Some parts of the aircraft were used as a check point by the rebels. 
        A reason could be the rescue team were looking for bodies. Another reason could be to get rid of evidence. More on this here. and on the Daily Mail. ABC news has a video.

        [Two days ago they observed that the cockpit section and part of first class were being cut into with a diesel power saw by uniformed men.]

        "After the crime comes the cover-up," Australian prime minister Abbott  was quoted by the Guardian as saying.

        A touching picture:




        ======================================================






        cc-by-nc-sa





        This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attibution-Non Commercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International Licence.